发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

B E Journal of Theoretical Economics最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Search Costs and Wage Inequality 搜索成本和工资不平等
IF 0.4 4区 经济学
B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2020-11-19 DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2019-0168
Jiancai Pi, Kaiqi Zhang
{"title":"Search Costs and Wage Inequality","authors":"Jiancai Pi, Kaiqi Zhang","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2019-0168","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2019-0168","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper analyzes how search costs affect skilled-unskilled wage inequality. In the basic model, we find that an increase in skilled labor’s search costs will decrease wage inequality if the skilled labor market and the unskilled labor market are separated. In the extended model, our findings are as follows: (i) Even if there exists free entry into the unskilled labor market or the endogenous provision of public goods, an increase of search costs in the skilled labor market will decrease wage inequality; and (ii) if skilled search costs are negatively related to the skilled wage, wage inequality will be increased.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"22 1","pages":"67 - 104"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/bejte-2019-0168","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46515731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Uncertain Outcomes and Climate Change Policy Using an Expo-Power Utility Function 利用世博会电力效用函数的不确定结果和气候变化政策
IF 0.4 4区 经济学
B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2020-11-17 DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2020-0009
Jules Sadefo Kamdem, David Akame
{"title":"Uncertain Outcomes and Climate Change Policy Using an Expo-Power Utility Function","authors":"Jules Sadefo Kamdem, David Akame","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2020-0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-0009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper extends the work of Pindyck, R. S. 2012. “Uncertain Outcomes and Climate Change Policy.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 63 (3): 289–303. by taking into consideration a large class of different utility functions of economic agents. As in Pindyck, R. S. 2012. “Uncertain Outcomes and Climate Change Policy.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 63 (3): 289–303, instead of considering a social utility function that is characterized by constant relative risk aversion (C.R.R.A), we use the expo-power utility function of Saha, A. 1993. “Expo-power Utility: A ‘Flexible’ Form for Absolute and Relative Risk Aversion.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 75 (4): 905–13. In fact, depending on the choice of the expo-power utility function parameters, we cover a diverse range of utility functions. Apart from covering the other utility functions that a C.R.R.A omits, the Expo-power utility function permits us to discern if under the other utility-regimes of economic agents, the willingness to pay remains more affected by uncertain outcomes than certain outcomes when we vary the expectation and standard deviation of the temperature’s probability distribution. Our paper has maintained the small-tailed gamma distributions of temperature and economic impact of Pindyck, R. S. 2012. “Uncertain Outcomes and Climate Change Policy.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 63 (3): 289–303. not only because they hinder infinite future welfare losses (for an exponential utility function), but because it is easy to change some moments of the distribution (jointly or holding the others fixed) while studying how uncertainty influences the willingness to pay as explained in Pindyck, R. S. 2012. “Uncertain Outcomes and Climate Change Policy.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 63 (3): 289–303.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"22 1","pages":"17 - 50"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/bejte-2020-0009","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43976025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Politically Connected Firms and the Environment 有政治关系的公司和环境
IF 0.4 4区 经济学
B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2020-10-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3721403
Haowei Yu, Lin Zhang
{"title":"Politically Connected Firms and the Environment","authors":"Haowei Yu, Lin Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3721403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3721403","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper examines the environmental effect of political connections at the individual and organizational levels. We integrate political connections at both levels in a four-stage game-theoretic framework to study the political interplay between an entrepreneur, a bureaucrat and a government. We distinguish individual-level political connections from bribery and argue that while the latter is generally more efficient for the firm aiming to reduce environmental tax payments, political connections become more appealing when the bureaucrat places a higher value on indirect non-monetary benefits. We find that individual-level political connections are associated with more emission discharges by the firm, while the effect of organizational-level political connections on emissions depends on a negative interaction effect between political connections at different levels and a positive resource-reallocation effect between abatement activities and production.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"22 1","pages":"579 - 602"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46178651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Price Versus Quantity Competition in a Vertically Related Market with Retailer’s Effort 零售商努力下垂直相关市场中的价格与数量竞争
IF 0.4 4区 经济学
B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2020-10-09 DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2020-0036
Qian Liu, Leonard F. S. Wang
{"title":"Price Versus Quantity Competition in a Vertically Related Market with Retailer’s Effort","authors":"Qian Liu, Leonard F. S. Wang","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2020-0036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-0036","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Allowing downstream retailers to engage in demand-enhancing investment, this paper demonstrates that the classical conclusions regarding the comparison of Cournot and Bertrand competition in a vertically related market with decentralized bargaining are completely reversed. It shows that Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot competition, in the sense that both consumer surplus and social welfare are always higher in the former.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"22 1","pages":"51 - 66"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/bejte-2020-0036","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49240504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Working Time under Alternative Pay Contracts in the Ride-Sharing Industry 网约车行业替代性工资合同下的工作时间
IF 0.4 4区 经济学
B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2020-10-05 DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2020-0026
F. Belloc
{"title":"Working Time under Alternative Pay Contracts in the Ride-Sharing Industry","authors":"F. Belloc","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2020-0026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-0026","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study hours worked by drivers in the peer-to-peer transportation sector with cross-side network effects. Medallion lease (regulated market), commission-based (Uber-like pay) and profit-sharing (“pure” taxi coop) compensation schemes are compared. Our static model shows that network externalities matter, depending on the number of active drivers. When the number of drivers is limited, in the presence of positive network effects, a regulated system always induces more hours worked, while the commission fee influences the comparative incentives towards working time of Uber-like pay versus profit-sharing. When the number of drivers is infinite (or close to it), the influence of network externalities on optimal working time vanishes. Our model helps identifying which is the pay scheme that best remunerates longer working times and offers insights to regulators seeking to improve the intensive margin of coverage by taxi services.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"22 1","pages":"281 - 295"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/bejte-2020-0026","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45536835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Product Differentiation in a Vertical Structure 垂直结构下的产品差异化
IF 0.4 4区 经济学
B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2020-09-27 DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2020-0037
Tien-Der Han, M. Haque, A. Mukherjee
{"title":"Product Differentiation in a Vertical Structure","authors":"Tien-Der Han, M. Haque, A. Mukherjee","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2020-0037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-0037","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We consider final goods producers’ preference for horizontal product differentiation in the presence of strategic input price determination. Final goods producers may not prefer maximal differentiation but may prefer moderate differentiation under both Cournot and Bertrand competition in the final goods market if product differentiation does not increase the market size significantly and there is either free entry in the input market or the input supplier has increasing returns to scale technology. Thus, we provide a new rationale for moderate product differentiation. Our reasons are different from the existing reasons of mixed pricing strategy, endogenous leadership, no-buy option for the consumers and the relative performance incentive schemes.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"22 1","pages":"105 - 122"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/bejte-2020-0037","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42395305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
On the Choice of Liability Rules 论责任规则的选择
IF 0.4 4区 经济学
B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2020-09-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3325615
R. Kundu, Debabrata Pal
{"title":"On the Choice of Liability Rules","authors":"R. Kundu, Debabrata Pal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3325615","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3325615","url":null,"abstract":"Legal assignment of liabilities for losses arising out of interactions involving negative externalities usually depend on which of the interacting parties are negligent and which are not. It has been established in the literature that, if negligence is defined as failure to take some cost-justified precaution then there is no liability rule which can always lead to an efficient outcome. The objective of this paper is to try and understand if it is still possible to make pairwise comparisons between rules on the basis of efficiency and to use such a method to explain/evaluate choices from a given set of rules. We focus on a set of five of the most widely analyzed rules (no liability, strict liability, negligence, negligence with the defense of contributory negligence and strict liability with the defense of contributory negligence), and use a binary relation according to which a rule in the set is considered to be at least as efficient as another if and only if the set of applications for which it is inefficient is a subset of the set of applications for which the other one is inefficient. We show that, with respect to the above mentioned relation, pairwise comparisons between rules in this set fail. The paper, thus, demonstrates that an efficiency based explanation for any choice from these five rules is not consistent with the notion of negligence defined as failure to take some cost-justified precaution.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47970404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Ambiguity and Awareness: A Coherent Multiple Priors Model 歧义与意识：一个连贯的多先验模型
IF 0.4 4区 经济学
B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2020-08-26 DOI: 10.1515/BEJTE-2018-0185
S. Grant, Ani Guerdjikova, J. Quiggin
{"title":"Ambiguity and Awareness: A Coherent Multiple Priors Model","authors":"S. Grant, Ani Guerdjikova, J. Quiggin","doi":"10.1515/BEJTE-2018-0185","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/BEJTE-2018-0185","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Ambiguity in the ordinary language sense means that available information is open to multiple interpretations. We model this by assuming that individuals are unaware of some possibilities relevant to the outcome of their decisions and that multiple probabilities may arise over an individual’s subjective state space depending on which of these possibilities are realized. We formalize a notion of coherent multiple priors and derive a representation result that with full awareness corresponds to the usual unique (Bayesian) prior but with less than full awareness generates multiple priors. When information is received with no change in awareness, each element of the set of priors is updated in the standard Bayesian fashion (that is, full Bayesian updating). An increase in awareness, however, leads to an expansion of the individual’s subjective state and (in general) a contraction in the set of priors under consideration.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"21 1","pages":"571 - 612"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/BEJTE-2018-0185","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49337431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Long-Run Growth, Speed of Convergence and the Specification of Technology 长期增长、趋同速度与技术规范
IF 0.4 4区 经济学
B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2020-08-24 DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2019-0163
Manuel A. Gómez
{"title":"Long-Run Growth, Speed of Convergence and the Specification of Technology","authors":"Manuel A. Gómez","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2019-0163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2019-0163","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This note analyzes the effect that the specification of technology has on the long-run growth rate and the asymptotic speed of convergence in the one-sector endogenous-growth model. We compare three otherwise identical economies – with the same baseline and parameter values – but with different production technologies: CES, VES or Sobelow, respectively. The long-run growth rate and the asymptotic convergence speed under CES production are lower than the corresponding ones under Sobelow production which, in turn, are lower than those under VES production. This is because a higher elasticity of substitution entails a higher easiness to substitute capital for labor which, in the end, results in a higher long-run growth rate.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"22 1","pages":"267 - 280"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/bejte-2019-0163","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42216987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Frontmatter
IF 0.4 4区 经济学
B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2020-08-20 DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2021-frontmatter1
{"title":"Frontmatter","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2021-frontmatter1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2021-frontmatter1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/bejte-2021-frontmatter1","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42123235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信