Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies最新文献_第10页

Where to Find Value on the Balance Sheet 在资产负债表上查找价值

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Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies Pub Date : 2021-03-01 DOI: 10.1142/S0219091521500090

Peter T. Chinloy, Matthew Imes, Tilan Tang

引用次数: 0

Trade Credit and Capital Structure Adjustment Speed: Evidence From Chinese Listed Firms 贸易信贷与资本结构调整速度——来自中国上市公司的证据

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Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies Pub Date : 2021-03-01 DOI: 10.1142/S0219091521500028

Jifeng Cao, Yiwen Cui

引用次数: 2

Antecedents of Equity Fund Performance: A Contingency Perspective 股票基金业绩的前因:权变视角

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Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies Pub Date : 2021-03-01 DOI: 10.1142/S0219091521500065

L. Liu, Fuming Jiang, Jizhong Li, O. Farooque

引用次数: 1

Does CEO Power Affect the Association Between CEO Compensation and Tangible Assets Impairments? CEO权力是否影响CEO薪酬与有形资产减值的关系?

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Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies Pub Date : 2021-03-01 DOI: 10.1142/S0219091521500053

K. Lee, Cheng-Few Lee, Gillian Yeo

引用次数: 0

Agency Conflicts and the Marginal Value of Capital Expenditure in Australian Listed Companies 代理冲突与澳大利亚上市公司资本支出的边际价值

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Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies Pub Date : 2021-03-01 DOI: 10.1142/S0219091521500016

James Butchers, G. S. Bhabra, Harjeet S. Bhabra, Anindya Sen

引用次数: 0

Impact of Government Bailout on Banks’ Cost of Equity: Additional Evidence from the Financial Bailout of 2008–2009 政府救助对银行股权成本的影响:来自2008-2009年金融救助的额外证据

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Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies Pub Date : 2021-03-01 DOI: 10.1142/S021909152150003X

Daphne Wang, R. Houmes, T. Ngo, Omar A. Esqueda

引用次数: 0

Taxes, Mispricing, or the Agency Cost of Managerial Discretion? Evidence from Corporation to REIT Conversions 税收，错误定价，还是管理自由裁量权的代理成本?从公司到REIT转换的证据

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Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies Pub Date : 2021-03-01 DOI: 10.1142/S0219091521500077

N. Gopal, Ravi Mateti, D. Nguyen, Gopola Vasudevan

{"title":"Taxes, Mispricing, or the Agency Cost of Managerial Discretion? Evidence from Corporation to REIT Conversions","authors":"N. Gopal, Ravi Mateti, D. Nguyen, Gopola Vasudevan","doi":"10.1142/S0219091521500077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219091521500077","url":null,"abstract":"We study the effect of change in the organizational structure from a corporation to a real estate investment trust (REIT) on the firm value. Changing the organizational structure from a corporation to a REIT could result in an increase in the firm value, and some companies may be motivated to change their organizational structure because of this. We examine three possible sources of gains in the firm value from such a change in the organizational structure. They are the potential tax savings, reduction in agency costs of managerial discretion, and increase in the price multiples after the conversion. We examine the changes in the firm value of firms that announce conversion to a REIT during 1990–2016. We find that the announcement period returns are positive and strongly significant. Consistent with the tax hypothesis, the announcement period returns are positively related to the effective tax rate of the sample firms. Consistent with the managerial discretion hypothesis, the announcement period returns are positively related to the level of free cash flow of low growth firms. Consistent with the mis-valuation hypothesis, the announcement period returns are higher when REIT valuations are higher relative to the sample firms.","PeriodicalId":45653,"journal":{"name":"Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies","volume":"24 1","pages":"2150007"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49176468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Do Negative Corporate Social Responsibility Events Signal Financial Misreporting? — Empirical Finding from Taiwan 负面的企业社会责任事件是否预示着财务误报?——来自台湾的实证发现

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Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies Pub Date : 2021-03-01 DOI: 10.1142/S0219091521500041

Ching-Lung Chen, Han Wang, Hung-Shu Fan, Shiu-Chieh Chiu

{"title":"Do Negative Corporate Social Responsibility Events Signal Financial Misreporting? — Empirical Finding from Taiwan","authors":"Ching-Lung Chen, Han Wang, Hung-Shu Fan, Shiu-Chieh Chiu","doi":"10.1142/S0219091521500041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219091521500041","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines whether negative corporate social responsibility events (NCSRs) signal potential firm misreporting and pending financial reporting restatements. Without formal opinions on the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting in Taiwan, we hypothesize NCSRs can represent and/or signal a firm’s internal control weakness, which may in turn result in poor financial reporting. Note that the concern with controlling owners expropriating wealth through ineffective internal controls is given important weight by investors and regulators. We further examine whether the signaling function of NCSRs is more pronounced in contexts with a serious agency problem, such as is found in the high divergence of control and cash flow rights case (denoted as high excess control rights) in Taiwan. Empirical results indicate that, as conjectured, incidence of NCSRs is positively associated with the likelihood of reporting restatements. Further evidence reveals that this result is particularly pronounced in the high divergence of control and cash-flow rights subsample test. We demonstrate several diagnostic tests and show the results are robust in various specifications.","PeriodicalId":45653,"journal":{"name":"Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies","volume":"24 1","pages":"2150004"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46532096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Validity of Multinomial Logistic Regression and Artificial Neural Network in Predicting Sukuk Rating: Evidence from Indonesian Stock Exchange 多项逻辑回归与人工神经网络预测伊斯兰债券评级的有效性:来自印尼证券交易所的证据

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Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies Pub Date : 2020-11-02 DOI: 10.1142/s0219091520500320

M. L. Nurhakim, Z. Kisman, F. Syihab

引用次数: 1

The Impact of Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank Legislation on Loan Loss Provisioning in US Banks Sarbanes-Oxley和Dodd-Frank法案对美国银行贷款损失准备金的影响

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Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies Pub Date : 2020-10-29 DOI: 10.1142/s0219091520500289

Gregory Mckee, A. Kagan

{"title":"The Impact of Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank Legislation on Loan Loss Provisioning in US Banks","authors":"Gregory Mckee, A. Kagan","doi":"10.1142/s0219091520500289","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219091520500289","url":null,"abstract":"The Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 and the 2010 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) were passed to address weaknesses in the internal control environment of the firm. Elements of these Acts reduce risky behavior of financial institutions by reducing informational asymmetry with borrowers. An important element of managing earnings quality in financial institutions is the loss provision, an annual expense set aside for uncollected loan and lease payments. These Acts affect the selection of loss provision expense levels in distinct ways. Using a dataset of community bank financial information observed between 1998 and 2017, it is shown that banks experience a complementary effect between SOX and DFA on loss provision expenses. Improved governance procedures to establish policy responses to nonperforming loans result in reduced expenses, whereas reduced information asymmetry tends to enhance a moral hazard effect. These results show that incentives for firm growth, income, capital, and loan specialization under the SOX and DFA regulatory environments complicate the loan risk management process.","PeriodicalId":45653,"journal":{"name":"Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies","volume":"1 1","pages":"2050028"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2020-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/s0219091520500289","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47021731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0