Journal of Applied Corporate Finance最新文献

{"title":"A Message From the Editors","authors":"John McCormack","doi":"10.1111/jacf.12677","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jacf.12677","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46789,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Corporate Finance","volume":"37 2","pages":"2-3"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145013285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Causes and dynamics of equity market run-ups and “bubbles”: Lessons from the boom and bust of Britain's railway mania of the 1840s","authors":"Vaska Atta-Darkua, Robert F. Bruner, Scott C. Miller","doi":"10.1111/jacf.12673","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jacf.12673","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Equity market run-ups (also known by the fraught term, “bubbles”) have riveted the attention of investors, asset managers, regulators, and central bankers for centuries. Commonly defined as a departure of prices from fundamental values dominated by a self-fulfilling feedback loop between expected prices and current prices, such episodes summon the conventional view that run-ups reflect market irrationality. Some run-ups preceded spectacular crashes and spawned serious economic contractions, from which new regimes of prudential regulation and pre-emption followed. Iconic examples were the Mississippi Bubble (1720), the South Sea Bubble (1720), the “Roaring Twenties” (1924–1929), and the Housing Bubble (of 2003–2008). Yet other run-ups have produced no long-lasting effects.3 Success in distinguishing malign run-ups from their benign counterparts depends on a deep understanding of their causes and dynamics.</p><p>Making use of these four propositions, we offer insights into the causes of one of the most prominent run-ups of the 19th century and then offer reflections upon their implications.</p><p>Yet why does discernment about run-ups matter? Central bankers and regulators often debate whether and how to intervene in run-ups and slumps. Household investors and professional asset managers struggle to adjust portfolios to unusual market conditions. CEOs and CFOs labor to make sense of unusual changes in their share prices in an effort to sustain efficient capital allocation. As a result, the astute official, investor, or executive should: (1) look for economic shocks that might explain the run-up; (2) assess the sufficiency and quality of information about them; and (3) ascertain which investors are trading—who is at the margin?</p><p>New research on Britain's “Railway Mania” of the 1840s by Atta-Darkua, Bruner, and Miller (<span>2024</span>) provides the foundation for this discussion. In 1844, British Prime Minister Robert Peel commenced a legislative reform of laws, regulations, and customs that constrained economic growth, restricted foreign trade, limited the ability of entrepreneurs to form new companies, checked the Bank of England's lending, challenged investors’ property rights, and constrained governance in the burgeoning railway industry. Altogether, Peel's initiative amounted to one of the most significant liberalizations in economic history.5 This programmatic onslaught coincided with a remarkable run-up in British railway equity prices from early 1844 to August 1845. Charles Mackay, a contemporary writer described the “mania” as the “greatest example in British history of the infatuation of the people for commercial gambling” ([1841], <span>1980</span>, p. 88). Then in the fall of 1845, the run-up turned into an equity price slump, followed by a modest recovery, and then a long and deep deflation in both stock prices and economic activity. This process triggered serious civil unrest in Britain. Indeed, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels ","PeriodicalId":46789,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Corporate Finance","volume":"37 2","pages":"46-59"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jacf.12673","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145012639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Executive Summaries","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/jacf.12675","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jacf.12675","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46789,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Corporate Finance","volume":"37 2","pages":"4-7"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145013207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The UBS-Credit Suisse Merger: Helvetia's Gift","authors":"Pascal Böni, Tim A. Kroencke, Florin P. Vasvari","doi":"10.1111/jacf.12674","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jacf.12674","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Pietro Veronesi and Luigi Zingales provide an account of the staggering costs of extensive government intervention in the US financial sector during the 2008 global financial crisis.1 To reduce such costs in the future, extensive regulation has been introduced to make banks more resilient, and to protect taxpayers and private investors from bearing bailout costs.2 But a key question remains: Is the post-2008 regulatory framework effective? In this paper, we analyze the UBS-Credit Suisse merger to shed light on this question.</p><p>On the evening of Sunday, March 19, 2023, the Swiss Federal Council, the Swiss National Bank, and the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (Finma) jointly announced the orchestrated bailout-merger of Credit Suisse (CS) by its domestic banking rival UBS Group AG (UBS), marking the end of 167 years of proud Swiss banking history.3 The demise of CS shook faith in a stable Swiss Confederation, often affectionately called “Helvetia”.4</p><p>The bailout-merger, which aimed to restore confidence in the Swiss financial system, deviated significantly from standard bank resolution procedures. It lacked competitive bidding and circumvented a typical bank resolution or purchase and assumption (P&A) transaction, where the acquiring bank purchases the failed bank's assets and assumes its deposits. Instead, the Swiss government forced the implementation of a government emergency rescue deal, which consisted of a complete emergency merger share-deal between UBS and CS. This emergency rescue deal also included massive state liquidity guarantees in the amount of 214 billion (bn) US dollars (USD) and, additionally, a substantial loss guarantee totaling 9.63 bn USD to cover potential losses incurred on the realization of certain CS assets. We argue that the exclusion of competitive bidding, imposed by the government, and the relatively late intervention of the regulator have led to an unexpectedly favorable deal for the acquirer, UBS. We show that significant wealth transfers to specific asset owners have taken place due to the merger. While some of these wealth transfers were offset by redistributions from CS shareholders and AT1 bondholders, the ones who are supposed to bear the burden of bankruptcy, the overall wealth effect cannot be solely explained by the participating firms’ abnormal returns on securities. We provide insights into the merger-induced value creation and destruction and the redistribution of wealth amongst stakeholders and taxpayers. More specifically, we show that Switzerland's cost of debt increased substantially as a consequence of the state-orchestrated merger between UBS and CS. We conclude that an economically meaningful part of the costs is borne exogenously, that is, primarily by the taxpayer. This is what we call the “Helvetia's gift”, which suggests that the current regulatory framework does not actually protect the public from bad behavior by financial actors as much as one might hope.</p><p>T","PeriodicalId":46789,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Corporate Finance","volume":"37 2","pages":"104-121"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jacf.12674","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145012280","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The impact of shifting societal attitudes toward women on capital markets and corporations: Evidence from the Harvey Weinstein scandal and the #MeToo movement*","authors":"Karl V. Lins,&nbsp;Lukas Roth,&nbsp;Henri Servaes,&nbsp;Ane Tamayo","doi":"10.1111/jacf.12672","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jacf.12672","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The underrepresentation of women in leadership positions in corporations, and in other organizations and institutions, is ubiquitous. While business leaders, investors and society in general advocate for greater gender equality at all firm levels, the reality differs: the fraction of female executives remains very low, despite the considerable growth in female representation on company boards over the last few decades. Figure 1 illustrates the low levels of female representation in companies that make up the S&amp;P 1500 index, which consists roughly of the 1500 largest firms in the United States by stock market capitalization. Figure 1A shows that the proportion of firms with at least one female executive among the five highest-paid executives has risen from under 10% in 1992 to 65% by the end of 2023—a significant increase, yet still far below what would be expected if gender were represented proportionately among top executives.1 Likewise, the fraction of top five executives who are female has also increased substantially over time, but remains at only 17% at the end of 2023 (Figure 1B). Finally, as illustrated in Figure 1C, only 7% of S&amp;P 1500 companies have a female CEO.</p><p>Why are there so few women in top leadership positions? One possible explanation is that the supply of qualified women is limited. Another is that conscious or unconscious biases lead to female candidates being overlooked for top roles. Of course, these two explanations could both be true, and work to reinforce one another: if female candidates are systematically passed over for top leadership positions, fewer women will pursue such opportunities, thereby further restricting future supply.</p><p>We contend that the absence or underrepresentation of women in leadership positions within some firms stems partly from a corporate culture that tolerates (and may even foster) sexism, preventing women from rising to the top—a phenomenon widely known as the “glass ceiling.” The renowned economist Marianne Bertrand (2018) has identified many factors that help explain the glass ceiling, but she highlights that there is an unexplained residual and that “sexism should be high on the list to name that residual” (p. 228).2 This notion is further supported by survey evidence. For example, analysis by the Rockefeller Foundation and Global Strategy Group (2017) indicates that the culture of the corporation itself, and particularly the so-called “boys club” attitude in the workplace, is one of the main hurdles preventing women from achieving top leadership positions.3 Research has also shown that having a woman in the firm's C-suite improves equality in the organization by narrowing the gender pay gap (Tate and Yang (2015), Kunze and Miller (2017), and Dong (2022)).4 Similarly, a World Economic Forum (2017) study on attitudes towards women in the workplace emphasizes the pivotal role of female leadership in building a culture of gender equality.5 In fact, it concludes that the key","PeriodicalId":46789,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Corporate Finance","volume":"37 2","pages":"24-35"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jacf.12672","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145013238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Agency costs of stakeholderism: Evidence from compensation contracting at AT&T","authors":"Stephen Bryan,&nbsp;Robert Nash,&nbsp;Ajay Patel","doi":"10.1111/jacf.12670","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jacf.12670","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;Agency costs of stakeholderism are the costs arising from the additional conflicts of interest that emerge when moving from shareholder primacy to stakeholder primacy.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In the opening passage of the Spring 2024 edition of this journal, the editors articulated the advantage of focusing on sustainability, as opposed to the more widely used ESG. Noting a major concern, McCormack (&lt;span&gt;2024&lt;/span&gt;, p. 2) explained that ESG represents “a wide variety of open-ended disputes that are often more social and political than economic in nature, and so subject to major confusion.” We agree and endeavor to reduce some of that confusion. In our paper, we recognize McCormack's concern and approach this important issue from an economic perspective (rather than a political or social perspective) by evoking agency theory, one of the most powerful instruments in the financial economist's toolkit.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Agency theory involves the economic analysis of conflicts of interest. Another article from the 2024 Spring issue identified the important role of conflicts of interest in terms of understanding ESG. Specifically, in the Epilogue to his new book, Chew (&lt;span&gt;2024&lt;/span&gt;, p. 28) notes that “conflicts between shareholders and stakeholders—and among different stakeholder groups themselves—are everywhere.” In another article from the Spring 2024 issue, Denis (&lt;span&gt;2024&lt;/span&gt;) further contends that agency costs stemming from the paradigm shift from shareholder to stakeholder primacy may outweigh the benefits of stakeholder-centric endeavors (such as CSR). Therefore, from that Spring 2024 issue, we can conclude that conflicts of interest involving stakeholders are pervasive and potentially very large. In this paper, we seek to build upon these important insights. First, we formally define the agency costs of stakeholderism and then we identify specific examples of how these costs may arise and how these costs may affect firm value.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Our paper considers the agency costs of stakeholderism in compensation contracts. Harkening back to the days of Friedman (&lt;span&gt;1970&lt;/span&gt;) and Jensen and Meckling (&lt;span&gt;1976&lt;/span&gt;), financial economists have long suggested that firms design management compensation contracts to minimize agency costs and maximize shareholder value. The seminal study by Jensen and Meckling (&lt;span&gt;1976&lt;/span&gt;) provided an initial taxonomy of agency costs. Specifically, Jensen and Meckling (&lt;span&gt;1976&lt;/span&gt;) identified agency costs of equity and agency costs of debt and presented examples of each.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Applying this theory, previous studies of compensation structure, summarized by Yermack (&lt;span&gt;1995&lt;/span&gt;) and Bryan, Hwang, and Lilien (&lt;span&gt;2000&lt;/span&gt;), primarily focus on the agency costs of equity and emphasize the role of equity-based executive compensation in managing this conflict of interest by establishing a more direct link between manager and shareholder wealth. Further drawing upon this theory, John and John (&lt;span&gt;1993&lt;/span&gt;) and ","PeriodicalId":46789,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Corporate Finance","volume":"37 2","pages":"60-76"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jacf.12670","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145013135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Body and soul: The price of paradise","authors":"Marc Hodak,&nbsp;Jack Masterson","doi":"10.1111/jacf.12668","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jacf.12668","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46789,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Corporate Finance","volume":"37 2","pages":"16-23"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145013069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Hire for character. Train for competence","authors":"Peter Rea,&nbsp;Alan Kolp,&nbsp;James K. Stoller","doi":"10.1111/jacf.12669","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jacf.12669","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46789,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Corporate Finance","volume":"37 2","pages":"77-84"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145012965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"EVA still matters! Corporate and investor applications using EVA-style analysis","authors":"Li Ai,&nbsp;Atreya Chakraborty,&nbsp;James L. Grant,&nbsp;Emery A. Trahan","doi":"10.1111/jacf.12671","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jacf.12671","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46789,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Corporate Finance","volume":"37 2","pages":"122-132"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145013059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Message from the Editor","authors":"Don Chew","doi":"10.1111/jacf.12659","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jacf.12659","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46789,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Corporate Finance","volume":"37 1","pages":"2-3"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2025-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144197549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}