A Differential Game Analysis of the Firms’ Process Innovation with Technological Spillover Under Different Market Structures in a Duopoly Market

IF 0.4 Q4 MATHEMATICS, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS

International Game Theory Review Pub Date : 2022-03-30 DOI:10.1142/s0219198922500128

Shoude Li

{"title":"A Differential Game Analysis of the Firms’ Process Innovation with Technological Spillover Under Different Market Structures in a Duopoly Market","authors":"Shoude Li","doi":"10.1142/s0219198922500128","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we formulated a dynamic game model of the firms’ process innovation with technological spillover under different market structures (market competition intensity) in a duopoly market, in which the firms are concerned about relative profits as well as their own profits and investigated the relationship between the degree of competitiveness faced by the firms and their R&D expenditure. Our results showed that, under certain conditions, the system always admits saddle point steady-state equilibrium under independent ventures and R&D cartel games, respectively, and although the process innovation investment under R&D cartel is higher than that under the independent ventures, whether the marginal production cost under R&D cartel is less (higher) than that under the independent ventures depends on the degree of technological R&D spillover and the market competition intensity. Furthermore, the marginal production cost under independent ventures is not monotonically decreasing with spillover for the given region of market competition intensity; while the marginal production cost under R&D cartel game always monotonically decreases with spillover for any market competition intensity.","PeriodicalId":45451,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2022-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Game Theory Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198922500128","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"MATHEMATICS, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Abstract

In this paper, we formulated a dynamic game model of the firms’ process innovation with technological spillover under different market structures (market competition intensity) in a duopoly market, in which the firms are concerned about relative profits as well as their own profits and investigated the relationship between the degree of competitiveness faced by the firms and their R&D expenditure. Our results showed that, under certain conditions, the system always admits saddle point steady-state equilibrium under independent ventures and R&D cartel games, respectively, and although the process innovation investment under R&D cartel is higher than that under the independent ventures, whether the marginal production cost under R&D cartel is less (higher) than that under the independent ventures depends on the degree of technological R&D spillover and the market competition intensity. Furthermore, the marginal production cost under independent ventures is not monotonically decreasing with spillover for the given region of market competition intensity; while the marginal production cost under R&D cartel game always monotonically decreases with spillover for any market competition intensity.

查看原文本刊更多论文

双寡头市场中不同市场结构下企业技术溢出过程创新的差异博弈分析

本文建立了双寡头市场中不同市场结构（市场竞争强度）下企业过程创新与技术溢出的动态博弈模型，企业关注相对利润和自身利润，并调查了企业面临的竞争力程度与其研发支出之间的关系。我们的结果表明，在一定条件下，系统分别在独立企业和研发卡特尔博弈下总是允许鞍点稳态均衡，并且尽管研发卡特尔下的工艺创新投资高于独立企业下的工艺革新投资，研发卡特尔条件下的边际生产成本是否低于（高于）独立企业条件下的生产成本，取决于技术研发溢出程度和市场竞争强度。此外，对于给定的市场竞争强度区域，独立企业的边际生产成本并不是随着溢出而单调递减的；而对于任何市场竞争强度，研发卡特尔博弈下的边际生产成本总是随着溢出而单调递减。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

International Game Theory Review MATHEMATICS, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS-

CiteScore

0.80

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Rapid developments in technology, communication, industrial organization, economic integration, political reforms and international trade have made it increasingly imperative to recognize the causes and effects of strategic interdependencies and interactions. A strategic approach to decision-making is crucial in areas such as trade negotiations, foreign and domestic investments, capital accumulation, pollution control, market integration, regional cooperation, development and implementation of new technology, arms control, international resource extraction, network sharing, and competitive marketing. Since its inception, game theory has contributed significantly to the foundations of decision-making.