Res Philosophica最新文献_第8页

Imaginative Resistance and Modal Knowledge 想象抵抗与模态知识

IF 0.5 3区哲学

Res Philosophica Pub Date : 2020-05-18 DOI: 10.11612/resphil.1922

Daniel Nolan

{"title":"Imaginative Resistance and Modal Knowledge","authors":"Daniel Nolan","doi":"10.11612/resphil.1922","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.1922","url":null,"abstract":"Readers of fictions sometimes resist taking certain kinds of claims to be true according to those fictions, even when they appear explicitly or follow from applying ordinary principles of interpretation. This “imaginative resistance” is often taken to be significant for a range of philosophical projects outside aesthetics, including giving us evidence about what is possible and what is impossible, as well as the limits of conceivability or readers’ normative commitments. I will argue that this phenomenon cannot do the theoretical work that has been asked of it. Resistance to taking things to be fictional is often best explained by unfamiliarity with kinds of fictions than any representational, normative, or cognitive limits. With training and experience, any understandable proposition can be made fictional and be taken to be fictional by readers. This requires a new understanding both of imaginative resistance and what it might be able to tell us about topics like conceivability or the bounds of possibility. An undeniable feature of our imaginative life is that we do not always successfully imagine things we try to imagine, and an equally familiar feature of our imagination is that some attempts to imagine are more challenging than others. Related to these phenomena is a phenomenon involving the uptake of fiction. When consuming fiction we are often willing to take a text’s say-so as definitive about what is going on in a story. Sometimes, however, when something is presented as being true according to a story, some people balk at treating it as in fact being true according to the relevant story. Again, this phenomenon comes in degrees: as well as the phenomenon of just not taking something to be true according to a fiction, sometimes we will in the end accept that something is true according to a story but find it hard to make sense of; or be reluctant to incorporate it in our understanding of the story; and so on.","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43080175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Rethinking Criminal Justice 对刑事司法的再思考

IF 0.5 3区哲学

Res Philosophica Pub Date : 2020-05-12 DOI: 10.11612/resphil.1900

Erin I. Kelly

{"title":"Rethinking Criminal Justice","authors":"Erin I. Kelly","doi":"10.11612/resphil.1900","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.1900","url":null,"abstract":"The punitive, moralizing conception of individual responsibility commonly associated with retributive justice exaggerates the moral meaning of criminal guilt. Criminal guilt does not imply moral desert, nor does it justify moral blame. Mental illness, intellectual disability, addiction, immaturity, poverty, and racial oppression are factors that mitigate our sense of a wrongdoer’s moral desert, though they are mostly not treated by the criminal justice system as relevant to criminal culpability. The retributive theory also distracts from shared responsibility for social injustice. Instead of highlighting the moral urgency of correcting conditions that help to explain the crime rate, a commitment to retribution diverts attention from the social conditions that engender crime. These conditions include an unequal distribution of social, economic, and political power, which poses a serious problem for the retributive theory. When disadvantaged members of society act in ways that violate the criminal law, they are less morally blameworthy, even when the laws they violate are justified. Judgments of blame and desert, in relation to criminal justice, vary in accordance with political status. The diminished political power of oppressed groups is at odds with a retributive justification of punishment. 1 The Stigma of Criminality In 1829, the Eastern State Penitentiary opened in the city of Philadelphia. Its corridors spread out like spokes from the prison’s dark center. They are lined with dozens of eight-by-twelve-foot individual cells, each with a small window where a shaft of light enters. Eastern State’s design was lauded by reformers, who proposed the individual prison cell as a progressive idea. The aim was, through isolation and silence, to awaken the conscience of the inmate and turn him into a better person. Prison was not intended as a place to spend your life. Most sentences were not longer than two years, and after doing their time, inmates were expected to resume normal life in society. Res Philosophica, Vol. 97, No. 2, April 2020, pp. 1–15 https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2020.97.2.0000 c © 2020 Erin I. Kelly • c © 2020 Res Philosophica","PeriodicalId":44475,"journal":{"name":"Res Philosophica","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2020-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48229821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Knowledge Second 知识第二

IF 0.5 3区哲学

Res Philosophica Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.11612/resphil.1948

Adam Bjorndahl

引用次数: 2

On Probabilistic Knowledge 论概率知识

IF 0.5 3区哲学

Res Philosophica Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.11612/resphil.1856

J. MacFarlane

引用次数: 2

Reid on Moral Sentimentalism 里德谈道德感伤主义