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Leniency Programs and Cartel Organization of Multiproduct Firms 宽大处理项目与多产品公司的卡特尔组织
IF 0.3
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2020-01-25 DOI: 10.1515/rle-2018-0060
Emilie Dargaud, Armel Jacques
{"title":"Leniency Programs and Cartel Organization of Multiproduct Firms","authors":"Emilie Dargaud, Armel Jacques","doi":"10.1515/rle-2018-0060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2018-0060","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements in different markets, they may compartmentalize these agreements by having different individuals manage them so as to avoid the contagion of antitrust authority investigations. Leniency programs can overcome this strategy but may also lead to procollusive effects for centralized firms. The introduction of US amnesty plus programs can have different competitive effects, and leniency programs may modify firms’ choice of internal structure.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72860807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Fairness Vs. Economic Efficiency: Lessons from an Interdisciplinary Analysis of Talmudic Bankruptcy Law 公平与经济效率:塔木德破产法跨学科分析的启示
IF 0.3
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2020-01-25 DOI: 10.1515/rle-2016-0070
Itay Lipschütz, Mordechai E. Schwarz
{"title":"Fairness Vs. Economic Efficiency: Lessons from an Interdisciplinary Analysis of Talmudic Bankruptcy Law","authors":"Itay Lipschütz, Mordechai E. Schwarz","doi":"10.1515/rle-2016-0070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2016-0070","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Bankruptcy problems are commonly associated with economic disasters, but can also emerge due to extraordinary economic performance The choice of a sharing rule has a significant potential effect on the economy’s general equilibrium. The economic literature hitherto neglected the search for an economically optimal bankruptcy solution and concentrated mainly on normative axiomatizations of sharing rules. However, its findings did not attract much attention of legal scholars. The purpose of this article is to create a symposium between the economic and legal literature on bankruptcy based on our interdisciplinary analysis of a fascinating polemic conducted by Jewish Law scholars over the course of fifteenth centuries about the appropriate bankruptcy solution.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73936083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
The Effects of Enforcement on Corporate Environmental Performance: The Role of Perceived Fairness 执法对企业环境绩效的影响:感知公平的作用
IF 0.3
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2020-01-24 DOI: 10.1515/rle-2019-0012
Dietrich H. Earnhart, Donna Ramirez Harrington, Robert L. Glicksman
{"title":"The Effects of Enforcement on Corporate Environmental Performance: The Role of Perceived Fairness","authors":"Dietrich H. Earnhart, Donna Ramirez Harrington, Robert L. Glicksman","doi":"10.1515/rle-2019-0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2019-0012","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Several empirical studies explore the effects of regulatory enforcement on environmental behavior and performance. Within this literature, extremely little empirical research examines the role of fairness, which we interpret broadly to include multiple dimensions, e. g. similar treatment of similarly situated regulated entities. Our study empirically examines the effect of perceived enforcement fairness on the extent of compliance with wastewater limits imposed on chemical manufacturing facilities regulated under the Clean Water Act. Our study also explores the influence of perceived fairness on the effectiveness of enforcement efforts – government inspections and enforcement actions – at inducing better compliance. For our analysis, we use a subjective measure of the degree of “fair treatment” of regulated facilities by environmental regulators, as perceived by facilities and reported as survey responses. Results reveal that a more (perceived) fair enforcement approach raises compliance, but only under limited enforcement conditions; in most instances, perceived more fair enforcement lowers compliance. As important, results show that greater perceived fairness improves the effectiveness of federal inspections and informal enforcement, but undermines the effectiveness of state inspections and formal non-penalty enforcement.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":"3 1","pages":"71 - 118"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88012990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Free Speech in Public Employment: Has the Supreme Court Clarified Matters? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Lane v Franks 公共就业中的言论自由:最高法院澄清了问题吗?莱恩诉弗兰克斯案影响的实证分析
IF 0.3
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2019-12-07 DOI: 10.1515/rle-2019-0030
J. Connolly, Lewis M. Wasserman
{"title":"Free Speech in Public Employment: Has the Supreme Court Clarified Matters? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Lane v Franks","authors":"J. Connolly, Lewis M. Wasserman","doi":"10.1515/rle-2019-0030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2019-0030","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We employ a counterfactual treatment effect analysis to evaluate whether U.S. Courts of Appeals judges have changed their propensity to vote against plaintiffs in public employment free speech disputes following the Supreme Court’s 2015 Lane v Franks decision. In order to ensure a like-for-like comparison of votes before and after the Lane decision we employ a variant of the “straddle” approach, which entails identifying cases caught in the crosshairs of the upper court’s ruling and then comparing the votes with those of cases already decided. Our results underscore the importance of paying close attention to selection effects when evaluating the impact of legal changes on judicial behavior.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90065877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Thinking Like (Law-And-) Economists – Legal Rules, Economic Prescriptions and Public Perceptions of Fairness 像(法律和)经济学家一样思考——法律规则、经济处方和公众对公平的看法
IF 0.3
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2019-08-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2649489
David Chavanne
{"title":"Thinking Like (Law-And-) Economists – Legal Rules, Economic Prescriptions and Public Perceptions of Fairness","authors":"David Chavanne","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2649489","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2649489","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Using vignettes that are based on seminal cases in law and economics, I find that judicial decisions across different areas of the common law are considered to be fairer when they follow prescriptions for efficiency based on law-and-economic reasoning. Vignettes describe legal disputes and require respondents to rate the fairness of a judge’s resolution. For each vignette, fairness ratings are compared across a version that follows a particular economic prescription and a version that does not, with differences across versions generated by subtle changes in context that are motivated by the economic logic that either was used in the relevant case’s actual judicial opinion or has been applied to the case by scholars of law and economics. The results suggest that the economic logic that underlies the Coase theorem, the Hand rule and the foreseeability doctrine, and generates prescriptions for efficient use of strict product liability and efficient breach of contract, aligns with lay intuitions of fairness. The results also identify two areas, fugitive property and punitive damages, where law-and-economic prescriptions do not align with perceptions of fairness.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":"231 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80267166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Refounding Law and Economics: Behavioral Support for the Predictions of Standard Economic Analysis 重建法律与经济学:标准经济分析预测的行为支持
IF 0.3
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2019-08-26 DOI: 10.1515/rle-2019-0023
E. Zamir
{"title":"Refounding Law and Economics: Behavioral Support for the Predictions of Standard Economic Analysis","authors":"E. Zamir","doi":"10.1515/rle-2019-0023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2019-0023","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Based on the premise that people are rational maximizers of their own utility, economic analysis has a fairly successful record in correctly predicting human behavior. This success is puzzling, given behavioral findings that show that people do not necessarily seek to maximize their own utility. Drawing on studies of motivated reasoning, self-serving biases, and behavioral ethics, this article offers a new behavioral foundation for the predictions of economic analysis. The behavioral studies reveal how automatic and mostly unconscious processes lead well-intentioned people to make self-serving decisions. Thus, the behavioral studies support many of the predictions of standard economic analysis, without committing to a simplistic portrayal of human motivation. The article reviews the psychological findings, explains how they provide a sounder, complementary foundation for economic analysis, and discusses their implications for legal policymaking.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":"67 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85175889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Optimal Resort to Court-Appointed Experts 法院指定专家的最佳选择
IF 0.3
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2019-07-26 DOI: 10.1515/RLE-2016-0029
Eve-Angéline Lambert, Yves Oytana
{"title":"Optimal Resort to Court-Appointed Experts","authors":"Eve-Angéline Lambert, Yves Oytana","doi":"10.1515/RLE-2016-0029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/RLE-2016-0029","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Departing from the observation that neutral experts are increasingly appointed by courts, this paper investigates the incentives of courts to appoint experts, and the interactions between the judge’s and the expert’s efforts to discover the truth about a given case. Judges seek to make correct decisions and may choose to appoint experts in order to do so. Experts are assumed to be guided by both reputational and truth-finding motives. We highlight the determinants of the judge’s and the expert’s effort levels and of the judge’s decision whether to appoint an expert. We find that the expert’s effort is decreasing in the judge’s effort, which implies potential freeriding from the judge. Moreover, we find that (i) the judge’s effort is generally suboptimal, and (ii) they might resort to an expert appraisal too frequently, thereby contributing to increased court congestion and higher costs for society. Our results therefore suggest that, under conditions that we discuss, it may be socially beneficial to apply a principle of proportionality to the use of expert testimony, depending on the complexity of the case.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":"71 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76564860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
How Do Risk-Averse Litigants Set Contingent Fees for Risk-Neutral Lawyers? 规避风险的诉讼当事人如何为风险中立的律师设定或有费用?
IF 0.3
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2019-07-26 DOI: 10.1515/RLE-2016-0034
P. Sung-Hoon, Lee Sanghack
{"title":"How Do Risk-Averse Litigants Set Contingent Fees for Risk-Neutral Lawyers?","authors":"P. Sung-Hoon, Lee Sanghack","doi":"10.1515/RLE-2016-0034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/RLE-2016-0034","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000We examine a two-stage litigation in which risk-averse litigants set contingent fees strategically for risk-neutral lawyers. In the first stage of the litigation, each litigant sets a fixed fee and a contingent fee for his lawyer. In the second stage, each lawyer exerts effort to win a lawsuit on behalf of the litigant. Employing the subgame-perfect equilibrium as a solution concept, we obtain the following results. First, if a litigant sets a higher rate of contingent fee, then the opponent follows suit and the contingent fee fraction increases in the difference in litigant’s utility between winning and losing the case. Second, changes in a litigant’s initial endowment have different effects on the contingent fee fraction depending upon litigant preferences, while an increase in the prize of the case always increases the contingent fee fraction regardless of litigant preferences.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86701427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Gang Rivalry and Crime: A Differential Game Approach 帮派对抗与犯罪:一种差异博弈方法
IF 0.3
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2019-07-26 DOI: 10.1515/RLE-2018-0017
J. Faria, F. Mixon, A. Upadhyaya, K. Upadhyaya
{"title":"Gang Rivalry and Crime: A Differential Game Approach","authors":"J. Faria, F. Mixon, A. Upadhyaya, K. Upadhyaya","doi":"10.1515/RLE-2018-0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/RLE-2018-0017","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This study contributes to the modern literature on the economics of crime by proposing and solving two models of a differential game that considers the dynamic strategic behavior of two gangs engaged in a territorial conflict. The police force acts as the leader in the game. In the first model, each gang is concerned solely by the actions of the other, thus leading to an equilibrium wherein the greater one gang’s criminal activity, the greater the rival gang’s criminal activity. In the second model both gangs account primarily for police activities aimed at maintaining law and order, thus leading to an equilibrium wherein the gangs respond directly to the law enforcement activities of the police force. Exploratory analyses employing gang-related crime and police activities in Los Angeles provide empirical support for the main features of both models of the differential game, such as how gang rivalry fuels criminal activity and how the role of police is crucial in reducing gang-related crime.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79545059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Effects of Hate Groups on Hate Crimes 仇恨团体对仇恨犯罪的影响
IF 0.3
Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2019-07-11 DOI: 10.1515/rle-2017-0035
Ken Yahagi
{"title":"The Effects of Hate Groups on Hate Crimes","authors":"Ken Yahagi","doi":"10.1515/rle-2017-0035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2017-0035","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper presents a simple theoretical model to analyze the relationship between hate groups and hate crimes. This paper focuses on two important roles of hate groups; as providers of membership benefits for group members and as a coordination device for leadership. This paper shows that this interaction implies the possibility of multiple equilibria of the crime rate. This result explains why hate crimes and extreme criminal activities vary across communities and over time, and why a social shock such as 9/11 resulted in a rapid increase of hate crimes. Moreover, if hate groups work as coordination devices, the existence of hate groups may increase hate crimes. This result supports recent empirical results analyzing relationships between hate groups and hate crimes.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":"53 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85915063","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
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