{"title":"The Best of Both Worlds: Compensation via Price-Caps for Passed-On Overcharges","authors":"Barak Yarkoni, R. Shalem, Sharon Hannes","doi":"10.1093/JLA/LAAA009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLA/LAAA009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We present a market-based compensation approach to antitrust litigation and other cases of price overcharges. Instead of lump-sum compensation, paid either directly or through coupons, defendants are required to lower their prices for a certain designated period, i.e. price-cap compensation (PCC). We show why previous criticism of PCC was misguided. And, in sharp contrast to the common view in the literature, implementing PCC may have many substantive and procedural advantages. Importantly, although PCC is implemented vis-à-vis direct purchasers only, it reconciles the U.S. and European Union legal approaches and solves the challenge of passed-on damages to indirect purchasers.","PeriodicalId":45189,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Legal Analysis","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86969486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Erratum to: Drawing the Legal Family Tree: An Empirical Comparative Study of 170 Dimensions of Property Law in 129 Jurisdictions","authors":"Yun-chien Chang, Nuno Garoupa, M. Wells","doi":"10.1093/jla/laab004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jla/laab004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45189,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Legal Analysis","volume":"132 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76111204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Holger Spamann, Lars Klöhn, Christophe Jamin, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, J. Liu, Pavan Mamidi, Alexander Morell, I. Reidel
{"title":"Judges in the Lab: No Precedent Effects, No Common/Civil Law Differences","authors":"Holger Spamann, Lars Klöhn, Christophe Jamin, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, J. Liu, Pavan Mamidi, Alexander Morell, I. Reidel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3700289","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3700289","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In our lab, 299 real judges from seven major jurisdictions (Argentina, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, and USA) spend up to fifty-five minutes to judge an international criminal appeals case and determine the appropriate prison sentence. The lab computer (i) logs their use of the documents (briefs, statement of facts, trial judgment, statute, precedent) and (ii) randomly assigns each judge (a) a horizontal precedent disfavoring, favoring, or strongly favoring defendant, (b) a sympathetic or an unsympathetic defendant, and (c) a short, medium, or long sentence anchor. Document use and written reasons differ between countries but not between common and civil law. Precedent effect is barely detectable and estimated to be less, and bounded to be not much greater than, that of legally irrelevant defendant attributes and sentence anchors.","PeriodicalId":45189,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Legal Analysis","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2020-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89207409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Economics of Leasing","authors":"Merrill T.","doi":"10.1093/jla/laaa003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jla/laaa003","url":null,"abstract":"<span><div>Abstract</div>Leasing may be the most important legal institution that has received virtually no systematic scholarly attention. Real property leasing is familiar in the context of residential tenancies. But it is also widely used in commercial contexts, including office buildings and shopping centers. Personal property leasing, which was rarely encountered before World War II, has more recently exploded on a world-wide basis, with everything from autos to farm equipment to airplanes being leased. This article seeks to develop a composite picture of the defining features of leases and why leasing is such a widespread and highly successful economic institution. The reasons fall under three general headings. (i) Leasing is an attractive method of financing the acquisition of assets, especially for persons who have limited capital or would like to conserve their capital and cash flows for other purposes. (ii) Leasing is a device for minimizing the risks that either lessees or lessors associate with owning assets; although leasing also creates risks, various lease modifications have been developed to manage these derivative risks. (iii) By dividing the rights to an asset between lessor and lessee, leasing permits the parties to specialize in different functions and to solve various impediments to contracting that would be difficult to overcome among separate owners. Understanding the economic advantages of leasing is an important first step in considering possible legal reforms of leasing.</span>","PeriodicalId":45189,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Legal Analysis","volume":"127 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2020-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138520776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does Winning a Patent Race lead to more follow-on Innovation?","authors":"Thompson N, Kuhn J.","doi":"10.1093/jla/laaa001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jla/laaa001","url":null,"abstract":"<span><div>Abstract</div>Competition between firms to invent and patent an idea, or “patent racing,” has been much discussed in theory, but seldom analyzed empirically and never at scale. This article introduces an empirical way to identify patent races, and provides the first broad-based view of them in the real world. It reveals that patent races are common, particularly in information-technology fields. The article then analyzes the effect of winning a patent race, showing that patent race winners do significantly more follow-on innovation, and their follow-on research is more similar to what was covered by the patent.(JEL CODES: O34, O32, O31)</span>","PeriodicalId":45189,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Legal Analysis","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2020-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138520853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}