Res Philosophica最新文献_第9页

Aiming for Moral Mediocrity 以道德平庸为目标

IF 0.5 3区哲学

Res Philosophica Pub Date : 2019-07-02 DOI: 10.11612/RESPHIL.1806

Eric Schwitzgebel

引用次数: 10

Sages, Integrity, and the Paradox of Vulnerability: Reply to Chung, McLeod, and Seok 圣人、正直与脆弱的悖论——对钟、麦克劳德和徐的回应

IF 0.5 3区哲学

Res Philosophica Pub Date : 2019-04-05 DOI: 10.11612/RESPHIL.1791

M. Ing

引用次数: 0

Rationality, Reasoning Well, and Extramental Props 理性、推理好与外在道具

IF 0.5 3区哲学

Res Philosophica Pub Date : 2019-04-02 DOI: 10.11612/RESPHIL.1777

Wade Munroe

引用次数: 2

An Objectivist's Guide to Subjective Reasons 客观主义者的主观原因指南

IF 0.5 3区哲学

Res Philosophica Pub Date : 2019-04-02 DOI: 10.11612/RESPHIL.1750

Daniel Wodak

{"title":"An Objectivist's Guide to Subjective Reasons","authors":"Daniel Wodak","doi":"10.11612/RESPHIL.1750","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11612/RESPHIL.1750","url":null,"abstract":"The distinction between objective and subjective reasons plays an important role in both folk normative thought and many research programs in metaethics. But the relation between objective and subjective reasons (or, more aptly, objective and subjective favoring) is unclear. This paper explores problems related to the unity of objective and subjective reasons for actions and attitudes and then offers a novel objectivist account of subjective reasons. The distinction between objective and subjective reasons plays an important role in both folk normative thought and many research programs in metaethics. But what is the relation between objective and subjective reasons? Are they species of a genus? If so, what is their essence, and what is the differentia? Does one reduce to the other? If so, how does the reduction go? Or are they utterly dissimilar entities, like jadeite and nephrite? There’s much at stake between these options. As Schroeder (2018, 290) points out, the “core case” that motivates the Reasons First program is that what we ought to do is determined by what we have reason to do. But since we need to distinguish “a subjective ‘ought’ of rationality” from “an objective ‘ought’ of advisability,” with subjective reasons explaining the former and objective reasons explaining the latter, there must be a “close relationship between objective and subjective reasons.” Reasons First would be an unattractive research program if it posited that normativity is explained in terms of utterly dissimilar entities. The most popular option in the current literature is ‘objectivism.’ The objectivist claims that subjective reasons reduce to objective reasons. Despite being the most common view in the literature (endorsed, in different forms, in influential work by Mark Schroeder, Derek Parfit, Jonathan Way, Eric Vogelstein, Kurt Sylvan, and Daniel Whiting), prominent forms of objectivism face serious—perhaps fatal—objections. I have two main aims in this paper. The first is to offer a new objection to prominent forms of objectivism. Unlike many objections in the current literature, it does not focus on extensional problems for objectivists. It turns on whether objectivists can deliver a unified account of favoring. Res Philosophica, Vol. 96, No. 2, April 2019, pp. 229–244 https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.1750 c © 2019 Daniel Wodak • c © 2019 Res Philosophica","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47311632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10

If There Are No Diachronic Norms of Rationality, Why Does It Seem Like There Are? 如果没有永恒的理性规范，为什么看起来有？

IF 0.5 3区哲学

Res Philosophica Pub Date : 2019-04-02 DOI: 10.11612/RESPHIL.1721

Ryan Doody

引用次数: 2

Disagreement as Interpersonal Incoherence 分歧是人际关系的不连贯

IF 0.5 3区哲学

Res Philosophica Pub Date : 2019-04-02 DOI: 10.11612/RESPHIL.1771

Alex Worsnip

引用次数: 15

The Self-Effacement Gambit 自我淡化策略

IF 0.5 3区哲学

Res Philosophica Pub Date : 2019-04-02 DOI: 10.11612/RESPHIL.1775

J. Woods

{"title":"The Self-Effacement Gambit","authors":"J. Woods","doi":"10.11612/RESPHIL.1775","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11612/RESPHIL.1775","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophical arguments usually are and nearly always should be abductive. Across many areas, philosophers are starting to recognize that often the best we can do in theorizing some phenomena is put forward our best overall account of it, warts and all. This is especially true in areas like logic, aesthetics, mathematics, and morality where the data to be explained is often based in our stubborn intuitions. While this methodological shift is welcome, it's not without problems. Abductive arguments involve significant theoretical resources which themselves can be part of what's being disputed. This means that we will sometimes find otherwise good arguments suggesting their own grounds are problematic. In particular, sometimes revising our beliefs on the basis of an argument can undermine the very justification we used in that argument. This feature, which I'll call self-effacingness, occurs most dramatically in arguments against our standing views on the subject matters mentioned above: logic, mathematics, aesthetics, and morality. This is because these subject matters all play a role in how we reason abductively. This isn't an idle fact; we can resist some challenges to our standing beliefs about these subject matters exactly because the challenges are self-effacing. The self-effacing character of certain arguments is thus both a benefit and limitation of the abductive turn and deserves serious attention. I aim to give it the attention it deserves.","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2019-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.11612/RESPHIL.1775","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41652338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

What Can Phenomenology Bring to Ontology? 现象学能给本体论带来什么?

IF 0.5 3区哲学

Res Philosophica Pub Date : 2019-03-07 DOI: 10.11612/RESPHIL.1760

Amie L. Thomasson

引用次数: 3

Freedom, Gratitude, and Resentment: Olivi and Strawson 自由、感激和怨恨:奥利维和斯特劳森

IF 0.5 3区哲学

Res Philosophica Pub Date : 2019-02-14 DOI: 10.11612/RESPHIL.1728

Daniel Coren

引用次数: 1

Moral Ecology, Disabilities, and Human Agency špace 1pc 2018 Wade Memorial Lecture 道德生态、残障与人类代理špace 1pc 2018韦德纪念讲座