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Justice & its motives: On Peter Vanderschraaf’s Strategic Justice 正义及其动机:论彼得·范德施拉夫的战略正义
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Politics Philosophy & Economics Pub Date : 2020-09-24 DOI: 10.1177/1470594X20961540
Paul Weithman
{"title":"Justice & its motives: On Peter Vanderschraaf’s Strategic Justice","authors":"Paul Weithman","doi":"10.1177/1470594X20961540","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X20961540","url":null,"abstract":"Peter Vanderschraaf’s Strategic Justice is a powerful elaboration and defense of what he calls ‘justice as mutual advantage’. Vanderschraaf opens Strategic Justice by observing that ‘Plato set a template for all future philosophers by raising two interrelated questions: (1) What precisely is justice? (2) Why should one be just?’. He answers that (1) justice consists of conventions which (2) are followed because each sees that doing so is in her interest. These answers depend upon two conditions which Vanderschraaf calls Baseline Consistency and Negative Mutual Expectations. I contend that the plausibility of the first condition depends upon principles which are prior to Vanderchraaf’s conventions of justice and that the second condition does not account for the interest Vanderschraaf must think we take in those principles. I therefore worry that Vanderschraaf does what he accuses other theorists of justice as mutual advantage of doing: going outside the bounds of justice as mutual advantage. To lay the groundwork for his conditions, Vanderschraaf analyzes the circumstances of justice. I argue that, his claims to the contrary notwithstanding, he does not take the circumstances to be the kind of conditions Hume takes them to be, but that he has good reason to do so.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"42 1","pages":"3 - 21"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89126382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The rationality of political experimentation 政治实验的合理性
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Politics Philosophy & Economics Pub Date : 2020-09-10 DOI: 10.1177/1470594X20949937
G. Robson
{"title":"The rationality of political experimentation","authors":"G. Robson","doi":"10.1177/1470594X20949937","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X20949937","url":null,"abstract":"Theorists from John Stuart Mill to Robert Nozick have argued that citizens can gain insight into the demands of justice by experimenting with diverse forms of political life. I consider the rationality of such experimentation, arguing for three distinct but related claims. First, rational citizens will not be highly incentivized to conduct experiments in living. Here I develop an account of what I call the ‘prudential rationality constraint’ (PRC). The PRC implies that rational citizens will be undermotivated from the standpoint of social value to conduct experiments in living. Second, despite the success of various radical political experiments (e.g., democracy after 1648), citizens generally ought to engage in moderate rather than radical political experimentation. The latter will nearly always be prudentially irrational to conduct, hard to learn from, and quite possibly harmful to participants and third parties. Finally, there are important but overlooked ways, including through entrepreneurship, in which institutions can incentivize citizens to engage in socially valuable political experimentation.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"166 1","pages":"67 - 98"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85165106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Undercutting Justice – Why legal representation should not be allocated by the market 削弱正义-为什么法律代理不应由市场分配
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Politics Philosophy & Economics Pub Date : 2020-08-28 DOI: 10.1177/1470594X20951886
Shai Agmon
{"title":"Undercutting Justice – Why legal representation should not be allocated by the market","authors":"Shai Agmon","doi":"10.1177/1470594X20951886","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X20951886","url":null,"abstract":"The adversarial legal system is traditionally praised for its normative appeal: it protects individual rights; ensures an equal, impartial, and consistent application of the law; and, most importantly, its competitive structure facilitates the discovery of truth – both in terms of the facts, and in terms of the correct interpretation of the law. At the same time, legal representation is allocated as a commodity, bought and sold in the market: the more one pays, the better legal representation one gets. In this article, I argue that the integration of a market in legal representation with the adversarial system undercuts the very normative justifications on which the system is based. Furthermore, I argue that there are two implicit conditions, which are currently unmet, but are required for the standard justifications to hold: that there is (equal opportunity for) equality of legal representation between parties, and that each party has (equal opportunity for) a sufficient level of legal representation. I, therefore, outline an ideal proposal for reform that would satisfy these conditions.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"119 1 1","pages":"99 - 123"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88312528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
With group power comes great (individual) responsibility 集体力量带来了巨大的(个人)责任
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Politics Philosophy & Economics Pub Date : 2020-08-26 DOI: 10.1177/1470594X20982052
Erin L. Miller
{"title":"With group power comes great (individual) responsibility","authors":"Erin L. Miller","doi":"10.1177/1470594X20982052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X20982052","url":null,"abstract":"When a group does harm, sometimes there’s no obvious individual who bears moral responsibility, and yet we still intuit that someone is to blame. This apparent ‘deficit’ of moral responsibility has led some scholars to posit that groups themselves can be responsible, and that this responsibility is distributed in some uniform fashion among group members. This solution to the deficit, however, risks providing a scapegoat for individuals who have acted wrongly and shifting blame onto those who have not. Instead, this article argues that, in most deficit cases, moral responsibility is borne not by the group but by specific individual members. When an individual acts within a group, she gains an increased potential for doing harm – and, accordingly, heightened duties of care toward others. These duties can, depending on the individual’s position, require amending the group’s rules, procedures, and norms. In most deficit cases, it is individuals who have failed to fulfill these duties who are responsible.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"22 - 44"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78793159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The democratic limits of political experiments 政治实验的民主限度
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Politics Philosophy & Economics Pub Date : 2020-08-21 DOI: 10.1177/1470594X20944401
Eric Beerbohm, Ryan W. Davis, Adam Kern
{"title":"The democratic limits of political experiments","authors":"Eric Beerbohm, Ryan W. Davis, Adam Kern","doi":"10.1177/1470594X20944401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X20944401","url":null,"abstract":"Since field experiments in democratic politics influence citizens and the relationships among citizens, they are freighted with normative significance. Yet the distinctively democratic concerns that bear upon such field experiments have not yet been systematically examined. In this paper, we taxonomize such democratic concerns. Our goal is not to justify any of them, but rather to reveal their basic structure, so that they can be scrutinized at further length. We argue that field experiments could be democratically objectionable even if they are not decisive – even if they do not swing the results of elections or other political decisions. Rather, if a class of campaign experiments is objectionable, one reason for this is that they undermine citizens’ equal standing. The ideal of equal standing affords nuanced judgments about the permissibility of field experiments in democratic politics.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"6 1","pages":"321 - 342"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87328275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The All Affected Principle, and the weighting of votes 所有受影响原则，以及投票的权重
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Politics Philosophy & Economics Pub Date : 2020-08-18 DOI: 10.1177/1470594X20949938
Kim Angell, R. Huseby
{"title":"The All Affected Principle, and the weighting of votes","authors":"Kim Angell, R. Huseby","doi":"10.1177/1470594X20949938","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X20949938","url":null,"abstract":"In this article we defend the view that, on the All Affected Principle of voting rights, the weight of a person’s vote on a decision should be determined by and only by the degree to which that decision affects her interests, independently of her voting weights on other decisions. Further, we consider two recent alternative proposals for how the All Affected Principle should weight votes, and give reasons for rejecting both.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"93 1","pages":"366 - 381"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81722176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
The value of longevity 长寿的价值
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Politics Philosophy & Economics Pub Date : 2020-08-01 DOI: 10.1177/1470594X19880279
G. Bognar
{"title":"The value of longevity","authors":"G. Bognar","doi":"10.1177/1470594X19880279","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X19880279","url":null,"abstract":"Longevity is valuable. Most of us would agree that it’s bad to die when you could go on living, and death’s badness has to do with the value your life would have if it continued. Most of us would also agree that it’s bad if life expectancy in a country is low, it’s bad if there is high infant mortality and it’s bad if there is a wide mortality gap between different groups in a population. But how can we make such judgments more precise? How should we evaluate the harm of mortality in a population? Although philosophers have written a lot about the harm of death for individuals, very little work has been done on the harm of mortality for populations. In this article, I take the first steps towards developing a theory of the harm of population mortality. Even these first steps, I argue, lead to surprising results.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"126 1","pages":"229 - 247"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89311529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Inadequate for democracy: How (not) to distribute education 不适合民主:如何(不)分配教育
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Politics Philosophy & Economics Pub Date : 2020-06-03 DOI: 10.1177/1470594X20924667
Alexandra Oprea
{"title":"Inadequate for democracy: How (not) to distribute education","authors":"Alexandra Oprea","doi":"10.1177/1470594X20924667","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X20924667","url":null,"abstract":"There is widespread agreement among philosophers and legal scholars that the distribution of educational resources in the US is unjust, but little agreement about why. An increasingly prominent view posits a sufficientarian standard based on the requirements of democratic citizenship. This view, which I refer to as democratic sufficientarianism, argues that inequalities in educational resources or opportunities above the threshold required for democratic citizenship are morally unobjectionable if and only if all children are provided with an education sufficient to meet those demands. In the article, I argue that democratic sufficientarianism faces a democratic education dilemma. Either the philosopher specifies a precise and demanding threshold with antidemocratic implications, or she insists upon democratic equality irrespective of educational achievements, thereby undercutting the search for anything but a minimal educational threshold. As an alternative, I defend a new sufficientarian standard that is reflexive, education-specific, and democracy-compatible. This reflexive sufficientarian standard can act as a guide to democratic deliberation about education policy. The article also sketches possibilities for litigation on behalf of children who have received insufficient primary education.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"42 1","pages":"343 - 365"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83675233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Systemic domination, social institutions and the coalition problem 系统支配、社会制度和联盟问题
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Politics Philosophy & Economics Pub Date : 2020-06-02 DOI: 10.1177/1470594X20927927
Hallvard Sandven
{"title":"Systemic domination, social institutions and the coalition problem","authors":"Hallvard Sandven","doi":"10.1177/1470594X20927927","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X20927927","url":null,"abstract":"This article argues for a systemic conception of freedom as non-domination. It does so by engaging with the debate on the so-called coalition problem. The coalition problem arises because non-domination holds that groups can be agents of (dominating) power, while also insisting that freedom be robust. Consequently, it seems to entail that everyone is in a constant state of domination at the hands of potential groups. However, the problem can be dissolved by rejecting a ‘strict possibility’ standard for interpreting non-domination’s robustness requirement. Frank Lovett and Philip Pettit propose to restrict the relevant domain of possible worlds by reference to two epistemic conditions pertaining to potential group members. I argue that this strategy unduly limits non-domination’s critical potential. I then argue that a suitably systemic conception of domination avoids this problem. By placing explanatory emphasis on social institutions, and how these bear on the feasibility of individual and collective action, a systemic conception of non-domination avoids the coalition problem in a way that retains its critical potential. The article clarifies the relationship between the rule of law and the social norms and objects to the claim that non-domination is bound to deem the latter irrelevant from the point of view of freedom.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"31 1","pages":"382 - 402"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89979818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Reconsidering the reciprocity objection to unconditional basic income 重新考虑无条件基本收入的互惠性反对
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Politics Philosophy & Economics Pub Date : 2020-05-28 DOI: 10.1177/1470594X20927901
A. Lister
{"title":"Reconsidering the reciprocity objection to unconditional basic income","authors":"A. Lister","doi":"10.1177/1470594X20927901","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X20927901","url":null,"abstract":"This article reconsiders the reciprocity objection to unconditional basic income based on the idea that reciprocity is not only a duty but a limiting condition on other duties. If the objection were that unconditionality invites people to neglect contributory obligations arising from a duty of reciprocity, people could ask to opt out of eligibility for the benefit so as to avoid liability to contribution. While market failure provides a reason for mandatory participation in social insurance, it will not justify the generous (if conditional) income support egalitarians favour. To sustain the objection, we need to think of reciprocity a limit on duties of assistance and fair-sharing. In this form, the objection resists the inherited assets response, which holds that we can’t have a duty reciprocate benefits we receive from nature or from previous generations.","PeriodicalId":45971,"journal":{"name":"Politics Philosophy & Economics","volume":"44 1","pages":"209 - 228"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83233624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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