CEO权力是否影响CEO薪酬与有形资产减值的关系?

IF 0.3 Q4 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies Pub Date : 2021-03-01 DOI:10.1142/S0219091521500053

K. Lee, Cheng-Few Lee, Gillian Yeo

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了CEO薪酬与有形长期资产减值之间的关系。我们发现CEO薪酬水平与有形长期资产减值费用呈负相关。我们还记录了，在首席执行官拥有更多决策权的公司中，首席执行官薪酬与有形长期资产减值费用之间的负面关联得到了缓解。具体而言，首席执行官薪酬与有形长期资产减值费用之间的负关联不太明显（1）当首席执行官担任董事会主席时，（2）当首席首席执行官是公司创始人时，（3）当首席执行官参与董事选拔过程时，以及（4）当董事会整体独立性较低时。

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Does CEO Power Affect the Association Between CEO Compensation and Tangible Assets Impairments?

This paper examines the association between CEO compensation and tangible long-lived assets impairment. We find that the level of CEO compensation is negatively associated with the tangible long-lived assets impairment charges. We also document that in firms with CEOs who have more decision-making power, the negative association between CEO compensation and tangible long-lived assets impairment charges is mitigated. Specifically, the negative association between CEO compensation and tangible long-lived assets impairment charges is less pronounced (1) when CEO chairs the board, (2) when CEO is the founder of the firm, (3) when the CEO is involved in the director selection process, and (4) when overall board independence is low.

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来源期刊

Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

1.30

自引率

11.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： This journal concentrates on global interdisciplinary research in finance, economics and accounting. The major topics include: 1. Business, economic and financial relations among the Pacific rim countries. 2. Financial markets and industries. 3. Options and futures markets of the United States and other Pacific rim countries. 4. International accounting issues related to U.S. companies investing in Pacific rim countries. 5. The issue of and strategy for developing Tokyo, Taipei, Shanghai, Sydney, Seoul, Hong Kong, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, Jakarta, and Manila as international or regional financial centers. 6. Global monetary and foreign exchange policy, and 7. Other high quality interdisciplinary research in global accounting, business, economics and finance.