Price Versus Quantity Competition in a Vertically Related Market with Retailer’s Effort

IF 0.3 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2020-10-09 DOI:10.1515/bejte-2020-0036

Qian Liu, Leonard F. S. Wang

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract Allowing downstream retailers to engage in demand-enhancing investment, this paper demonstrates that the classical conclusions regarding the comparison of Cournot and Bertrand competition in a vertically related market with decentralized bargaining are completely reversed. It shows that Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot competition, in the sense that both consumer surplus and social welfare are always higher in the former.

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零售商努力下垂直相关市场中的价格与数量竞争

摘要允许下游零售商参与提高需求的投资，本文证明了关于在具有分散议价的垂直相关市场中比较Cournot和Bertrand竞争的经典结论是完全相反的。这表明Bertrand竞争比Cournot竞争更有效，因为前者的消费者剩余和社会福利总是更高。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

B E Journal of Theoretical Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

0.80

自引率

25.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： We welcome submissions in all areas of economic theory, both applied theory and \"pure\" theory. Contributions can be either innovations in economic theory or rigorous new applications of existing theory. Pure theory papers include, but are by no means limited to, those in behavioral economics and decision theory, game theory, general equilibrium theory, and the theory of economic mechanisms. Applications could encompass, but are by no means limited to, contract theory, public finance, financial economics, industrial organization, law and economics, and labor economics.