{"title":"是否存在不可言喻的命题结构?","authors":"K. Filcheva","doi":"10.5840/JPR2021112159","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Is it possible for there to be facts about reality with a logical structure that is in principle unrepresentable by us? I outline the main motivations for thinking that this question should receive a positive answer. I then argue that, upon inspection, the view that such structurally ineffable facts are possible is self-defeating and thus incoherent. My argument is based on considerations about the fundamental role that the purely formal concept of an object plays in our propositional representations and its intimate connection with subject-predicate structure.","PeriodicalId":44494,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophical Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Can There Be Ineffable Propositional Structures?\",\"authors\":\"K. Filcheva\",\"doi\":\"10.5840/JPR2021112159\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Is it possible for there to be facts about reality with a logical structure that is in principle unrepresentable by us? I outline the main motivations for thinking that this question should receive a positive answer. I then argue that, upon inspection, the view that such structurally ineffable facts are possible is self-defeating and thus incoherent. My argument is based on considerations about the fundamental role that the purely formal concept of an object plays in our propositional representations and its intimate connection with subject-predicate structure.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44494,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Philosophical Research\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Philosophical Research\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5840/JPR2021112159\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Philosophical Research","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5840/JPR2021112159","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Is it possible for there to be facts about reality with a logical structure that is in principle unrepresentable by us? I outline the main motivations for thinking that this question should receive a positive answer. I then argue that, upon inspection, the view that such structurally ineffable facts are possible is self-defeating and thus incoherent. My argument is based on considerations about the fundamental role that the purely formal concept of an object plays in our propositional representations and its intimate connection with subject-predicate structure.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Philosophical Research is an annual peer-reviewed journal uniquely committed to the advancement of all areas of philosophical inquiry. It publishes articles from any philosophical orientation, in English or French, that make a significant contribution to the field. A generous length limit provides an outlet for essential works such as bibliographies, translations, and commentaries that are difficult to publish because of unusual length or complex format. JPR is particularly interested in helping new authors and an outstanding group of referees provides written comments on submitted manuscripts.