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The Puzzle of Fictional Models 虚构模型之谜
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-12-11 DOI: 10.1007/s10838-023-09662-5
Lisa Zorzato
{"title":"The Puzzle of Fictional Models","authors":"Lisa Zorzato","doi":"10.1007/s10838-023-09662-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-023-09662-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The use of fictional models is extensive and rewarding in modern science. This fact captured the attention of philosophers of science, who are focusing on questions such as the following: is it possible for a fictional model to be explanatory? And, if so, in virtue of what is such a fictional model explanatory? In this paper, I discuss these questions in relation to the realism vs. anti-realism debate in philosophy of science. I focus on work developed by Alisa Bokulich who has argued for the explanatory role played by fictional models, claiming that it can be accommodated by realism in ‘a broad sense’. To this end, Bokulich introduced what she called ‘an eikonic conception’ of explanation, as opposed to the so-called ‘ontic’ conception. This move, Bokulich claims, allows non-causal explanations to be acceptable to a modified version, as opposed to a ‘naïve’ brand of realism. Roughly, a fictional model can capture aspects of reality if it manages to act as a proxy for a theory targeting a physical system. As Bokulich explains with the example of James Clerk Maxwell’s use of mechanical models, this is due to structural correspondences between a model and a theory at a certain level of abstraction. However, Bokulich does not explain how the model grasps reality. In this paper, I fill this missing piece of the puzzle. While I agree with Bokulich on the explanatory function of fictional models, I shall invoke her reading of Maxwell’s work to draw a different conclusion. Specifically, I argue that structural correspondences at various levels form what I call ‘a ladder of abstractions’ which connects aspects of a target system to the corresponding depths of descriptions. Modifying in these terms the scope of ‘representing a system’, I suggest that Bokulich’s proposed modification of realism is obviated.</p>","PeriodicalId":44953,"journal":{"name":"Journal for General Philosophy of Science","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138565714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Locus of Agency in Extended Cognitive Systems 扩展认知系统中的代理中心
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-12-09 DOI: 10.1007/s10838-023-09666-1
Barbara Tomczyk
{"title":"The Locus of Agency in Extended Cognitive Systems","authors":"Barbara Tomczyk","doi":"10.1007/s10838-023-09666-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-023-09666-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The increasing popularity of artificial cognitive enhancements raises the issue of their impact on the agent’s personal autonomy, and issues pertaining to how the latter is to be secured. The <i>extended mind</i> thesis implies that mental states responsible for autonomous action can be partly constituted by the workings of cognitive artifacts themselves, and the question then arises of whether this commits one to embracing an <i>extended agent</i> thesis. My answer is negative. After briefly presenting the main accounts on the conditions for autonomous agency, and analyzing how the latter can be protected from threats posed by the use of cognitive artifacts, I argue that autonomous agency is essentially tied to conscious experience and intentionality, which in turn can only be attributed to the human part of any extended cognitive system. I present both theoretical (conceptual) and practical arguments against recognizing the entire extended system, composed of one human and an artifact, as an autonomous agent.</p>","PeriodicalId":44953,"journal":{"name":"Journal for General Philosophy of Science","volume":"77 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138560040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Pragmatism Versus Social Construction: A Reply to Shahryari 实用主义与社会建构：对 Shahryari 的答复
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-12-07 DOI: 10.1007/s10838-023-09668-z
David J. Stump
{"title":"Pragmatism Versus Social Construction: A Reply to Shahryari","authors":"David J. Stump","doi":"10.1007/s10838-023-09668-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-023-09668-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a response to my recent article in this journal, Shahram Shahryari argues that I fail to present a third position between absolutism and relativism. He makes two points: first, that fallibilism is insufficient as an alternative, because it is compatible with both relativism and absolutism. The second point is that my argument that experience can lead to objective judgment without being a new absolute fails. I discuss these in turn, showing that both critiques fail and that pragmatism is a genuine alternative between absolutism and relativism.</p>","PeriodicalId":44953,"journal":{"name":"Journal for General Philosophy of Science","volume":"108 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138546651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
‘Does the Claim that there are no Theories Imply that there is no History of Theories to be Written?(!)’* “没有理论的说法是否意味着没有理论史可写?(!)”*
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-11-24 DOI: 10.1007/s10838-023-09651-8
Steven French
{"title":"‘Does the Claim that there are no Theories Imply that there is no History of Theories to be Written?(!)’*","authors":"Steven French","doi":"10.1007/s10838-023-09651-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-023-09651-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In <i>There Are No Such Things As Theories</i> (French 2020), the reification of theories is critically analysed and rejected. My aim here is to tease out some of the implications of this approach first of all, for how we, philosophers of science, should view the history of science; secondly, for how we should understand the devices that we use in our own philosophical practices; and thirdly, for how we might think about the relationship between the history of science and the philosophy of science.</p>","PeriodicalId":44953,"journal":{"name":"Journal for General Philosophy of Science","volume":"85 S1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138495540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Many Faces of Realism about Natural Kinds 关于自然种类的现实主义的许多面
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-11-17 DOI: 10.1007/s10838-023-09663-4
Zdenka Brzović
{"title":"The Many Faces of Realism about Natural Kinds","authors":"Zdenka Brzović","doi":"10.1007/s10838-023-09663-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-023-09663-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The label realist in the debate about natural kinds can imply different things. Many authors in this debate subscribe to views that are in some way realist, but without making clear whether the realism in question specifically attaches to kind categories or something else. The traditional understanding of realism about natural kinds is stated in terms of the mind-independence criterion. However, a recent tendency in the debate is to reject this understanding on the ground of its incompatibility with naturalistic approaches to natural kinds. The aim of this paper is to disentangle different meanings attached to the term realism about natural kinds and examine arguments for rejecting the traditional mind-independence framing of the debate. I recommend the reestablishment of mind-independent realism as a legitimate contender for naturalist approaches to natural kinds by indicating that mind-independent realists have at their disposal all the resources to subscribe to such an approach. I proceed by showing how keeping the traditional distinction between realist and antirealist views in terms of mind-independence allows us to keep track of important distinctions between different accounts of natural kinds which are otherwise blurred. Then I examine the arguments against this traditional framing and conclude that they either (1) rest on a conflation between mind-independence of kinds versus entities belonging to kinds, or (2) unjustifiably presuppose that mind-independent realists do not have resources to uphold a naturalistic view of natural kinds.</p>","PeriodicalId":44953,"journal":{"name":"Journal for General Philosophy of Science","volume":"85 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138495539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Thomas S. Kuhn: The Last Writings of Thomas S. Kuhn: Incommensurability in Science. Edited by Bojana Mladenovic. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2022, xlix + 302 pp., €25,99 (Hardcover), ISBN 9780226822747 托马斯-S-库恩托马斯-S-库恩的最后著作：科学中的不可通约性》。Bojana Mladenovic 编辑。芝加哥大学出版社：芝加哥，2022 年，xlix + 302 页，25,99 欧元（精装），ISBN 9780226822747
2区 哲学
Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-11-09 DOI: 10.1007/s10838-023-09661-6
Juan V. Mayoral
{"title":"Thomas S. Kuhn: The Last Writings of Thomas S. Kuhn: Incommensurability in Science. Edited by Bojana Mladenovic. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2022, xlix + 302 pp., €25,99 (Hardcover), ISBN 9780226822747","authors":"Juan V. Mayoral","doi":"10.1007/s10838-023-09661-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-023-09661-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44953,"journal":{"name":"Journal for General Philosophy of Science","volume":" 8","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135286563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Veritistic Teleological Epistemology, the Bad Lot, and Epistemic Risk Consistency 真论的目的论认识论，坏运气，和认识论风险的一致性
2区 哲学
Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-11-09 DOI: 10.1007/s10838-023-09650-9
Raimund Pils
{"title":"Veritistic Teleological Epistemology, the Bad Lot, and Epistemic Risk Consistency","authors":"Raimund Pils","doi":"10.1007/s10838-023-09650-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-023-09650-9","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper connects veritistic teleological epistemology, VTE , with the epistemological dimension of the scientific realism debate. VTE sees our epistemic activities as a tradeoff between believing truths and avoiding error. I argue that van Fraassen’s epistemology is not suited to give a justification for a crucial presupposition of his Bad Lot objection to inference to the best explanation (IBE), the presupposition that believing that p is linked to p being more likely to be true. This makes him vulnerable to a counterargument, tailored after Musgrave’s defense of IBE , which would result in a stalemate between them about presuppositions of rationality. I will, however, show that switching to VTE can justify van Fraassen’s presupposition. This leads to a dismissal of common IBE arguments for realism as presented by Boyd and Musgrave, but I also argue that a more cautious version of realism can be rescued from the Bad Lot objection. Finally, I raise some worries about epistemic risk-attitude consistency for constructive empiricists and develop an alternative anti-realist position. 1","PeriodicalId":44953,"journal":{"name":"Journal for General Philosophy of Science","volume":" 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135285594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Causal Pluralism in Medicine and its Implications for Clinical Practice 医学中的因果多元化及其对临床实践的影响
2区 哲学
Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-11-03 DOI: 10.1007/s10838-023-09658-1
Mariusz Maziarz
{"title":"Causal Pluralism in Medicine and its Implications for Clinical Practice","authors":"Mariusz Maziarz","doi":"10.1007/s10838-023-09658-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-023-09658-1","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The existing philosophical views on what is the meaning of causality adequate to medicine are vastly divided. We approach this question and offer two arguments in favor of pluralism regarding concepts of causality. First, we analyze the three main types of research designs (randomized-controlled trials, observational epidemiology and laboratory research). We argue, using examples, that they allow for making causal conclusions that are best understood differently in each case (in agreement with a version of manipulationist, probabilistic and mechanistic definitions, respectively). Second, we analyze clinical practice and argue that these manipulationist, probabilistic and mechanistic causal claims can be used as evidence for different therapeutic decisions. We differentiate among ‘predicting’ that does not change the relata of causal claims, (mechanistic) ‘interferences’, and ‘interventions’ in the strict sense that act on causes to change effects. The central conclusion is that causal claims agreeing with diverse concepts of causality can deliver evidence for different types of therapeutic decisions.","PeriodicalId":44953,"journal":{"name":"Journal for General Philosophy of Science","volume":"55 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135868630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Contextualist Solution to the Demarcation Problem 界定问题的语境主义解决方案
2区 哲学
Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-09-21 DOI: 10.1007/s10838-023-09648-3
Olivier Sartenaer
{"title":"A Contextualist Solution to the Demarcation Problem","authors":"Olivier Sartenaer","doi":"10.1007/s10838-023-09648-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-023-09648-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44953,"journal":{"name":"Journal for General Philosophy of Science","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136154175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Can Dispositions Replace Laws in the Description of the Physical World? 在物理世界的描述中，性情能取代规律吗?
2区 哲学
Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-09-20 DOI: 10.1007/s10838-023-09657-2
Joanna Luc
{"title":"Can Dispositions Replace Laws in the Description of the Physical World?","authors":"Joanna Luc","doi":"10.1007/s10838-023-09657-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-023-09657-2","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, it is argued that, contrary to some suggestions in the philosophical literature, dispositions cannot replace laws in the description of the physical world. If for a certain type of physical situation a well-working law-based account is available, then it is not possible to describe that situation equally well in terms of dispositions. Using an example consisting of four laws (Coulomb’s law, Newton’s law of gravitation, the rule for the composition of forces and Newton’s second law), it is shown that when one attempts to replace a law-based account with a disposition-based account, the latter turns out to be either less informative or inferior with respect to theoretical virtues, such as simplicity, unification, non-triviality of predictions and explanatory power. Laws are also better suited to deal with interactions and their screening off. Using inference to the best explanation, one can conclude from this comparison that it is laws rather than dispositions that should be included in our ontological picture of nature.","PeriodicalId":44953,"journal":{"name":"Journal for General Philosophy of Science","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136308207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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