PHILOSOPHIAPub Date : 2023-11-29DOI: 10.1007/s11406-023-00703-3
Frank Jackson
{"title":"Does Representationalism Offer a Reply to the Knowledge Argument?","authors":"Frank Jackson","doi":"10.1007/s11406-023-00703-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00703-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I agree with Torin Alter that physicalists should be a priori physicalists. I argue against his rejection of the representationalist response to the knowledge argument.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138536552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
PHILOSOPHIAPub Date : 2023-11-28DOI: 10.1007/s11406-023-00704-2
Mélanie Frappier
{"title":"Towards a Pluralistic Account of Thought Experiments","authors":"Mélanie Frappier","doi":"10.1007/s11406-023-00704-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00704-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In light of our knowledge about neurodiversity, I argue that the cognitive science framework Miščević uses in <i>Thought Experiments</i> must be broaden to create a pluralistic account of thought experimentation, one able to account for the many ways thought experiments are replicated using not only visual models, but also arguments, conceptual analyses, and images as some of the many instruments used in the laboratory of our mind.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138536554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
PHILOSOPHIAPub Date : 2023-11-27DOI: 10.1007/s11406-023-00697-y
Christopher Devlin Brown
{"title":"Russellian Physicalism, Phenomenal Concepts, and Revelation","authors":"Christopher Devlin Brown","doi":"10.1007/s11406-023-00697-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00697-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper responds to an argument from Botin which claims that Russellian physicalism is committed to the view that either (i) our phenomenal concepts do not reveal anything essential about phenomenal properties (following Goff, Botin calls this the ‘opaque’ account of phenomenal concepts), or that (ii) phenomenal concepts are capable of revealing at least some of the essence of phenomenal properties—making phenomenal concepts ‘translucent’ if some-but-not-all-revealing or ‘transparent’ if all-revealing—but this entails that phenomenal properties are fundamental, which violates physicalism. I argue that Botin is wrong that Russellian physicalists are committed to the view that physical and phenomenal concepts must have similarly qualitative/phenomenal modes of presentation or contents, since Russellian physicalists assume that we do not possess concepts which specifically refer to non-phenomenal categorical properties. If we were to acquire concepts for non-phenomenal categorical properties, they would need to have categorical contents and modes of presentation, but need not have qualitative/phenomenal contents and modes of presentation. Given this, Russellian physicalists can embrace a translucent account of phenomenal concepts, and hold that our phenomenal concepts more-or-less accurately tell us about certain sorts of non-fundamental properties which are both physical and categorical.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138536583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
PHILOSOPHIAPub Date : 2023-11-23DOI: 10.1007/s11406-023-00693-2
Gabriele Ferretti, Silvano Zipoli Caiani
{"title":"The Rationality and Flexibility of Motor Representations in Skilled Performance","authors":"Gabriele Ferretti, Silvano Zipoli Caiani","doi":"10.1007/s11406-023-00693-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00693-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Philosophers and cognitive scientists have been debating about the nature of practical knowledge in skilled action. A big challenge is that of establishing whether and how practical knowledge (knowledge-how) is influenced by, or related to propositional knowledge (knowledge-that). This becomes even more challenging when trying to understand how propositional and motor representations may cooperate in making action performance flexible, while also remaining rational. In this paper, we offer an account that explains how practical knowledge leads to the execution of our actions in a way that accounts for its relation to propositional knowledge, and with respect to the possibility of granting flexibility and rationality.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138536553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
PHILOSOPHIAPub Date : 2023-11-14DOI: 10.1007/s11406-023-00698-x
David Collins
{"title":"Imagining the Author: Historical Understanding and the Cognitive Value of Art","authors":"David Collins","doi":"10.1007/s11406-023-00698-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00698-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134992109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
PHILOSOPHIAPub Date : 2023-11-13DOI: 10.1007/s11406-023-00696-z
Tony Tsz Fung Lau
{"title":"Holistic Competence and its Partial Manifestations","authors":"Tony Tsz Fung Lau","doi":"10.1007/s11406-023-00696-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00696-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136347887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
PHILOSOPHIAPub Date : 2023-11-11DOI: 10.1007/s11406-023-00690-5
Michał Oleksowicz
{"title":"Metaphysical Causal Pluralism: What Are New Mechanists Pluralistic About?","authors":"Michał Oleksowicz","doi":"10.1007/s11406-023-00690-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00690-5","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Although the literature on the issue of pluralism within the philosophy of science is very extensive, this paper focuses on the metaphysical causal pluralism that emerges from the new mechanistic discussion on causality. The main aim is to situate the new mechanistic views on causation within the account of varieties of causal pluralism framed by Psillos (2009). Paying attention to his taxonomy of metaphysical views on causation (i.e., the straightjacket view, the functional view, the two-concept view, the agnostic view and the atheist view) will help clarify differences in opinion and, at the same time, make it possible to elucidate the main metaphysical theses present within the new mechanistic debate. Special attention is given to S. Glennan’s theory of causation, since it is unique in offering an overall metaphysical view of the issue. It is also argued that mechanists are not “atheists” on causation: while all of them are causal realists, most mechanists are “agnostic” on causation, with a few exceptions such as S. Glennan, P. Machamer and J. Bogen.","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135042722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
PHILOSOPHIAPub Date : 2023-11-03DOI: 10.1007/s11406-023-00694-1
Emil Badici
{"title":"Prisoner’s Dilemma and Newcomb’s Problem: Two Problems or One?","authors":"Emil Badici","doi":"10.1007/s11406-023-00694-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00694-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135821140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
PHILOSOPHIAPub Date : 2023-10-11DOI: 10.1007/s11406-023-00692-3
C.A.J. Coady
{"title":"The Significance and Complexity of Conscience","authors":"C.A.J. Coady","doi":"10.1007/s11406-023-00692-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00692-3","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The concept of conscience continues to play a central role in our ethical reasoning as well as in public and philosophical debate over medical ethics, religious freedom, and conscientious objection in many fields, including war. Despite this continued relevance the nature of conscience itself has remained a relatively neglected topic in recent philosophical literature. In this paper I discuss some historical background to the concept and outline the essential features required for any satisfactory account of conscience and its significance for a coherent moral psychology. It will become clear that conscience is a complex concept resisting reduction to any one of its component features. In doing so I critique recent accounts of conscience which have been insufficiently attentive to these complexities and as a consequence have drawn mistaken conclusions about the legitimate role of conscience in moral reasoning. I also discuss the significance of various distortions of conscience such what I call “the fanaticised conscience”. Clarifying our concept of conscience helps us avoid both conceptual confusion in moral psychology and misapplications of the concept in our understanding of conscientious objection both theoretically and in practice.","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136211024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
PHILOSOPHIAPub Date : 2023-10-04DOI: 10.1007/s11406-023-00691-4
Zhen Li
{"title":"Moral Responsibility, the Author, and the Ethical Criticism of Art","authors":"Zhen Li","doi":"10.1007/s11406-023-00691-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00691-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135592761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}