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Is there a Human Right to Subsistence Goods? in advance 是否存在获得生存物资的人权？
IF 0.2 4区 哲学
Journal of Philosophical Research Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.5840/JPR2021622162
Cristián Rettig
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引用次数: 1
Interactionist Moral Character and the Causal-Constitutive Fallacy 互动主义道德品质与因果构成谬论
IF 0.2 4区 哲学
Journal of Philosophical Research Pub Date : 2020-12-08 DOI: 10.5840/jpr2020127151
C. Lutman
{"title":"Interactionist Moral Character and the Causal-Constitutive Fallacy","authors":"C. Lutman","doi":"10.5840/jpr2020127151","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr2020127151","url":null,"abstract":"Interactionism has emerged as a promising approach to moral character in the wake of the situationist challenge and the character-situation debate. This paper will consider whether interactionism is troubled by a familiar problem from the philosophy of mind: the coupling-constitution or causal-constitution fallacy (C-C fallacy). In relation to character, this issue pertains to whether the external factors featured in interactionist models are partly constitutive of the agent’s character, or whether they merely play a causal role. In contrast to some other interactionist theorists, I argue that interactionism doesn’t need to make distinctions regarding causation and constitution, and would be better off without attempting to do so. Making such claims would only add metaphysical baggage to interactionism that won’t aid in its goal of providing an empirically adequate moral psychology of character. Interactionists are thus better off evading the C-C fallacy challenge, rather than attempting to meet it head-on.","PeriodicalId":44494,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Research","volume":"446 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77851031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Acting with Good Intentions 善意行事
IF 0.2 4区 哲学
Journal of Philosophical Research Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.5840/jpr20201230157
Charles K. Fink
{"title":"Acting with Good Intentions","authors":"Charles K. Fink","doi":"10.5840/jpr20201230157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr20201230157","url":null,"abstract":"In Morals from Motives (2001), Michael Slote proposed an agent-based approach to virtue ethics in which the morality of an action derives solely from the agent’s motives. Among the many objections that have been raised against Slote’s account, this article addresses two problems associated with the Kantian principle that ought implies can. These are the problems of “deficient” and “inferior” motivation. These problems arise because people cannot freely choose their motives. We cannot always choose to act from good motives; nor can we always avoid acting from bad ones. Given this, Slote’s account implies that we sometimes cannot do what we ought to do, contrary to Kant’s principle. In this article, I propose an alternative agent-based account which, I argue, circumvents these problems. While people cannot choose their motives, they can choose their intentions. By characterizing virtuous action, as I do, in terms of good intentions rather than in terms of good motives, the conflict between what people can do and what they ought to do is resolved.","PeriodicalId":44494,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Research","volume":"31 1","pages":"79-95"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85788086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Can There Be Ineffable Propositional Structures? 是否存在不可言喻的命题结构?
IF 0.2 4区 哲学
Journal of Philosophical Research Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.5840/JPR2021112159
K. Filcheva
{"title":"Can There Be Ineffable Propositional Structures?","authors":"K. Filcheva","doi":"10.5840/JPR2021112159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/JPR2021112159","url":null,"abstract":"Is it possible for there to be facts about reality with a logical structure that is in principle unrepresentable by us? I outline the main motivations for thinking that this question should receive a positive answer. I then argue that, upon inspection, the view that such structurally ineffable facts are possible is self-defeating and thus incoherent. My argument is based on considerations about the fundamental role that the purely formal concept of an object plays in our propositional representations and its intimate connection with subject-predicate structure.","PeriodicalId":44494,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Research","volume":"18 1 1","pages":"149-164"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82616248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Grounding Deep Friendships 深厚的友谊
IF 0.2 4区 哲学
Journal of Philosophical Research Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.5840/jpr20201230156
K. Kristjánsson
{"title":"Grounding Deep Friendships","authors":"K. Kristjánsson","doi":"10.5840/jpr20201230156","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr20201230156","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to offer an account of the grounding of deep friendships within the context of virtue ethics. While drawing on Aristotle’s justification of so-called character friendships, it goes some distance in reconciling Aristotle’s highly moralistic view with a prevalent counterview according to which we are drawn toward close friends for reasons that are essentially aesthetic, amoral, and irrational. It is argued that there are resources within Aristotelian virtue ethics (not exploited by Aristotle himself) that enable us to overcome some of the difficulties of his exclusively moralistic view and bring it into better harmony with common-sense conceptions; yet preserving the claim that vicious people cannot form truly deep friendships. The paper aims at an ‘individuality-adjusted moralized view’ of the grounding of deep friendships: a conciliatory view that yet remains closer to an amendment of the moralized view than to a middle-ground synthesis.","PeriodicalId":44494,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Research","volume":"29 1","pages":"197-216"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73283241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
The Cartesian Doxastic Argument For Free Will 笛卡尔关于自由意志的谬误论证
IF 0.2 4区 哲学
Journal of Philosophical Research Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.5840/jpr20201217153
A. Kissel
{"title":"The Cartesian Doxastic Argument For Free Will","authors":"A. Kissel","doi":"10.5840/jpr20201217153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr20201217153","url":null,"abstract":"This paper raises objections to what I call the Cartesian Doxastic Argument for free will: the argument that it is probably true that we are free on the grounds that there is already widespread intuitive belief in that claim. Richard Swinburne provides the best extant defense of the argument, using his principle of credulity (PoC), which holds that beliefs are probably true merely on the believer’s evidence that they believe it. I argue that the PoC is either too liberal, justifying intuitively unjustified beliefs, or else is inapplicable in practice. I then show that attempts to reformulate the principle to avoid liberality render it too weak to support the Cartesian Doxastic Argument. These failures suggest that any version of the argument that relies on similar principles is likely to fail.","PeriodicalId":44494,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Research","volume":"6 1","pages":"217-229"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81314297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
An Interpretation of Sartre’s Phenomenology of the Image as a Phenomenology of the Sign 从符号现象学解读萨特的《图像现象学》
IF 0.2 4区 哲学
Journal of Philosophical Research Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.5840/jpr20201228154
Ahmet Süner
{"title":"An Interpretation of Sartre’s Phenomenology of the Image as a Phenomenology of the Sign","authors":"Ahmet Süner","doi":"10.5840/jpr20201228154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr20201228154","url":null,"abstract":"Sartre’s phenomenology of the image in L’Imaginaire includes analytical distinctions between the mind’s comportments towards perceptual objects, images, and signs, which he refers to as different forms of consciousness. Sartre denies any possible convergence between imaging and sign consciousness, arguing that there are essential differences in the way they relate to the notions of resemblance, positionality, and affect. This essay argues against his phenomenological distinctions by stressing the continuity of imaging with sign consciousness: between images and words. In particular, it argues that his understanding of the sign as affectless is questionable and that there is no reason to believe that images and signs cannot elicit similar affects or perform the same functions. Consequently, it is possible to interpret Sartre’s physical images or “analoga” as pictorial signs: his phenomenological descriptions of physical images may indeed be recast in the language of the sign and reformulated as acts of consciousness that involve pictorial signs.","PeriodicalId":44494,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Research","volume":"18 1","pages":"231-247"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85520808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Consciousness and Topology 意识与拓扑
IF 0.2 4区 哲学
Journal of Philosophical Research Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.5840/jpr20201230158
E. Mills
{"title":"Consciousness and Topology","authors":"E. Mills","doi":"10.5840/jpr20201230158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr20201230158","url":null,"abstract":"Most philosophers of the self would take what David Barnett calls ‘The Datum’—that “pairs of people themselves are incapable of experience”—to merit its name. Barnett argues abductively from The Datum to Simplicity, the view that conscious beings must be simple. The truth of Simplicity would upend almost all materialist accounts of what we are, so Barnett’s argument and attempted rebuttals of it merit scrutiny. Rory Madden charges Barnett with overlooking a rival, better explanation, deriving from Integrity: the thesis that our naïve conception of a conscious subject demands that conscious beings be topologically integrated. The content of this naïve conception is supposed to be superior to Simplicity in explaining The Datum. I argue here that Madden is mistaken: the requirement of topological integration cannot explain The Datum, and Barnett’s argument survives Madden’s challenge.","PeriodicalId":44494,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Research","volume":"11 1","pages":"189-195"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87689601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Eudaimonism, Egoism, and Responsibility for Oneself 理想主义、利己主义和对自己的责任
IF 0.2 4区 哲学
Journal of Philosophical Research Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.5840/jpr20201210152
Micah Lott
{"title":"Eudaimonism, Egoism, and Responsibility for Oneself","authors":"Micah Lott","doi":"10.5840/jpr20201210152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr20201210152","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers the following claim: In order to live well, your first concern must be with yourself. I show how the truth in this claim can be captured by a eudaimonist framework. I distinguish two sorts of self-concern: (1) self-care and (2) self-responsibility. I examine each of these notions. I also consider different senses in which either sort of self-concern might be one’s first concern. I identify the place of each of these ideas in a properly developed eudaimonism. As part of my discussion, I respond to the egoism challenge to eudaimonism, and I outline a thoroughly non-egoistic form of eudaimonism.","PeriodicalId":44494,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Research","volume":"130 1","pages":"35-56"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89316204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Truthfulness without Truth 没有真理的真
IF 0.2 4区 哲学
Journal of Philosophical Research Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI: 10.5840/JPR2021120161
Allan Hazlett
{"title":"Truthfulness without Truth","authors":"Allan Hazlett","doi":"10.5840/JPR2021120161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/JPR2021120161","url":null,"abstract":"It is natural to think that the badness of false belief explains the badness of lying. In this paper, I argue against this: I argue that the badness of false belief does not explain the badness of lying and that, given a popular account of the badness of lying, the badness of false belief is orthogonal to the badness of lying.","PeriodicalId":44494,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Research","volume":"119 1","pages":"115-131"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79416274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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