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How Lewis Can Meet the Integration Challenge 刘易斯如何应对整合挑战
IF 0.2 4区 哲学
Journal of Philosophical Research Pub Date : 2019-11-05 DOI: 10.5840/jpr20191014143
Bob Fischer, E. Gilbertson
{"title":"How Lewis Can Meet the Integration Challenge","authors":"Bob Fischer, E. Gilbertson","doi":"10.5840/jpr20191014143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr20191014143","url":null,"abstract":"We show that Lewis’s modal realism, and his serviceability-based argument for it, cohere with his epistemological contextualism. Modal realism explains why serviceability-based reasoning in metaphysics might be reliable, while Lewis’s contextualism explains why Lewis can properly ignore the possibility that serviceability isn’t reliable, at least when doing metaphysics. This is because Lewis’s contextualism includes a commitment to a kind of pragmatic encroachment, so that whether a subject knows can depend on how much is at stake with respect to whether the belief is true or false. Accordingly, we suggest that Lewis can count as knowing that serviceability is a reliable guide to truth in metaphysics, since the stakes are generally low there, and so can be justified in believing that modal realism is true based on its serviceability.","PeriodicalId":44494,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Research","volume":"55 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72608652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What Gary Couldn’t Imagine 这是加里无法想象的
IF 0.2 4区 哲学
Journal of Philosophical Research Pub Date : 2019-10-30 DOI: 10.5840/jpr20191029146
Tufan Kıymaz
{"title":"What Gary Couldn’t Imagine","authors":"Tufan Kıymaz","doi":"10.5840/jpr20191029146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr20191029146","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44494,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Research","volume":"48 2","pages":"293-311"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72572815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
What the Humean Theory of Motivation Gets Wrong 休谟的动机理论错在哪里
IF 0.2 4区 哲学
Journal of Philosophical Research Pub Date : 2019-10-30 DOI: 10.5840/jpr20191029148
Caroline T. Arruda
{"title":"What the Humean Theory of Motivation Gets Wrong","authors":"Caroline T. Arruda","doi":"10.5840/jpr20191029148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr20191029148","url":null,"abstract":"I show that defenses of the Humean theory of motivation (HTM) often rely on a mistaken assumption. They assume that desires are necessary conditions for being motivated to act because desires (and other non-cognitive states) themselves have a special, essential, necessary feature, such as their world-to-mind direction of fit, that enables them to motivate. Call this the Desire-Necessity Claim. Beliefs (and other cognitive states) cannot have this feature, so they cannot motivate. Or so the story goes. I show that: (a) when pressed, a proponent of HTM encounters a series of prima facie counterexamples to this Claim; and (b) the set of claims that seem to naturally complement the Desire-Necessity Claim as well as provide successful responses to these counterexamples turn out to deny the truth of this same claim. As a result, the Humean implicitly grants that it is at least equally plausible, if not more plausible, to claim that desires are not able to motivate in virtue of what they necessarily possess. Instead, desires contingently possess features that enable them to motivate.","PeriodicalId":44494,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Research","volume":"133 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72506247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Welfare-Prior Eudaimonism, Excellence-Prior Eudaimonism, and the Self-Absorption Objection 福利-优先享乐主义、卓越-优先享乐主义与自我专注的反对
IF 0.2 4区 哲学
Journal of Philosophical Research Pub Date : 2019-10-25 DOI: 10.5840/jpr20191024145
Jeff D’Souza
{"title":"Welfare-Prior Eudaimonism, Excellence-Prior Eudaimonism, and the Self-Absorption Objection","authors":"Jeff D’Souza","doi":"10.5840/jpr20191024145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr20191024145","url":null,"abstract":"One of the longest standing objections levied against virtue ethics is the Self-Absorption Objection. Proponents of this objection state that the main problem with neo-Aristotelian accounts is that the virtuous agent’s motive is to promote her own eudaimonia. In this paper, I examine Christopher Toner’s attempt to address this objection by arguing that we should understand the virtuous agent as acting virtuously because doing so is what it means to live well qua human. I then go on to defend Toner’s view from two of Anne Baril’s criticisms: that his account is un-Aristotelian, and that his account does not take seriously the importance of the virtuous agent organizing her life in a way that is good for her. In doing so, I pave the way for neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists to develop an adequate response to the self-absorption objection along Toner’s lines.","PeriodicalId":44494,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Research","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88593466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Distributing Welfare and Resources 分配福利和资源
IF 0.2 4区 哲学
Journal of Philosophical Research Pub Date : 2019-10-17 DOI: 10.5840/jpr20191016144
Elizabeth C. Hupfer
{"title":"Distributing Welfare and Resources","authors":"Elizabeth C. Hupfer","doi":"10.5840/jpr20191016144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr20191016144","url":null,"abstract":"Should theories of distribution focus solely on subjective welfare or solely on objective resources? While both of these ‘currencies’ have well-known objections that make each of them implausible alone, I argue that neither currency should be jettisoned entirely. Instead, I construct a multi-currency distributive theory involving both welfare and resources. While I think that such a heterogeneous theory is able to mitigate objections to both pure resourcism and pure welfarism, it also creates a new concern, which I call the precedence concern, in which a theorist must determine which currency takes precedence in a given situation. I argue that to answer the precedence concern, altering the currency should result in altering the site of distribution as well. As a result, moral value between individuals should be measured in terms of welfare while state justice should be measured in terms of resources.","PeriodicalId":44494,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Research","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79290898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Home and Our Need For It 家和我们对它的需求
IF 0.2 4区 哲学
Journal of Philosophical Research Pub Date : 2019-10-15 DOI: 10.5840/jpr20191014142
Christopher H. Toner
{"title":"Home and Our Need For It","authors":"Christopher H. Toner","doi":"10.5840/jpr20191014142","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr20191014142","url":null,"abstract":"Aviezer Tucker claims that “home-searching is a basic trait of being human,” yet as a rule the concept of home has not been central in recent Anglophonic ethics. I will argue, though, that giving an important place to the concept of home should be far more common. I begin by showing that ‘home’ is a particular kind of concept, what Daniel Russell calls a model concept. I then turn to the main task of the paper, the construction of a theoretical model of ‘home,’ bringing various treatments of the concept—linguistic, literary, and social scientific—into reflective equilibrium. Security, comfort, and belonging will turn out to be key features of the model. I close by noting some ways in which the concept of home is much more important to moral theory, and especially to virtue ethics, than has generally been recognized. The title refers both to our need for home, as humans, and to our need for ‘home,’ as moral theorists.","PeriodicalId":44494,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Research","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88489150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Classification of Disjunctivism about the Phenomenology of Visual Experience 视觉经验现象学的分离主义分类
IF 0.2 4区 哲学
Journal of Philosophical Research Pub Date : 2019-10-15 DOI: 10.5840/jpr20191014141
T. Niikawa
{"title":"Classification of Disjunctivism about the Phenomenology of Visual Experience","authors":"T. Niikawa","doi":"10.5840/jpr20191014141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr20191014141","url":null,"abstract":"This paper proposes a classificatory framework for disjunctivism about the phenomenology of visual perceptual experience. Disjunctivism of this sort is typically divided into positive and negative disjunctivism. This distinction successfully reflects the disagreement amongst disjunctivists regarding the explanatory status of the introspective indiscriminability of veridical perception and hallucination. However, it is unsatisfactory in two respects. First, it cannot accommodate eliminativism about the phenomenology of hallucination. Second, the class of positive disjunctivism is too coarse-grained to provide an informative overview of the current dialectical landscape. Given this, I propose a classificatory framework which preserves the positive-negative distinction, but which also includes the distinction between eliminativism and non-eliminativism, as well as a distinction between two subclasses of positive disjunctivism. In describing each class in detail, I specify who takes up each position in the existing literature, and demonstrate that this classificatory framework can disambiguate some existing disjunctivist views.","PeriodicalId":44494,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Research","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86042103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
On Armstrong’s Difficulties with Adequate Truthmaking Restrictions 论阿姆斯壮的困难与适当的造真限制
IF 0.2 4区 哲学
Journal of Philosophical Research Pub Date : 2019-10-09 DOI: 10.5840/jpr2019108140
Brannon McDaniel
{"title":"On Armstrong’s Difficulties with Adequate Truthmaking Restrictions","authors":"Brannon McDaniel","doi":"10.5840/jpr2019108140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr2019108140","url":null,"abstract":"D. M. Armstrong rejects various ontologies that posit truths without truthmakers. But, lest proponents of such questionable ontologies postulate suspicious truthmakers in a bid to regain ontological respectability, Armstrong requires a plausible restriction on truthmaking that eliminates such ontologies. I discuss three different candidate restrictions: categorical, natural, and intrinsic difference-making. While the categorical and natural restrictions eliminate the questionable ontologies, they also eliminate Armstrong’s own ontology. The intrinsic difference-making restriction, on the other hand, fails to eliminate any of them. Thus Armstrong lacks a principled reason for rejecting such ontologies.","PeriodicalId":44494,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Research","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86406289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Three Transparency Principles Examined 研究三项透明度原则
IF 0.2 4区 哲学
Journal of Philosophical Research Pub Date : 2019-09-01 DOI: 10.5840/jpr20191029147
R. Woudenberg, Naomi Kloosterboer
{"title":"Three Transparency Principles Examined","authors":"R. Woudenberg, Naomi Kloosterboer","doi":"10.5840/jpr20191029147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr20191029147","url":null,"abstract":"This paper derives, from Richard Moran’s work, three different accounts of doxastic Transparency—roughly, the view that when a rational person wants to know whether she believes that p, she directs her attention to the truth-value of p, not to the mental attitude she has vis-à-vis p. We investigate which of these is the most plausible of the three by discussing a number of (classes of) examples. We conclude that the most plausible account of Transparency is in tension with the motivation behind Transparency accounts: it is disconnected from the deliberative stance.","PeriodicalId":44494,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Research","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84959949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
A Phenomenal Defense of Reflective Equilibrium 反思平衡的惊人辩护
IF 0.2 4区 哲学
Journal of Philosophical Research Pub Date : 2019-08-13 DOI: 10.5840/JPR2019812138
Weston Ellis, Justin P. McBrayer
{"title":"A Phenomenal Defense of Reflective Equilibrium","authors":"Weston Ellis, Justin P. McBrayer","doi":"10.5840/JPR2019812138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/JPR2019812138","url":null,"abstract":"The method of reflective equilibrium starts with a set of initial judgments about some subject matter and refines that set to arrive at an improved philosophical worldview. However, the method faces two, trenchant objections. The Garbage-In, Garbage-Out Objection argues that reflective equilibrium fails because it has no principled reason to rely on some inputs to the method rather than others and putting garbage-in assures you of getting garbage-out. The Circularity Objection argues that reflective equilibrium fails because it has no principled, non-circular way of sorting whatever is put into the method. The moves required to avoid both objections are instructive. Reflective equilibrium requires a meta-justification, and we offer one that appeals to the epistemic goods that underwrite a view known as phenomenal conservatism. Reflective equilibrium calls on us to start with what seems most likely to be true and to alter that collection of judgments in the ways that seem most likely to get us to the truth. Proceeding in this way is epistemically defensible and unavoidable. Hence, reflective equilibrium is not just good, it’s phenomenal.","PeriodicalId":44494,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Research","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85938384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
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