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Journal for General Philosophy of Science最新文献

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Induction and the Principles of Love in Francis Bacon’s Philosophy of Nature 弗朗西斯-培根自然哲学中的归纳法和爱的原则
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-09-09 DOI: 10.1007/s10838-024-09676-7
Ori Belkind
{"title":"Induction and the Principles of Love in Francis Bacon’s Philosophy of Nature","authors":"Ori Belkind","doi":"10.1007/s10838-024-09676-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-024-09676-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper presents a reading of Bacon’s <i>Novum Organum</i> and the inductive method he offers therein. According to this reading, Bacon’s induction is the search for forms that are necessary and sufficient for making simple natures present. Simple natures are observable qualities. However, in the paper we argue that forms can best be understood via Bacon’s appetitive physics, according to which particles and bodies are endowed with appetites or inclinations that lead to bodily transformations. We argue that this conceptual elaboration of the notion of form changes our understanding of Bacon’s inductive method. In fact, his inductive method is a reductive program designed to find, for each observable quality (or simple nature), the transformation or combination of transformations associated with its coming to being. The paper considers the textual evidence for this reading and argues for the benefits of this reading in relation to other, traditional interpretations.</p>","PeriodicalId":44953,"journal":{"name":"Journal for General Philosophy of Science","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142200877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Back to Reichenbach 返回莱辛巴赫
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-08-13 DOI: 10.1007/s10838-024-09680-x
Carlo Rovelli
{"title":"Back to Reichenbach","authors":"Carlo Rovelli","doi":"10.1007/s10838-024-09680-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-024-09680-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In his 1956 book ‘The Direction of Time’, Hans Reichenbach offered a comprehensive analysis of the physical ground of the <i>direction of time</i>, the notion of <i>physical cause</i>, and the relation between the two. I review its conclusions and argue that at the light of recent advances in physics Reichenbach analysis provides the best account for the physical underpinning of these notions. I integrate results in cosmology, and on the physical underpinning of <i>records</i> and <i>agency</i> into Reichenbach’s account, and discuss which questions it leaves open.</p>","PeriodicalId":44953,"journal":{"name":"Journal for General Philosophy of Science","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142200878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Deep Learning-Aided Research and the Aim-of-Science Controversy 深度学习辅助研究与科学目标之争
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-08-01 DOI: 10.1007/s10838-023-09667-0
Yukinori Onishi
{"title":"Deep Learning-Aided Research and the Aim-of-Science Controversy","authors":"Yukinori Onishi","doi":"10.1007/s10838-023-09667-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-023-09667-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The aim or goal of science has long been discussed by both philosophers of science and scientists themselves. In <i>The Scientific Image</i> (van Fraassen 1980), the aim of science is famously employed to characterize scientific realism and a version of anti-realism, called <i>constructive empiricism.</i> Since the publication of <i>The Scientific Image</i>, however, various changes have occurred in scientific practice. The increasing use of machine learning technology, especially deep learning (DL), is probably one of the major changes in the last decade. This paper aims to explore the implications of DL-aided research for the aim of science debate. I argue that, while the emerging DL-aided research is unlikely to change the state of classic opposition between constructive empiricism and scientific realism, it could offer interesting cases regarding the opposition between those who espouse truth as the aim of science and those oriented to understanding (of the kind that sacrifices truth).</p>","PeriodicalId":44953,"journal":{"name":"Journal for General Philosophy of Science","volume":"75 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141887354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On Semirealism, Realism More Generally, and Underlying Epistemic Stances 论半现实主义、一般现实主义和基本认识论立场
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-07-22 DOI: 10.1007/s10838-024-09672-x
Anjan Chakravartty
{"title":"On Semirealism, Realism More Generally, and Underlying Epistemic Stances","authors":"Anjan Chakravartty","doi":"10.1007/s10838-024-09672-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-024-09672-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The commentators in this Special Issue on ‘Epistemology, ontology, and scientific realism’ raise substantial questions about, and objections to, central aspects of my own thinking about semirealism (a proposal for how best to formulate scientific realism), as well as the larger philosophical context in which debates about scientific realism unfold. This larger context concerns the nature of realism more generally and the epistemic stances that underlie our considered opinions of what the sciences are telling us about the ontology of the world. In this paper, I consider my critics’ remarks, and endeavor to lay their criticisms to rest.</p>","PeriodicalId":44953,"journal":{"name":"Journal for General Philosophy of Science","volume":"62 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141741952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Evolution of the Bell Notion of Beable: From Bohr to Primitive Ontology 贝尔可待概念的演变：从玻尔到原始本体论
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-06-25 DOI: 10.1007/s10838-024-09675-8
Federico Laudisa
{"title":"The Evolution of the Bell Notion of Beable: From Bohr to Primitive Ontology","authors":"Federico Laudisa","doi":"10.1007/s10838-024-09675-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-024-09675-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>John S. Bell introduced the notion of <i>beable</i>, as opposed to the standard notion of <i>observable</i>, in order to emphasize the need for an unambiguous formulation of quantum mechanics. In the paper I show that Bell formulated in fact <i>two</i> different theories of beables. The first is somehow reminiscent of the Bohr views on quantum mechanics but, at the same time, is curiously adopted by Bell as a critical tool <i>against</i> the Copenhagen interpretation, whereas the second, more mature formulation was among the sources of inspiration of the so-called <i>Primitive Ontology</i> (PO) approach to quantum mechanics, an approach inspired to scientific realism. In the first part of the paper it is argued that, contrary to the Bell wishes, the first formulation of the theory fails to be an effective recipe for addressing the ambiguity underlying the standard formulation of quantum mechanics, whereas it is only the second formulation that successfully paves the way to the PO approach. In the second part, I consider how the distinction between the two formulations of the Bell theory of beables fares <i>vis-a-vis</i> the complex relationship between the theory of beables and the details of the PO approach.</p>","PeriodicalId":44953,"journal":{"name":"Journal for General Philosophy of Science","volume":"61 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141502739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Ontology of Causation: A Carnapian-Pragmatist Approach 因果关系本体论：卡纳普实用主义方法
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-06-19 DOI: 10.1007/s10838-023-09669-y
Zili Dong
{"title":"The Ontology of Causation: A Carnapian-Pragmatist Approach","authors":"Zili Dong","doi":"10.1007/s10838-023-09669-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-023-09669-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Metaphysicians of causation have long debated the existence of primitive causal modalities (e.g., powers), with reductionists and realists taking opposing stances. However, little attention has been given to the legitimacy of the metaphysical question itself, despite our longstanding awareness of Rudolf Carnap’s critique of metaphysics. This article develops a (broadly) Carnapian-pragmatist approach to causation as an alternative to existing metaphysical approaches. Within this pragmatist approach, metaphysical questions about causation are reinterpreted as practical questions about the choice of causal frameworks. To motivate and justify this new approach, I argue that, in emphasizing the priority of ontology over methodology, metaphysical approaches to causation fail to adequately capture the interplay between causal ontology and causal methodology in scientific practice. In contrast, the Carnapian approach provides a more appealing alternative that emphasizes the mutual dependence and ‘balance’ between the two in an ongoing process of scientific inquiry. I use the recent controversy over ‘What counts as a cause’ in statistical causal inference as a case study to demonstrate how the Carnapian approach can help us better understand the role of ontological issues in methodological practices.</p>","PeriodicalId":44953,"journal":{"name":"Journal for General Philosophy of Science","volume":"87 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141502740","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Structural Realism About the Free Energy Principle, the Best of Both Worlds 关于自由能原理的结构现实主义，两全其美的方案
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-03-26 DOI: 10.1007/s10838-024-09673-w
Majid D. Beni
{"title":"Structural Realism About the Free Energy Principle, the Best of Both Worlds","authors":"Majid D. Beni","doi":"10.1007/s10838-024-09673-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-024-09673-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>There are realist and antirealist interpretations of the free energy principle (FEP). This paper aims to chart out a structural realist interpretation of FEP. To do so, it draws on Worrall’s (Dialectica 43(1–2): 99–124, 1989) proposal. The general insight of Worrall’s paper is that there is progress at the level of the structure of theories rather than their content. To enact Worrall’s strategy in the context of FEP, this paper will focus on characterising the formal continuity between fundamental equations of thermodynamics—such as Boltzmann’s equation and Gibbs’s equation—on the one hand, and Friston’s characterisation of FEP on the other. Lack of a universal consensus on the physical character of entities that feature in thermodynamics, information theory and FEP notwithstanding, I argue that there is structural continuity and unity at the level of mathematical equations that regiment entropy, information and free energy. The existence of such structural continuity and unity provides grounds for structural realism about FEP.</p>","PeriodicalId":44953,"journal":{"name":"Journal for General Philosophy of Science","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140297612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Running Mice and Successful Theories: The Limitations of a Classical Analogy 奔跑的老鼠和成功的理论：经典类比的局限性
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-12-27 DOI: 10.1007/s10838-023-09664-3
Matthias Egg, August Hämmerli
{"title":"Running Mice and Successful Theories: The Limitations of a Classical Analogy","authors":"Matthias Egg, August Hämmerli","doi":"10.1007/s10838-023-09664-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-023-09664-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Bas van Fraassen’s Darwinian explanation for the success of science has sparked four decades of discussion, with scientific realists and antirealists alike using biologically inspired reasoning to support their points of view. Based on critical engagement with van Fraassen’s proposal itself and later contributions by Stathis Psillos and K. Brad Wray, we claim that central arguments on both sides of this controversy suffer from an insufficient understanding of Darwinism and its underlying biological concepts. Adding the necessary biological background turns out to subvert the argumentative force of viewing the success of scientific theories as analogous to the behaviour of biotic entities. In conclusion, we sketch more productive ways of viewing the relationship between biology and scientific realism.</p>","PeriodicalId":44953,"journal":{"name":"Journal for General Philosophy of Science","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139057007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Global Epistemologies and Philosophies of Science: Global Dialogues and New Directions for Philosophy of Science 全球认识论与科学哲学：全球对话与科学哲学的新方向
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-12-19 DOI: 10.1007/s10838-023-09660-7
Elise Alkemade, Nils Deeg, Carles Guillén Almiñana, Samar Nasrullah Khan, Oriana Morales Hernández, Abigail Nieves Delgado, Elian Schure, Mark Whittle, Hilbrand Wouters
{"title":"Global Epistemologies and Philosophies of Science: Global Dialogues and New Directions for Philosophy of Science","authors":"Elise Alkemade, Nils Deeg, Carles Guillén Almiñana, Samar Nasrullah Khan, Oriana Morales Hernández, Abigail Nieves Delgado, Elian Schure, Mark Whittle, Hilbrand Wouters","doi":"10.1007/s10838-023-09660-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-023-09660-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44953,"journal":{"name":"Journal for General Philosophy of Science","volume":" 473","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138960466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
In Science We Trust: Larry Laudan (1941–2022) 我们相信科学拉里-劳丹（1941-2022）
IF 1 2区 哲学
Journal for General Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-12-16 DOI: 10.1007/s10838-023-09670-5
S. Psillos
{"title":"In Science We Trust: Larry Laudan (1941–2022)","authors":"S. Psillos","doi":"10.1007/s10838-023-09670-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-023-09670-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44953,"journal":{"name":"Journal for General Philosophy of Science","volume":"92 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138966965","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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