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The Effects of Hate Groups on Hate Crimes 仇恨团体对仇恨犯罪的影响
IF 0.3
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2019-07-11 DOI: 10.1515/rle-2017-0035
Ken Yahagi
{"title":"The Effects of Hate Groups on Hate Crimes","authors":"Ken Yahagi","doi":"10.1515/rle-2017-0035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2017-0035","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper presents a simple theoretical model to analyze the relationship between hate groups and hate crimes. This paper focuses on two important roles of hate groups; as providers of membership benefits for group members and as a coordination device for leadership. This paper shows that this interaction implies the possibility of multiple equilibria of the crime rate. This result explains why hate crimes and extreme criminal activities vary across communities and over time, and why a social shock such as 9/11 resulted in a rapid increase of hate crimes. Moreover, if hate groups work as coordination devices, the existence of hate groups may increase hate crimes. This result supports recent empirical results analyzing relationships between hate groups and hate crimes.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85915063","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Reducing Ethical Misconduct of Attorneys with Mandatory Ethics Training: A Dynamic Panel Approach 通过强制性道德培训减少律师的道德不端行为:一个动态的小组方法
IF 0.3
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2019-05-07 DOI: 10.1515/rle-2017-0049
F. Fagan
{"title":"Reducing Ethical Misconduct of Attorneys with Mandatory Ethics Training: A Dynamic Panel Approach","authors":"F. Fagan","doi":"10.1515/rle-2017-0049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2017-0049","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract State bar associations require bar applicants to pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination over a range of scores and earn a variable number continuing legal education credits in ethics annually. Panel data from 2007–2014 across the fifty states and the District of Columbia are used to assess whether these requirements reduce charges of ethical misconduct against attorneys. Deviations GMM estimation provides evidence that increases in MCLE annual credit-hours in ethics reduce charges. Specifically, a one-hour increase in MCLE reduces the number of charges of ethical misconduct by 10.506 %. The result is robust to different types of models and estimators, but requires making several strong assumptions which are discussed in detail.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75836546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
On Plaintiff Preferences Regarding Methods of Compensating Lawyers 论原告对律师补偿方式的偏好
IF 0.3
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2019-04-25 DOI: 10.1515/rle-2018-0008
Tim Friehe, Yannick Gabuthy
{"title":"On Plaintiff Preferences Regarding Methods of Compensating Lawyers","authors":"Tim Friehe, Yannick Gabuthy","doi":"10.1515/rle-2018-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2018-0008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper analyzes a litigation contest in which the plaintiff’s lawyer and the defendant choose effort. The plaintiff selects the relative importance of a contract component related to the judgment (similar to contingent fees) and a component related to the lawyer’s efforts (similar to conditional fees) to ensure lawyer participation and guide the lawyer’s decision-making. For our setup, we find that the plaintiff considers the component related to the lawyer’s effort to be the relatively more desirable instrument in the light of its effort-inducing and cost characteristics. However, high levels of the lawyer’s outside utility may limit the role of this component.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85817194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Litigation and the Product Rule: A Rent Seeking Approach 诉讼与产品规则:一种寻租方法
IF 0.3
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2019-04-24 DOI: 10.1515/rle-2017-0044
J. D. De Mot, Thomas J. Miceli
{"title":"Litigation and the Product Rule: A Rent Seeking Approach","authors":"J. D. De Mot, Thomas J. Miceli","doi":"10.1515/rle-2017-0044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2017-0044","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper examines the suppression of the product rule in litigation from a rent seeking perspective. We show that there are some important arguments in favor of not applying it. First, the expected judgment is always lower when the product rule is used, especially for relatively strong cases. Second, litigation expenditures are often larger when the product rule is used, again especially for relatively strong cases. Both of these factors decrease the plaintiff’s expected value for such cases. Third, when the product rule is suppressed, the plaintiff files all cases that he or she should win. This is not so when the product rule is applied. Fourth, for many of the weakest cases (the ones in which the quality of all issues is rather weak), the expected value of the plaintiff’s case is larger when the product rule is used. The main argument in favor of the application of the product rule is that when the rule is suppressed, plaintiffs file more cases in which the quality of one issue is weak and the quality of the other issue is strong. However, the influence of this factor on the ex ante incentives of the injurer is relatively small.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91257968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Rawls, Taxation and Calabresi & Melamed’s Rules 罗尔斯，《税收与卡拉布雷西和梅拉米德规则》
IF 0.3
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2019-04-24 DOI: 10.1515/rle-2016-0073
Limor Riza
{"title":"Rawls, Taxation and Calabresi & Melamed’s Rules","authors":"Limor Riza","doi":"10.1515/rle-2016-0073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2016-0073","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The paper identifies a new rule in the tax discourse – the versatility rule. Calabresi and Melamed’s landmark article contributed to the legal discussion despite paying relatively little attention to taxation. This paper analyzes income tax, Calabresi and Melamed’s rules and Rawls’ theory, and examines whether Calabresi and Melamed’s pioneering work on liability, property and inalienability rules can be integrated into income tax discourse (and other legitimate property expropriations); and claims that these rules assist in understanding the essence of taxation. The question is analyzed from the Rawlsian perspective since his concern with the “least advantaged” and inequality in society poses a serious global challenge. The paper offers a unique analysis by showing that in the tax field all rules protect the same entitlement at the same time against the same entity – the government. This concurrent implementation of Calabresi and Melamed’s rules in taxation can only take place when taxation is understood as both “giving” and “taking”. Although the paper aims at increasing distributive goals, it appears that efficient outcome is its byproduct. Integrating Calabresi and Melamed’s rules into the tax discourse via Rawls’ theory not only elucidates the versatility rule but also blurs the distinction between the protection and transfer rules, and highlights the reciprocity of the duty and right to pay taxes. Since Calabresi and Melamed’s classical work, many scholars have significantly modified the existing rules and developed new ones, such as the Solomonic entitlement and the pliability rule, though no one has thus far proposed a scenario in which all remedies simultaneously apply against the same entity.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90490300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Expanding Shareholders’ Power: An Analysis of Reform Proposals in Malaysia 扩大股东权力:马来西亚改革建议分析
IF 0.3
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2019-04-24 DOI: 10.1515/RLE-2015-0041
S. Rachagan, Aiman Nariman Mohd Sulaiman
{"title":"Expanding Shareholders’ Power: An Analysis of Reform Proposals in Malaysia","authors":"S. Rachagan, Aiman Nariman Mohd Sulaiman","doi":"10.1515/RLE-2015-0041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/RLE-2015-0041","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A series of recent reform proposals in Malaysia have started to consider enhancing shareholders’ self-help remedies by expanding shareholders’ powers in corporate decision-making. The reform of listing rules, codes of corporate governance, and securities law legislation is intended to enhance shareholders’ participatory rights in decision-making in Malaysia. Some of the proposals echo the present UK position under the UK Companies Act 2006. These changes, occurring in several common law countries such as Malaysia, Hong Kong and UK, and the recent EU revision proposals, indicate a change of legal position towards expanding shareholders’ power even to the extent of giving instruction to the board. But are these sufficient or can more be done? For Malaysia and other developing economies, we argue for a self-enforcing model that requires expansion of shareholders’ general power by identifying and removing legal barriers to shareholders’ empowerment. This is recommended for other developing countries which share a similar corporate and regulatory architecture.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90981203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
A Rule of Reason Approach for Passive Minority Interests within the European Union 欧盟内部被动少数人利益的理性规则方法
IF 0.3
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2019-04-12 DOI: 10.1515/rle-2018-0041
N. Zevgolis, Panagiotis N. Fotis
{"title":"A Rule of Reason Approach for Passive Minority Interests within the European Union","authors":"N. Zevgolis, Panagiotis N. Fotis","doi":"10.1515/rle-2018-0041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2018-0041","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this interdisciplinary paper we analyze the anticompetitive effects and the practicability and applicability of passive (non-controlling) minority interests within the existing Merger Regulation system [Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), OJ L 24/1]. The empirical evidences from existing economic literature and case law show that the existence of an enforcement gap in European Union competition law regarding the anticompetitive effects of non-controlling minority interests has not been confirmed so far. Therefore, there is no space, at least to date, for a per se ruling in the European Union Law for the assessment of passive minority interests, but for a Rule of Reason approach, based on a case by case analysis. The Commission should continue to investigate non-controlling transactions and, in the future, an ex post assessment/quantification of their anticompetitive effects, based on existing (or settled) case law and economic theory, should be at the core of its agenda.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85392072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Product Market Competition’s Effect on Earnings Management When Audit Quality Is Endogenous: Theory and Evidence 审计质量内生时产品市场竞争对盈余管理的影响:理论与证据
IF 0.3
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2019-04-10 DOI: 10.1515/rle-2018-0044
A. Samuel, Jeremy Schwartz
{"title":"Product Market Competition’s Effect on Earnings Management When Audit Quality Is Endogenous: Theory and Evidence","authors":"A. Samuel, Jeremy Schwartz","doi":"10.1515/rle-2018-0044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2018-0044","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A long standing question is whether product market competition disciplines a firm’s incentive to engage in earnings management. This paper argues that this question cannot be investigated adequately without accounting for the quality of firms’ auditors, because auditors affect the probability of discovering earnings management. Since firms choose their auditor, a non-compliant firm can alter its own probability of being detected. Consequently, a firm’s decision to manage earnings is a function of its auditor’s quality, which is itself endogenously chosen by the firm. To study this issue we develop a game-theoretic model that captures the potential inter-relationship between industry competition, the firms’ choice of audit quality, and compliance with accounting regulations (or the degree of earnings manipulation). We show that the link between financial compliance and product market competition is affected by the endogenously chosen audit quality. We estimate this model’s structural parameters and find that greater competition reduces both compliance and the demand for high quality audits.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86101282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Emissions Trading Hybrids: The Case of the EU ETS 混合排放交易:以欧盟排放交易体系为例
IF 0.3
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2019-03-31 DOI: 10.1515/rle-2014-0054
E. Woerdman, A. Nentjes
{"title":"Emissions Trading Hybrids: The Case of the EU ETS","authors":"E. Woerdman, A. Nentjes","doi":"10.1515/rle-2014-0054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2014-0054","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We argue that the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) has evolved into a hybrid of two design variants, allowance trading (cap-and-trade) and credit trading (performance standard rate trading), with an added feature of industry support to minimize carbon leakage. In particular the current rules tying free allowances to production capacity expansion, plant closure and capacity use have transformed the efficient cap-and-trade program that stood at the origins of the EU ETS into a system that even surpasses credit trading in paying hidden product subsidies to firms. This combination of rules encourages an inefficiently high level of investment in production capacity and an inefficiently high output in industries exposed to international competition. The result is a sub-optimal EU Emissions Trading ‘Hybrid’ (which we therefore label as ‘EU ETH’).","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87260404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
A Law-and-Economics Perspective on Cost-Sharing Rules for a Condo Elevator 公寓电梯成本分担规则的法律经济学视角
IF 0.3
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2019-03-06 DOI: 10.1515/RLE-2016-0001
B. Crettez, Régis Deloche
{"title":"A Law-and-Economics Perspective on Cost-Sharing Rules for a Condo Elevator","authors":"B. Crettez, Régis Deloche","doi":"10.1515/RLE-2016-0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/RLE-2016-0001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000How to enhance the maintenance, repair and improvement of condo buildings? We address this issue by focusing on the case of an elevator installation whose benefits are not uniform across units. We examine the link between majority approval and cost sharing. Relying on a cooperative game theory approach, we prove the coalitional stability of any cost allocation which is such that the unit shares are a non-decreasing function of the floor level. Second, we show that the two surplus allocations induced, respectively, by the de facto cost-sharing rule used in France and the equal cost-sharing rule may fail to be coalitionally stable. By insisting that the cost sharing must depend on the relative individual advantages provided by an improvement, French law increases the risk of disputes between neighbors, compared to other sharing rules.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75964511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
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