发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

International Game Theory Review最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Robustness Against Indirect Invasions in Asymmetric Games with Continuous Strategy Spaces 具有连续策略空间的非对称博弈对间接入侵的鲁棒性
International Game Theory Review Pub Date : 2023-11-07 DOI: 10.1142/s0219198923500123
Aradhana Narang, A. J. Shaiju
{"title":"Robustness Against Indirect Invasions in Asymmetric Games with Continuous Strategy Spaces","authors":"Aradhana Narang, A. J. Shaiju","doi":"10.1142/s0219198923500123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198923500123","url":null,"abstract":"Strategies which are robust against indirect invasions (RAII) have been studied in the literature for symmetric games. In this paper, we introduce the notion of RAII profiles for asymmetric games with continuous strategy spaces. For these games, we prove that the set of all indirect neutral mutants of a RAII profile is equivalent to a minimal evolutionarily stable set. Furthermore, globally strong uninvadable profiles are shown to be RAII profiles. We also discuss connections between evolutionarily stable sets and strict equilibrium sets of profiles.","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135432013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Resolution of the n-person Prisoners' Dilemma by Kalai's Preplay Negotiation Procedure 卡莱博弈前谈判程序解决n人囚徒困境
International Game Theory Review Pub Date : 2023-11-07 DOI: 10.1142/s0219198923500135
Ko Nishihara
{"title":"Resolution of the <i>n</i>-person Prisoners' Dilemma by Kalai's Preplay Negotiation Procedure","authors":"Ko Nishihara","doi":"10.1142/s0219198923500135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198923500135","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135541471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Revealed VNM-Solutions: Characterizations 揭示的vnm解决方案:表征
IF 0.3
International Game Theory Review Pub Date : 2023-07-07 DOI: 10.1142/s0219198923500111
S. Vannucci
{"title":"Revealed VNM-Solutions: Characterizations","authors":"S. Vannucci","doi":"10.1142/s0219198923500111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198923500111","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43305893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Best-Response dynamics for evolutionary stochastic games 进化随机对策的最佳响应动力学
IF 0.3
International Game Theory Review Pub Date : 2023-06-09 DOI: 10.1142/s021919892350010x
Divya Murali, A. Shaiju
{"title":"Best-Response dynamics for evolutionary stochastic games","authors":"Divya Murali, A. Shaiju","doi":"10.1142/s021919892350010x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919892350010x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42874278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Generalized Means and Randomization Scheme of Nash Equilibria 纳什均衡的广义均值与随机化方案
IF 0.3
International Game Theory Review Pub Date : 2023-04-07 DOI: 10.1142/s0219198923500093
{"title":"Generalized Means and Randomization Scheme of Nash Equilibria","authors":"","doi":"10.1142/s0219198923500093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198923500093","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47723034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Differential Game Analysis of the Firms’ Process Innovation with Technological Spillover Under Different Market Structures in a Duopoly Market 双寡头市场中不同市场结构下企业技术溢出过程创新的差异博弈分析
IF 0.3
International Game Theory Review Pub Date : 2022-03-30 DOI: 10.1142/s0219198922500128
Shoude Li
{"title":"A Differential Game Analysis of the Firms’ Process Innovation with Technological Spillover Under Different Market Structures in a Duopoly Market","authors":"Shoude Li","doi":"10.1142/s0219198922500128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198922500128","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we formulated a dynamic game model of the firms’ process innovation with technological spillover under different market structures (market competition intensity) in a duopoly market, in which the firms are concerned about relative profits as well as their own profits and investigated the relationship between the degree of competitiveness faced by the firms and their R&D expenditure. Our results showed that, under certain conditions, the system always admits saddle point steady-state equilibrium under independent ventures and R&D cartel games, respectively, and although the process innovation investment under R&D cartel is higher than that under the independent ventures, whether the marginal production cost under R&D cartel is less (higher) than that under the independent ventures depends on the degree of technological R&D spillover and the market competition intensity. Furthermore, the marginal production cost under independent ventures is not monotonically decreasing with spillover for the given region of market competition intensity; while the marginal production cost under R&D cartel game always monotonically decreases with spillover for any market competition intensity.","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48041637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Market Exit and Minimax Regret 市场退出和最大最小遗憾
IF 0.3
International Game Theory Review Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1142/S021919892250013X
G. Umbhauer
{"title":"Market Exit and Minimax Regret","authors":"G. Umbhauer","doi":"10.1142/S021919892250013X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S021919892250013X","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64370331","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Polymatrix Gap Conjecture 多矩阵间隙猜想
IF 0.3
International Game Theory Review Pub Date : 2021-11-11 DOI: 10.1142/s0219198922500050
Pavel Naumov, I. Simonelli
{"title":"The Polymatrix Gap Conjecture","authors":"Pavel Naumov, I. Simonelli","doi":"10.1142/s0219198922500050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198922500050","url":null,"abstract":"This paper proposes a novel way to compare classes of strategic games based on their sets of pure Nash equilibria. This approach is then used to relate the classes of zero-sum games, polymatrix, and k-polymatrix games. This paper concludes with a conjecture that k-polymatrix games form an increasing chain of classes.","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64370725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Author Index Volume 22 (2020) 作者索引第22卷(2020)
IF 0.3
International Game Theory Review Pub Date : 2020-08-17 DOI: 10.1142/s0219199720990011
{"title":"Author Index Volume 22 (2020)","authors":"","doi":"10.1142/s0219199720990011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219199720990011","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1142/s0219199720990011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48414255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Author Index Volume 21 (2019) 作者索引第21卷(2019)
IF 0.3
International Game Theory Review Pub Date : 2019-10-20 DOI: 10.1142/s0219199719990013
{"title":"Author Index Volume 21 (2019)","authors":"","doi":"10.1142/s0219199719990013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219199719990013","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47868434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信