Thought-A Journal of Philosophy最新文献

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Redundancy masking and the identity crowding debate 冗余屏蔽与身份拥挤争论
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Thought-A Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-10-23 DOI: 10.1002/tht3.469
Henry Taylor, B. Sayim
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引用次数: 6
Desolation sound: Social practices of natural beauty 苍凉声:社会实践的自然美
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Thought-A Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-10-21 DOI: 10.1002/tht3.470
D. Lopes
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引用次数: 2
An exclusion problem for epiphenomenalist dualism 副现象二元论的一个排除问题
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Thought-A Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-10-07 DOI: 10.1002/tht3.467
Bradford Saad
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引用次数: 1
Publishing without (some) belief 没有信仰的出版
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Thought-A Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-09-24 DOI: 10.1002/THT3.466
W. Fleisher
{"title":"Publishing without (some) belief","authors":"W. Fleisher","doi":"10.1002/THT3.466","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/THT3.466","url":null,"abstract":"Alexandra Plakias has recently argued that philosophers may permissibly publish claims they do not believe. This raises the question: when is it permissible to publish without belief? Is it always? I provide three counterexamples to the idea that it is always permissible to publish without belief. I argue that it is only permissible to publish a certain kind of claim when one does not believe it. I call these advocacy role claims. Another kind of claim is impermissible to publish without belief: what I call evidential role claims. These types are distinguished by their function. Advocacy role claims aim to promote productive debate and disagreement. Evidential role claims aim to add to the common stock of evidence. The resulting theory incorporating the distinction explains the differences between Plakias’ cases and mine. It is applicable to publishing in a wide variety of fields beyond philosophy. Philosophers have recently been interested in the appropriate attitude to have toward a controversial philosophical theory. There are a variety of reasons to doubt that belief is appropriate, as the high epistemic standards required for justified belief would seem to exclude too many philosophical theories as viable options. Relatedly, there are worries about assertions of philosophical claims, since assertion is also thought to be governed by substantive epistemic norms. In light of this, a variety of alternative attitudes have been proposed in order to characterize philosophical commitment and assertion.1 Alexandra Plakias (2019) has helpfully expanded this discussion to the topic of philosophical publication. Plakias argues that it is permissible for philosophers to write and publish works (e.g., journal articles or books) that include claims they do not believe, a practice she calls publishing without belief (PWB).2 Her thesis is carefully limited to philosophy, as opposed to 1For the reasons to worry about the appropriateness of belief, see Frances (2010, 2013), Goldberg (2013). For proposed alternative attitudes, see Barnett (2019), Carter (2018), Goldberg (2015), McKaughan (2007), Palmira (2019), and Fleisher (2018). For accounts of philosophical assertion, see Goldberg (2015) and Fleisher (2019). 2I will talk in terms of ‘claims’ in order to remain neutral about which types of speech acts publishing involves. On this usage, claims are token speech acts: statements uttered in writing.","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/THT3.466","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44026090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Counterfactuals and double prevention: Trouble for the Causal Independence thesis 反事实与双重预防:因果独立性论题的困境
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Thought-A Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-09-01 DOI: 10.1002/tht3.463
David Turon
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引用次数: 0
Putting the stars in the their places 让星星就位
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Thought-A Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-09-01 DOI: 10.1002/tht3.462
S. Logan
{"title":"Putting the stars in the their places","authors":"S. Logan","doi":"10.1002/tht3.462","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.462","url":null,"abstract":"A bstract . This paper presents a new semantics for the weak relevant logic DW that makes the role of the infamous Routley Star more explicable. Central to this rewriting is combining aspects of both the American and Australian plan for understanding negations in relevance logics.","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.462","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43055002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Issue Information 问题信息
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Thought-A Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-09-01 DOI: 10.1002/tht3.422
{"title":"Issue Information","authors":"","doi":"10.1002/tht3.422","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.422","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.422","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46502775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Inverse enkrasia and the real self 逆恩怨与真我
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Thought-A Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-08-31 DOI: 10.1002/tht3.465
Fernando Rudy‐Hiller
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引用次数: 0
Scorekeeping trolls Scorekeping巨魔
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Thought-A Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-08-31 DOI: 10.1002/tht3.464
W. Tuckwell, Kai Tanter
{"title":"Scorekeeping trolls","authors":"W. Tuckwell, Kai Tanter","doi":"10.1002/tht3.464","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.464","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.464","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45370347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Free will as a higher‐level phenomenon? 自由意志是一种更高层次的现象?
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Thought-A Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-08-18 DOI: 10.1002/tht3.461
Alexander Gebharter
{"title":"Free will as a higher‐level phenomenon?","authors":"Alexander Gebharter","doi":"10.1002/tht3.461","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.461","url":null,"abstract":"List (2014, 2019) has recently argued for a particular view of free will as a higher-level phenomenon compatible with determinism. According to List, one could refute his account by showing that determinism at the physical level implies the impossibility of doing otherwise at the agential level. This paper takes up that challenge. Based on assumptions to which List's approach is committed, I provide a simple probabilistic model that establishes the connection between physical determinism and the impossibility of doing otherwise at the agential level that is needed to refute free will as a higher-level phenomenon.","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":"9 1","pages":"177-187"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.461","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45326834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
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