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Thought-A Journal of Philosophy最新文献

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A puzzle for evaluation theories of desire 对欲望评价理论的困惑
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Thought-A Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-01-27 DOI: 10.1002/THT3.483
Alex Grzankowski
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引用次数: 0
Concomitant ignorance excuses from moral responsibility 伴随而来的无知是道德责任的借口
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Thought-A Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-01-25 DOI: 10.1002/THT3.481
R. J. Hartman
{"title":"Concomitant ignorance excuses from moral responsibility","authors":"R. J. Hartman","doi":"10.1002/THT3.481","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/THT3.481","url":null,"abstract":"Correspondence Robert J. Hartman, Philosophy, Stockholm University, Sweden. Email: roberthartman122@gmail.com Abstract Some philosophers contend that concomitant ignorance preserves moral responsibility for wrongdoing. An agent is concomitantly ignorant with respect to wrongdoing if and only if her ignorance is non-culpable, but she would freely have performed the same action if she were not ignorant. I, however, argue that concomitant ignorance excuses. I show that leading accounts of moral responsibility imply that concomitant ignorance excuses, and I debunk the view that concomitant ignorance preserves moral responsibility.","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/THT3.481","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44495059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Supersubstantivalism and the argument from harmony 超实体性与和谐论
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Thought-A Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-01-13 DOI: 10.1002/THT3.479
Matt Leonard
{"title":"Supersubstantivalism and the argument from harmony","authors":"Matt Leonard","doi":"10.1002/THT3.479","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/THT3.479","url":null,"abstract":". The core doctrine of supersubstantivalism is that material objects are identical to their spacetime locations. One powerful consideration for the view is the argument from harmony − supersubstantivalism, it is claimed, is in a position to offer an elegant explanation of a number of platitudes concerning objects and their locations. However, I will argue that identifying material objects with their locations does not provide a satisfying explanation of harmony. What the supersubstantivalist needs is not a theory about the identity of objects, but another theory about the identity of some relations. This paper proposes such a theory and shows that with it in place, the argument from harmony can be repaired.","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/THT3.479","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49010250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Expressing consistency consistently 始终如一地表达一致性
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Thought-A Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-01-04 DOI: 10.1002/tht3.477
Lucas Rosenblatt
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引用次数: 0
Myers' paradox 迈尔斯的悖论
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Thought-A Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.1002/tht3.480
G. Priest
{"title":"Myers' paradox","authors":"G. Priest","doi":"10.1002/tht3.480","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.480","url":null,"abstract":"Correspondence Graham Priest, Department of Philosophy, CUNY Graduate Center, New York, NY, USA. Email: priest.graham@gmail.com Abstract This note is an analysis of the paradox given by Meyers (2019). It is shown, assuming that the resources available in paraconsistent logic may be applied, how the conclusion of the paradox may be perfectly acceptable, but that the argument is, nonetheless, invalid. This provides a dialethic solution to the paradox.","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":"49 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.480","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50986204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Yablo's paradox and forcing 亚布罗的悖论和强迫
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Thought-A Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-12-30 DOI: 10.1002/tht3.475
S. Garti
{"title":"Yablo's paradox and forcing","authors":"S. Garti","doi":"10.1002/tht3.475","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.475","url":null,"abstract":"We suggest a forcing version of Yablo's paradox and discuss its implication on self-reference.","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.475","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48491344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Issue Information 问题信息
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Thought-A Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-12-01 DOI: 10.1002/tht3.423
{"title":"Issue Information","authors":"","doi":"10.1002/tht3.423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.423","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.423","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47667095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Beyond good and bad: Reflexive imperativism, not evaluativism, explains valence 超越好与坏：解释效价的是反思性的否定主义，而不是评价主义
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Thought-A Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-11-10 DOI: 10.1002/tht3.471
Luca Barlassina
{"title":"Beyond good and bad: Reflexive imperativism, not evaluativism, explains valence","authors":"Luca Barlassina","doi":"10.1002/tht3.471","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.471","url":null,"abstract":"Evaluativism by Carruthers and reflexive imperativism by Barlassina and Hayward agree that valence—the (un)pleasantness of experiences—is a natural kind shared across all affective states. But they disagree about what valence is. For evaluativism, an experience is pleasant/unpleasant in virtue of representing its worldly object as good/bad; for reflexive imperativism, an experience is pleasant/unpleasant in virtue of commanding its subject to get more/less of itself. I argue that reflexive imperativism is superior to evaluativism according to Carruthers's own standards. He maintains that a theory of valence should account for its phenomenology and role in imagination‐based decision‐making. I show that it is reflexive imperativism, rather than evaluativism, that fits this explanatory bill.","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.471","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42439750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Deixis, demonstratives, and definite descriptions 指示语、指示词和确定性描述
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Thought-A Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-11-08 DOI: 10.1002/tht3.472
Thomas J. Hughes
{"title":"Deixis, demonstratives, and definite descriptions","authors":"Thomas J. Hughes","doi":"10.1002/tht3.472","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.472","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":"9 1","pages":"285-297"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.472","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47703334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does empirical evidence support perceptual mindreading? 经验证据支持感知读心吗？
IF 0.7 2区 哲学
Thought-A Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-10-29 DOI: 10.1002/tht3.468
Joulia Smortchkova
{"title":"Does empirical evidence support perceptual mindreading?","authors":"Joulia Smortchkova","doi":"10.1002/tht3.468","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.468","url":null,"abstract":"According to perceptual accounts of mindreading, we can see, rather than cognize, other people's mental states. On one version of this approach, certain mental properties figure in the contents of our perceptual experiences. In a recent paper, Varga has appealed to empirical research to argue that intentions and emotions can indeed be seen, rather than cognized. In this paper, I argue that none of the evidence adduced to support the perceptual account of mindreading shows that we see mental properties, as opposed to non-mental properties.","PeriodicalId":44963,"journal":{"name":"Thought-A Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/tht3.468","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49562407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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