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Skepticism, Naturalism, Pyrrhonism 怀疑主义，自然主义，皮龙主义
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2022-10-20 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12213
Otávio Bueno
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引用次数: 0
Understanding phenomena: From social to collective? 理解现象：从社会到集体？
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2022-10-20 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12216
F. Malfatti
{"title":"Understanding phenomena: From social to collective?","authors":"F. Malfatti","doi":"10.1111/phis.12216","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12216","url":null,"abstract":"In making sense of the world, we typically cooperate, join forces, and draw on one another’s competence and expertise. A group or community in which there is a well-functioning division of cognitive-epistemic labor can achieve levels of understanding that a single agent who relies exclusively on her own capacities would probably never achieve. However, is understanding also collective ? I.e., is understanding something that can be possessed by a group or community rather than by individuals? In this paper, I develop an account of understanding phenomena according to which understanding a phenomenon requires reasonably endorsing an adequate and intelligible epistemic mediator that accounts for this phenomenon. I then show that understanding, conceived along these lines, can be attributed to collective entities. An important result of my arguments will be that a collective entity’s understanding cannot (always) be reduced to the sum of the understandings of the individuals belonging to it. This is because a collective entity can sometimes be rightfully claimed to understand a phenomenon while none of its individual members understands it.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43359843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Group agential epistemic injustice: Epistemic disempowerment and critical defanging of group epistemic agency 1 群体代理的认知不公:群体认知代理的认知剥夺与批判性去尖化
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2022-10-20 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12221
José Medina
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引用次数: 0
Why group mental states are not exhaustively determined by member states 为什么群体心理状态不是由成员国完全决定的
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2022-10-20 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12215
B. Epstein
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引用次数: 0
Challenging the ability intuition: From personal to extended to distributed belief‐forming processes 挑战能力直觉:从个人到扩展到分布式信念形成过程
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2022-10-20 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12222
Joseph Shieber
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引用次数: 1
Knowing failably and Moorean assertions 知道失败和摩尔断言
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2022-10-20 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12233
S. Hetherington
{"title":"Knowing failably and Moorean assertions","authors":"S. Hetherington","doi":"10.1111/phis.12233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12233","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42189430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Defeat and proficiencies 失败和熟练
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2022-10-20 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12223
Christoph Kelp
{"title":"Defeat and proficiencies","authors":"Christoph Kelp","doi":"10.1111/phis.12223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12223","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45461354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Group evidence 组证据
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2022-10-17 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12220
Jessica Brown
{"title":"Group evidence","authors":"Jessica Brown","doi":"10.1111/phis.12220","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12220","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42312695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
List for Epistemology volume 认识论卷列表
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12236
{"title":"List for Epistemology volume","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/phis.12236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12236","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46350501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Opacity of Character: Virtue Ethics and the Legal Admissibility of Character Evidence 品格的不透明:美德伦理与品格证据的法律可采性
IF 0.7 3区 哲学
Philosophical Issues Pub Date : 2021-10-27 DOI: 10.1111/phis.12192
Jacob A. Smith, Georgi Gardiner
{"title":"Opacity of Character: Virtue Ethics and the Legal Admissibility of Character Evidence","authors":"Jacob A. Smith, Georgi Gardiner","doi":"10.1111/phis.12192","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12192","url":null,"abstract":"Many jurisdictions prohibit or severely restrict the use of evidence about a defendant’s character to prove legal culpability. Situationists, who argue that conduct is largely determined by situational features rather than character, can easily defend this prohibition. According to situationism, character evidence is misleading or paltry evidence. But proscriptions on character evidence seem harder to justify on virtue ethical accounts. It appears that excluding character evidence either denies the centrality of character for explaining conduct—the situationist position—or omits probative evidence. Situationism, after all, is antithetical to virtue ethics. This essay provides a virtue ethical defense of character evidence exclusion rules. We show that existing virtue ethical rebuttals to situationism themselves support prohibitions on character evidence; even if behavior arises from stable character traits, character evidence should be prohibited. In building our case, we provide a taxonomy of kinds of character judgment and reconcile the ubiquity and reasonableness of character judgements in ordinary life with the epistemic legitimacy of character evidence prohibitions in law.","PeriodicalId":46360,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Issues","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47100317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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