{"title":"Judging care proceedings – ‘it’s not what you do it’s the way that you do it’","authors":"J. Masson","doi":"10.1080/09649069.2022.2136703","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09649069.2022.2136703","url":null,"abstract":"In Re H-W [2022] UKSC 17 the Supreme Court examined the standards for decisionmaking and proportionality in care cases, revisiting an area thoroughly considered in and after Munby P’s decision in Re B-S (Children)(Adoption Order: Leave to Oppose) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146 and creating a bright line for the test for appeals. In a single judgement, it held that it was no longer enough for judges to do the right thing i.e. not be wrong, they must now make decisions in the right way. Failure to consider all the court’s powers (Children Act 1989, s.1(3)(g)), comparing each option, holistically, with all the others as set out by McFarlane LJ in Re G (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Welfare Evaluation) [2013] EWCA Civ 965 was fatal. There were no allowances for experience of first instance judges, extempore judgements or the pressure of making decisions in the family court. At a stroke the Supreme Court imposed a more stringent test for proportionality in care cases; a decision could only be upheld where the judge’s reasoning fully explained why all other options for mitigating risks and securing welfare, not just realistic ones, have been rejected. Decision-making was not only about substance but also structure and form (cf Munby P in Re R (A Child) [2014] EWCA Civ 1625, paras 18 and 68). A summary of the facts There was a long history of neglect and sexual abuse in the mother’s extended family. In care proceedings in 2013, her son, A, was found to have abused her daughters B and C, and F2, the father of her youngest daughter, E, was found to have had a sexually abusive relationship with the mother, starting in her early teens. The court made a care order for A who was and placed in foster care; residence and supervision orders for B, C, D and E, who remained with their mother. F2ʹs application for residence of E was rejected and an injunction made preventing him entering the family home. Although the supervision orders expired in 2015, the local authority remained involved with M and her current partner, F3. In 2016, there were care proceedings in respect of F3ʹs children who, with the exception of G, were living with their mother; G was made subject of child arrangements and supervision orders to live with F3, but the placement broke down and G went into care. The local authority conducted family assessments in 2016/17 but M did not tell them that she had taken B for a week’s holiday with F2, where they had all shared a chalet, information that only emerged in the latest care proceedings. Child protection plans for","PeriodicalId":45633,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND FAMILY LAW","volume":"44 1","pages":"533 - 536"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43413364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A happy medium? Telephone hearings for litigants in person facing housing eviction","authors":"Bridgette Toy-Cronin","doi":"10.1080/09649069.2022.2136710","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09649069.2022.2136710","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Courts around the world moved rapidly to adopt remote hearings as the Covid-19 pandemic took hold. This accelerated a trend that pre-dated the pandemic, as governments and courts looked to remote hearings for their potential cost savings and the promise of greater accessibility. The debate about remote hearings has focused on using audio-visual technology, but audio-only hearings are widely used and involve the much more accessible technology, the telephone. Can an effective hearing (a key component of access to justice) be delivered by telephone? Drawing on a study of the New Zealand housing court, this article considers the benefits and problems for tenants – unrepresented and often vulnerable participants – when using audio-only hearings. It concludes that audio-hearings do offer the potential for greater access to justice as long as these hearings include adequate preparation, access to information, and support for the tenants.","PeriodicalId":45633,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND FAMILY LAW","volume":"44 1","pages":"477 - 494"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48623583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Welcome break? Holidays and recreation as eligible needs under the Care Act 2014","authors":"Alison Tarrant, C. Goodall","doi":"10.1080/09649069.2022.2136707","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09649069.2022.2136707","url":null,"abstract":"In R (BG and KG) v Suffolk County Council the Court of Appeal has upheld the High Court decision that the Care Act 2014 (CA 2014) empowers a local authority to pay for holidays and other recreational activities for people who are in need of care and support, where there is an eligible need. In doing so, the judgment does more than any previous case to advance self-determination and agency in the CA 2014 and infuse its provisions with a sense of personhood. The case concerned adult brothers, BG and KG, who have autism, learning disabilities, anxiety and physical conditions including epilepsy. BG and KG require 24-hour care which is provided on an unpaid basis by their mother, SQ, with assistance from other family members. The brothers are unable to trust other carers as a result of abuse they previously experienced when attending a day centre. From 2011, Suffolk County Council (‘SCC’) provided direct payments of between £108-150 per week to both BG and KG. SCC approved the use of these to fund family outings, activities and breaks as it had assessed the brothers as having eligible needs for recreation and holidays. From 2014, SCC also provided an annual ‘respite budget’ of £3000 to each brother which they used to finance trips and holidays including family holidays in Florida in 2015, 2017 and 2018. A community nurse described these breaks as having a therapeutic value, allowing all the family to feel less distress, as well as enabling SQ to continue her caring role. In 2020, SCC advised the family that it would be ending both the direct payments and the respite budgets. In respect of the direct payments, SCC stated that as all the brothers’ support needs were being fulfilled by their family, there were no eligible unmet needs that it could lawfully meet. The respite budget was no longer to be paid for the same reason, and on the basis that holiday costs were not an eligible need under the CA 2014. In relation to all the payments, SCC stated that as the eligibility criteria under the CA 2014 require needs to arise from ‘a physical or mental impairment’ (Care and Support (Eligibility Criteria) Regulations 2014, r 2(1)(a)), it was not empowered to fund the ‘universal’ costs connected to leisure activities that would be incurred by anyone undertaking that activity. It stated, for example, that it was not responsible for paying costs such as holiday travel or accommodation, or an entrance ticket to an attraction, but only costs","PeriodicalId":45633,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND FAMILY LAW","volume":"44 1","pages":"544 - 546"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44373337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Through a glass, darkly: Gallagher and transparency in the financial remedies court","authors":"Polly Morgan","doi":"10.1080/09649069.2022.2136706","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09649069.2022.2136706","url":null,"abstract":"There has been much recent debate about whether parties in family cases should be identified in published judgments and media reports. In an important contribution to the debate, Mostyn J surveys the legal position in his judgment in Gallagher v Gallagher (No.1) (Reporting Restrictions) [2022] EWFC 52 and sets out the approach that should be taken to the reporting of financial remedies proceedings. Financial remedies proceedings are conducted in private by virtue of FPR 17.10–11. Journalists and accredited legal bloggers can attend hearings unless excluded for the reasons set out in FPR 27.11 (described by Holman J in Fields v Fields [2015] EWHC 1670 as ‘strict and limited exceptions’). However, attendance and publication are not the same thing. Whether the hearing is in open court or in private, publication of information relating to it may be caught by s12 Administration of Justice Act 1960, which sets out the circumstances in which publication would constitute contempt. Financial remedy cases do not fall within s12 ʹ s contempt provisions unless they relate wholly or mainly to the maintenance of a minor, or because the person publishing the information is doing so contrary to a reporting restriction order or anonymity order made in that particular case. Mostyn J therefore concluded in Xanthopoulos v Rakshina [2022] EWFC that with the exception of these two situations, financial remedy cases could be reported and – as long as they do not misuse confidential information – freely discussed by the parties. The fact of a court sitting in private did no more than limit who could be present at the hearing. The court could make a reporting restriction order (RRO) or anonymity order, certainly, but only if the court had first, as in Re S [2004] UKHL 47, carefully weighed the rights engaged – Article 8 ʹ s privacy but also autonomy, including the right to tell one’s own story; Article 10 ʹ s freedom of expression; and (not at issue in Re S itself) Article 6 ʹ s fair and public hearing.","PeriodicalId":45633,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND FAMILY LAW","volume":"44 1","pages":"541 - 543"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46152101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Women, precarious work and care: the failure of family-friendly rights","authors":"Poland Lai","doi":"10.1080/09649069.2022.2136715","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09649069.2022.2136715","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45633,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND FAMILY LAW","volume":"44 1","pages":"547 - 549"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45970568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Justice and welfare: Lady Hale and the journal of social welfare and family law","authors":"M. Maclean","doi":"10.1080/09649069.2022.2102769","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09649069.2022.2102769","url":null,"abstract":"In 1972 the Legal Action Group was founded with the aim of bringing about more active intervention by lawyers in welfare issues. The arrival of this ‘new kid on the block’ aroused the interest of Sweet and Maxwell in bringing together and stimulating the interest of both academics and practitioners in law and social policy with a series of short text books on ‘Welfare and Society’ beginning with Mental Health in 1976, 1 followed by Parents and Children in 1977, by Brenda Hale and Roger Smith’s Children and the Courts in 1979. The next suggestion was the possibility of a journal to be edited by a lawyer and a social policy academic to encourage debate and research, and to support the development of teaching and qualifications in Social Welfare. Brenda, then teaching in Manchester, responded with enthusiasm to the suggestion. She was due a sabbatical term which, after some debate, was granted in order to set up the Journal of Social Welfare. A great deal of hard work was required, but the results were a triumph. Brenda with typical modesty remains almost invisible in the public record. But this chapter may help to set the record straight in acknowledging her central role in the foundation and the continuing development of what is now the Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law where she remains an active, effective and contributing member of the editorial advisory board. The Journal of Social Welfare edited by Brenda Hale with Margaret Heywood, BA, Director of the Training Course for Social Workers, Extra Mural Department, University of Manchester and published by Sweet and Maxwell, produced its first issue in 1978. The editorial asks “Why another law journal? Why another social work journal?“ and goes on to explain that:","PeriodicalId":45633,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND FAMILY LAW","volume":"45 1","pages":"3 - 10"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49163998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Surrogacy breakdown, birth registration and Article 8: a missed opportunity in Strasbourg","authors":"R. Marsh","doi":"10.1080/09649069.2022.2102758","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09649069.2022.2102758","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45633,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND FAMILY LAW","volume":"44 1","pages":"529 - 532"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59921195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Editorial: justice and welfare and the JSWFL","authors":"M. Maclean, E. Hitchings","doi":"10.1080/09649069.2022.2102770","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09649069.2022.2102770","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45633,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND FAMILY LAW","volume":"44 1","pages":"281 - 282"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43946844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Upholding the dignity of gay men who are (prospective) parents: an analysis of adoption and surrogacy law","authors":"Robert L. Marsh","doi":"10.1080/09649069.2022.2102764","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09649069.2022.2102764","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Many gay men want to be parents. Some, however, feel unable to explore their parenting desires due to heteronormative understandings of the family which pervade their everyday lives. By inhibiting these gay men from exploring their parenting desires, wider society treats them differently from other social groups and curtails their liberty. Another way of thinking about this, at a more fundamental level, is that wider society is disrespecting the dignity of gay men. While law cannot singlehandedly end the stigma that gay men face, it can uphold their dignity by embracing gay men within the protective legal frameworks that are available to other new parents, and signalling the legitimacy of gay men’s reproductive choices. Through this analytical lens, this article then assesses how far adoption and surrogacy law historically upheld the dignity of gay men who were (prospective) parents; how far they currently do; and if (and how) they could go further. The article concludes that significant progress has been made towards judicial and Parliamentary respect for the parenting desires of gay men, but with scope for improvement, particularly regarding the legislative framework for surrogacy.","PeriodicalId":45633,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND FAMILY LAW","volume":"44 1","pages":"306 - 328"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43003083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"‘Everyone remains the child of someone’: a parental order for an adult","authors":"Alan Brown, Katherine Wade","doi":"10.1080/09649069.2022.2102760","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09649069.2022.2102760","url":null,"abstract":"In X v Z [2022] EWFC 26 a parental order was granted under section 54 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 regarding a surrogacy arrangement undertaken in 1998, meaning that the ‘child’ involved was an adult at the time of both the application and the making of the order. This represented a novel issue for judicial consideration, and the judgment provides striking evidence of the extent to which the statutory conditions for parental orders ‘are being stretched to their limits, or simply cannot be applied’ (Joint Consultation Paper, 2019, para. 11.2). Mr and Mrs X undertook a surrogacy arrangement with Mrs Z through a Californian agency in 1998 and Y was born as result (para. 1). They are Y’s biological parents, since both of their gametes were used to create the embryo that was carried by Mrs Z (para. 10). The relevant pre-birth legal process was followed declaring Mr and Mrs X as Y’s legal parents under Californian law (para. 12) and a US passport was secured for Y, allowing the family to return to the UK when Y was a few days old (para. 13). The couple were entirely unaware of the requirement for a parental order to transfer legal parenthood in the UK and no application was made (para. 17). Quite remarkably, this position remained until September 2021, when Mrs X was contacted by Mrs Z who had recently been informed of the parental order process (para. 16). Mrs X sought legal advice and the application was made in December 2021, when Y was 23 years old. The apparent difficulty for the applicants is that section 54(3) provides: ‘the applicants must apply for the order during the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which the child is born’. However, as is now well known, since Sir James Munby P’s judgment in Re X (A Child) (Parental Order: Time Limit) [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam), [2015] 1 FLR 349 parental orders can be granted for applications made after six months, with a 13-year-old and 12-year-old twins in A v C [2016] EWFC 42, [2017] 2 FLR 101 being the oldest children where orders had been previously granted. The question for the court in X v Z was whether this reasoning was limited to parental order applications raised prior to the child’s eighteenth birthday, as is the case for adoption orders under section 49(4) Adoption and Children Act 2002. Ultimately, Theis J granted the parental order (para. 57), stating: ‘[t]he fact that Y is now an adult does not, in my judgment, preclude the court from making the order’ (para. 55). The judgment emphasises the factual background, observing that ‘Mr and Mrs Z’s","PeriodicalId":45633,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND FAMILY LAW","volume":"44 1","pages":"411 - 413"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43487231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}