Ethics Policy & Environment最新文献

{"title":"Moral Dimensions of Offsetting Luxury Emissions","authors":"Adriana Placani, Stearns Broadhead","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2022.2104099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2022.2104099","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This essay addresses moral aspects of using carbon offsets for counteracting individuals’ luxury emissions. After introducing and outlining the main topics and terms related to carbon offsetting, this essay answers three objections that have been levied against carbon offsetting: objections from the indulgences analogy, objections from the directness of the duty not to harm, and separateness objections. The essay argues that advocates for offsetting have resources to defend against these criticisms by pointing to particularities of individual emissions’ harmfulness, as well as the preemptive nature of offsetting. The essay then shows that in spite of these defenses there is reason to regard not emitting as a better option because of a host of problems that plague offsetting in its current forms. The essay concludes that offsetting enhances individuals’ options for discharging their duty not to harm, but that standards of justice and efficacy need to be adopted.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"6 1","pages":"297 - 315"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79794054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Can Consumption-Based Emissions Accounting Solve the Problem of Historical Emissions? Some Skeptical Remarks","authors":"Laura García Portela","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2022.2104096","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2022.2104096","url":null,"abstract":"The ethics of emissions accounting deals with the following question: When considering who has emitted how much, should emissions be attributed to producers (production-based emissions accounting, or PBEA) or to consumers (consumption-based emissions accounting, or CBEA)? This normative question is gaining currency in climate change ethics (Duus-Otterström & Hjorthen, 2019; Duus-Otterström, 2022; Mittiga, 2019; Steininger et al., 2014). Olle Torpman has recently contributed to this debate by arguing that CBEA can solve the problem of historical emissions, or the so-called dead polluters objection, and that this constitutes an advantage over PBEA (Torpman, 2022). The dead polluters objection affects any account based on the idea that remedial responsibility for the costs or negative effects of climate change be polluters. This objection states that we cannot attribute remedial responsibility for an namely, García-Portela, Emissions-accounting mechanisms are by this objection because they distribute remedial responsibility for the negative effects and costs of climate change based on agent’s pollution.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"68 1","pages":"367 - 370"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82959124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Offsetting Risks to the Unjustly Advantaged: Why Doing More Good Sometimes Takes Priority Over Offsetting Risks We’ve Unjustly Imposed","authors":"Brian Berkey","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2022.2104095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2022.2104095","url":null,"abstract":"central we have stronger moral reasons to direct resources to charitable organizations like those recommended by GiveWell than we have to use the same resources to offset our greenhouse gas emissions. The our the risks by the same risks as a result of risks on particular people through emitting activity it at best reduces the risks faced by different people. the amount of done by reducing risks through offsetting is so much lower the amount of done by donating the same to an effective to the","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"19 1","pages":"261 - 263"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88046779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Should I Offset or Should I Do More Good?","authors":"H. Stefánsson, Orri Stefánsson","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2022.2104093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2022.2104093","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Offsetting is a very ineffective way to do good. Offsetting your lifetime emissions may increase aggregated life expectancy by at most seven years, while giving the amount it costs to offset your lifetime emissions to a malaria charity saves in expectation the life of at least one child. Is there any moral reason to offset rather than giving to some charity that does good so much more effectively? There might be such a reason if your offsetting compensated or somehow benefitted the victims of your emission, since that could mean that you would satisfy the duty not to harm others by emitting and offsetting. But that is typically not true. If your emission harms some person and your offsetting benefits some person, then these are most likely different people. Hence, I conclude, we have a stronger reason to give to effective charities than we have to offset our emissions.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"113 1","pages":"225 - 241"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81021649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Do We Impose Undue Risk When We Emit and Offset? A Reply to Stefansson","authors":"Christian Barry, G. Cullity","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2022.2104090","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2022.2104090","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT We have previously argued that there are forms of greenhouse gas offsetting for which, when one emits and offsets, one imposes no risk. Orri Stefansson objects that our argument fails to distinguish properly between the people who stand to be harmed by one’s emissions and the people who stand to be benefited by one’s offsetting. We reply by emphasizing the difference between acting with a probability of making a difference to the distribution of harm and acting in a way that worsen’s someone’s prospect.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"22 1","pages":"242 - 248"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74574335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Is There Any Virtue in Offsetting?","authors":"Kevin Meeker","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2022.2104192","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2022.2104192","url":null,"abstract":"Do we have a strong reason to offset even if offsetting is morally inefficient? Some philosophers – such as John Broome – argue that justice-based climate duties require us to contribute money to offsetting even if we could actualize a greater good by funding more effective charities (Stefansson 2022, 226). H. Orri Stefánsson’s meticulous dissection of this type of reasoning convincingly concludes that ‘we have not yet seen an argument’ (Stefansson 2022, 237) that effectively delivers strong moral reasons to offset. While I agree with Stefánsson’s general point, I suggest that his focus on consequentialist assumptions of such reasoning (Stefansson 2022, 226) and possible deontic responses to his criticisms (Stefansson 2022, 233) overlooks the possibility that virtue theory might provide a better way to ethically support offsetting. More specifically, I propose to explore food choices in particular, and how virtue theory’s emphasis on habituation might provide moral reason to offset. We should begin by noting that our actions affect others and the environment that we all share in a myriad of ways. The precise causal chains connecting our lives are often difficult to detect – especially when it involves indirect associations. Making moral judgments is seemingly intractable in the best of circumstances. When complicated causal issues entangle with further complex issues of responsibility, one might be tempted to throw in the towel. But we need not give in to such temptation. As Aristotle observed (Nic. Eth. 1.3) we should not expect exactness in fields such as ethics or political philosophy – or, we might add today, environmental ethics. Stefánsson’s paper provides perspicuous and persuasive philosophical reasoning about the morality of offsetting while recognizing the Aristotelian point that we should not anticipate precise quantitative models of the complicated causal mechanisms involved. Although Stefánsson grants that these debates involve issues that are ‘highly uncertain’ (Stefansson 2022, 228) and relationships that are ‘probabilistic’ (Stefansson 2022, 231), he judiciously finds enough commonality with his opponents to debate the issues fruitfully. Stefánsson concentrates on the simple example that one can achieve a greater amount of good by donating to a charity that combats malaria than a charity that offsets one’s carbon emissions. As previously noted, of course, many philosophers argue that because previous emissions have caused harm, justice requires that this harm be remedied. Stefánsson counters cogently that offsetting almost always fails to help those who may have been wronged by previous actions, making it difficult to see how","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"74 1","pages":"258 - 260"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81504043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Carbon Offsetting and Justice: A Kantian Response","authors":"Zachary Vereb","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2022.2104094","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2022.2104094","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In ‘Should I offset or should I do more good?’, H. Orri Stefansson defends an argument that calls into question the belief that we can discharge our duties to prevent harm by carbon offsetting. Stefansson suggests that other actions, such as donations, should be preferred. This paper questions aspects of that analysis by evaluating the normative assumptions underlying it. It does so from a broadly Kantian perspective. I begin by highlighting assumptions that could benefit from elaboration and defense. These concern justice, anthropocentrism, imputability, and temporal perspectives. Lastly, I consider Kant’s long-term view of humanity to supplement any short-termist limitations.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"2002 1","pages":"253 - 257"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88915678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Replies to “Can Consumption-Based Emissions Accounting Solve the Problem of Historical Emissions? Some Skeptical Remarks”","authors":"O. Torpman","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2022.2104098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2022.2104098","url":null,"abstract":"In ‘Consumption-Based Emissions Accounting and Historical Emissions’ (Torpman 2022), I argued that a move from production-based emissions accounting (PBEA) to consumption-based emissions accounting (CBEA) would contribute to solving the problem of historical emissions. More precisely, the argument is that CBEA can assign currently living people remedial responsibility for historical emissions to the extent that they consume goods and services that embody historical emissions, which PBEA cannot. This argument has recently received some criticism, to which I aim to respond here. In particular, I will respond to the following two objections raised by Laura GarcíaPortela (2022): (1) the common causation-based justificatory rationale for CBEA cannot ground the application of CBEA to historical emissions if ‘consumption’ is interpreted as ‘use’ because users (qua users) are not causal inputs for emissions; and (2) it is unclear whether CBEA can cover more overall emissions than PBEA, since the former cannot account for recent past and contemporary emissions, which is covered by the latter. I will spell out these arguments and reply to them in turn. Starting with (1), García-Portela argues that the common justificatory rationale for CBEA is that consumers’ demand is an essential causal input for emissions. In my original paper, however, I argued that ‘consumption’ should be interpreted as ‘use’ rather than as ‘purchase’. This interpretation, García-Portela claims, cannot ground the application of CBEA to historical emissions, since users (qua users) do not provide any causal input to those emissions. García-Portela asks: ‘If they have not caused those emissions, why should they be allocated those emissions and the remedial responsibility that comes with them?’ Moreover, the argument goes, if ‘consumption’ would hence be interpreted as ‘purchase’ in order to avoid this, then CBEA cannot cover historical emissions because initial purchasers of historically produced goods and services are typically dead. My answer to this objection goes as follows. The point that consumer demand is often a causal input for emissions is certainly one potential reason for adopting CBEA. In my article, however, I mentioned it merely as a quick response to the claim that PBEA should be adopted for its capacity to assign responsibility to those who contribute causally to emissions. In addition, I brought up reasons related to CBEA’s capacity to deal with carbon leakage, as well as issues of fairness. For instance, unlike PBEA, CBEA does not assign","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"29 1","pages":"371 - 374"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75052701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Innovation, Deep Decarbonization and Ethics","authors":"Ewan Kingston","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2022.2132797","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2022.2132797","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Deep decarbonization – slashing global greenhouse gas emissions to net-zero – now dominates global climate policy. Two recent books assess feasible routes to achieve deep decarbonization. Bill Gates’ How to Avoid a Climate Disaster explains in depth why deep decarbonization requires significant innovations in tech, and Danny Cullenward and David Victor’s Making Climate Policy Work emphasizes the importance of policy innovation (beyond carbon pricing) for driving clean tech breakthroughs. In this critical review essay, I summarize and assess both books. In the final section, I raise several normative questions, which the pair of books might lead us to.","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"8 1","pages":"375 - 384"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84136683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Morality and the Environmental Crisis","authors":"Megs S. Gendreau","doi":"10.1080/21550085.2022.2102277","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2022.2102277","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45955,"journal":{"name":"Ethics Policy & Environment","volume":"41 1","pages":"385 - 387"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81272762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}