{"title":"Working Paper 27: Anti-corruption Collective Action","authors":"G. Aiolfi","doi":"10.12685/bigwp.2018.27.1-40","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12685/bigwp.2018.27.1-40","url":null,"abstract":"Anti-corruption Collective Action Initiatives (CAIs) are structured efforts that bring together private sector actors with other stakeholders with the aim of preventing corruption and improving the business environment in a particular context. \u0000The landscape of CAIs is extremely diverse. Differences cut across the type and number of stakeholders involved. Initiatives can be sector-specific or cross-sectoral. They can be applied at the community, country, regional or global level. \u0000This paper is based on two recent workshops in which a wide variety of international Collective Action practitioners shared their experiences, success factors and strategies for overcoming common challenges. \u0000For more information about Collective Action, see the B20 Collective Action Hub.","PeriodicalId":447485,"journal":{"name":"Basel Institute on Governance Working Papers","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126864704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Working Paper 26: The ambivalence of social networks and their role in spurring and potential for curbing petty corruption: comparative insights from East Africa","authors":"Cosimo Stahl, Saba Kassa","doi":"10.12685/bigwp.2018.26.1-28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12685/bigwp.2018.26.1-28","url":null,"abstract":"This paper compares social network dynamics and related petty corrupt practices in East Africa. It highlights how the properties of structural and functional networks could serve as entry points for anti-corruption interventions. \u0000With a focus on the health sector in Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, the empirical findings from this research corroborate the role of social networks in perpetuating collective practices of petty corruption, including bribery, favouritism and gift-giving. \u0000The paper makes a case for designing a novel type of behavioural anti-corruption intervention, whereby the power of social networks is harnessed to elicit behavioural and attitudinal change for anti-corruption outcomes.","PeriodicalId":447485,"journal":{"name":"Basel Institute on Governance Working Papers","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128902857","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Working Paper 25: High Level Reporting Mechanisms","authors":"G. Aiolfi, Valeria Silva","doi":"10.12685/bigwp.2018.25.1-32","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12685/bigwp.2018.25.1-32","url":null,"abstract":"This report discusses the different contexts and processes through which a High Level Reporting Mechanism (HLRM) has been designed and implemented in Colombia, Ukraine, Panama and Argentina, as well as initial interest in the HLRM model in Peru. \u0000Its aim is to understand the specificities of each case and draw lessons applicable to future projects in other countries, whilst respecting the commitment to develop an HLRM that takes account of the specific country’s context. ","PeriodicalId":447485,"journal":{"name":"Basel Institute on Governance Working Papers","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121271975","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Working Paper 24: It takes two to tango: Decision-making processes on asset return","authors":"C. Baez-Camargo, G. Fenner, Saba Kassa","doi":"10.12685/bigwp.2017.24.1-28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12685/bigwp.2017.24.1-28","url":null,"abstract":"This Working Paper presents findings from a research project that sought to better understand decision-making processes on the return of illegally obtained assets using the examples of past cases of returning assets that had been stolen from Kazakhstan, Peru and the Philippines. While previous papers on the subject of returning stolen assets and end-use of returned assets were based on third-party and desk research, the research feeding into this working paper is based on first-hand accounts collected through semi-structured interviews with key decision makers involved in these cases in the concerned states. \u0000The key objective of the research was to better understand the motivations, considerations and processes that led to the decisions on how and for what purpose to use returned assets. In this context, the report in particular looks at a question often debated in asset recovery circles, namely whether there may be a power imbalance between requesting and requested states in these processes despite the fact that requesting states are legally empowered through the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). \u0000The potential existence of such a power imbalance has in the past often given rise to concern, as it is perceived to potentially compromise the fundamental principles of asset return of UNCAC and the sovereignty of the concerned states.","PeriodicalId":447485,"journal":{"name":"Basel Institute on Governance Working Papers","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121124497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Working Paper 23: New perspectives in e-government and the prevention of corruption","authors":"G. Aiolfi","doi":"10.12685/bigwp.2017.23.1-60","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12685/bigwp.2017.23.1-60","url":null,"abstract":"Does e-government have an impact in reducing corruption? Do e-government solutions sufficiently take private sector perspectives into account to maximise its potential for addressing corruption risks? \u0000This paper addresses these and additional questions about the dynamic between governments and the private sector with respect to harnessing e-governance tools for corruption prevention. It is written primarily from a private sector perspective and for private sector actors who are interested in a more comprehensive understanding of the scope and examples of e-government solutions to improve their anti-corruption policies, but concludes with numerous recommendations for the private sector and governments alike.","PeriodicalId":447485,"journal":{"name":"Basel Institute on Governance Working Papers","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125315277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Working Paper 22: Hidden agendas, social norms and why we need to re-think anti-corruption","authors":"C. Baez-Camargo, N. Passas","doi":"10.12685/bigwp.2017.22.1-25","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12685/bigwp.2017.22.1-25","url":null,"abstract":"In many countries high levels of corruption persist in spite of the adoption of so-called anti-corruption “best practices”. In this paper we make a call to pursue a context-sensitive inquiry into the drivers of corruption in order to substantially improve the practices and effects of anti-corruption. \u0000We discuss evidence from case studies in Africa, Central Asia and the Caucasus suggesting that high levels of corruption are associated to a significant discrepancy between formal rules and informal practices. Informal practices of co-optation, control and camouflage are used by political and business elites to safeguard regime survival via a de facto re-distribution of public resources in favour of informal networks of “insiders”. \u0000From the perspective of citizens, corrupt acts such as bribing enjoy social acceptability especially when they are effective in solving practical problems and protecting livelihoods. The functional relevance of informal practices clarifies the factors behind the limited effectiveness of anti-corruption law-driven reforms, short-term action plans, and technical measures that focus on particular processes, procedures and institutions. \u0000We argue for the need to ponder informality and consider how it may help us develop better anti-corruption strategies. The prevalence and entrenched nature of informal practices indicate their heuristic potential: they can tell us what we are missing in official policies, inform about resistances and can help uncover pathways to strategic, sustainable reforms. \u0000This paper has been presented at the OECD Global Anti-Corruption & Integrity Forum 2017 in a form of a poster presentation.","PeriodicalId":447485,"journal":{"name":"Basel Institute on Governance Working Papers","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115912729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Working Paper 21: Globale Finanzflüsse und nachhaltige Entwicklung","authors":"Kathrin Betz, Mark Pieth","doi":"10.12685/bigwp.2016.21.1-48","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12685/bigwp.2016.21.1-48","url":null,"abstract":"Im Rahmen von UNO und OECD diskutiert die internationale Gemeinschaft zurzeit intensiv, warum die meisten Entwicklungsländer nicht über ausreichend Ressourcen zur Finanzierung der für sie notwendigen Investitionen und ihrer öffentlichen Dienstleistungen verfügen. Dabei fällt das Augenmerk jeweils schnell auf die Ausgestaltung des internationalen Finanz- und Steuersystems. Mit welcher Art Investitionen kann man eine nachhaltige Entwicklung fördern? Wie kann der chronische Abfluss von finanziellen Ressourcen (namentlich aus Rohstoff-reichen Ländern) – oftmals als unlautere und illegale Finanzflüsse (illicit financial flows) umschrieben – reduziert werden? Welche Rolle spielt schliesslich die öffentliche Entwicklungshilfe in diesem Gesamtbild?\u0000Die Direktion für Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit (DEZA) hat am 29. Oktober 2015 mit Unterstützung des Basel Institute on Governance und unter der Leitung von Prof. Mark Pieth eine Fachtagung‚ Globale Finanzflüsse für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung – Handlungsmöglichkeiten der Schweiz aus Sicht der Entwicklungspolitik‘ durchgeführt. Das vorliegende Dokument stellt die Vorarbeiten und Resultate der Tagung zusammen.\u0000Mit einem Vorwort von Pio Wennubst, Vizedirektor Direktion für Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit (DEZA).","PeriodicalId":447485,"journal":{"name":"Basel Institute on Governance Working Papers","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131967495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Working Paper 20: Corruption and human rights","authors":"Anne Peters","doi":"10.12685/bigwp.2015.20.1-34","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12685/bigwp.2015.20.1-34","url":null,"abstract":"It is a fact that states with a high corruption rate (or a high corruption perception) are at the same time those with a bad human rights situation. Beyond this coincidence, the paper seeks to identify a concrete legal relationship between corruption and deficient human rights protection. This seems relevant and practical terms, because the extant international norms against corruption have so far yielded only modest success; their implementation could be improved with the help of human rights arguments and instruments. \u0000This paper therefore discusses a dual question: \u0000 \u0000Can corrupt behaviour be conceptualised as a human rights violation? \u0000Should corrupt behaviour be categorised and sanctioned as a human rights violation? \u0000 \u0000The author's answer is that such a juridic reconstruction is plausible under specific conditions, especially for petty corruption, but that we should be aware of the risks of such reframing of the issue.","PeriodicalId":447485,"journal":{"name":"Basel Institute on Governance Working Papers","volume":"246 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114015030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Working Paper 19: High Level Reporting Mechanisms in Colombia and Ukraine","authors":"Frédéric Wehrlé","doi":"10.12685/bigwp.2015.19.1-36","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12685/bigwp.2015.19.1-36","url":null,"abstract":"The responsibility for governments to address bribe solicitation derives from internationally recognised anticorruption standards all of which prohibit the ‘demand side’ of bribery, namely, the solicitation by a public official of an undue advantage. \u0000So far however, most governmental anti-bribery efforts have focused on the offering or giving of bribes by companies and their employees. They have neglected practical solutions to support companies that are faced with explicit or implicit demands for bribes when dealing with public administrations, for example in the context of public contracts, business licensing or tax audits. Unless they pay these bribes, companies may risk losing business or face obstructions to doing business. \u0000The concept of high level reporting mechanisms (HLRM) has been devised to help address this gap experienced by companies that are solicited for bribes or subject to other forms of extortion and unfair treatment. Two countries have pioneered the concept so far, namely Colombia and Ukraine. \u0000This paper describes the underlying purpose and principles of the HLRM, reviews how this was translated into national mechanisms in these countries, and offers some initial comments on the lessons learned.","PeriodicalId":447485,"journal":{"name":"Basel Institute on Governance Working Papers","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122838460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Working Paper 18: Communities against corruption","authors":"Claudia Baez Camargo","doi":"10.12685/bigwp.2015.18.1-78","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12685/bigwp.2015.18.1-78","url":null,"abstract":"This practitioners’ handbook provides the required tools for contextualising social accountability initiatives aimed at empowering citizens to engage in anti-corruption actions. The material herein contained has been developed through a collaborative effort with UNDP and reflects the findings from academic research conducted in the scope of the ANTICORRP research consortium (anticorrp.eu). \u0000The handbook presents an analytical framework through which the critical dimensions involved in developing successful anti-corruption social accountability initiatives are identified. It also includes concrete research tools that may be applied in order to obtain key information about the communities intended to engage in anti-corruption actions and guidelines to aid implementers in designing participatory schemes that best meet the characteristics of the local context.","PeriodicalId":447485,"journal":{"name":"Basel Institute on Governance Working Papers","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125504186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}