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International Studies in the Philosophy of Science最新文献

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Conceptual Change in Visual Neuroscience: The Receptive Field Concept 视觉神经科学的概念变化:感受野概念
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2021-01-02 DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.2002675
A. Venturelli
{"title":"Conceptual Change in Visual Neuroscience: The Receptive Field Concept","authors":"A. Venturelli","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.2002675","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.2002675","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT I focus on the concept of the receptive field of a sensory neuron, taking it as a prominent case to address conceptual change in the history of neuroscience. I argue for an interpretation of its role and evolution based on the idea, previously rehearsed in the philosophy of biology, of a problem agenda. I claim that the concept's main contribution to visual neuroscience was that of establishing a problem agenda for the early experimental research on visual processing, thus structuring the field's experimental practices and integration between converging scientific fields. I pay particular attention to the research programme led by Hubel and Wiesel, revolving their famous experiments on the cat's visual cortex during the 60s, when receptive field exploration blossomed. I additionally claim that the concept's more recent evolution, witnessing a loss in its definiteness and centrality, can be accommodated by my account.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"34 1","pages":"41 - 57"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45221241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Editorial Report 2020 编辑报告2020
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-10-01 DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2020.1986773
V. Kindi
{"title":"Editorial Report 2020","authors":"V. Kindi","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2020.1986773","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2020.1986773","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"33 1","pages":"259 - 260"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46705595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Against Cognitive Instrumentalism 反对认知工具主义
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-10-01 DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1961420
S. Psillos, Lisa Zorzato
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引用次数: 1
Realism Without Interphenomena: Reichenbach's Cube, Sober's Evidential Realism, and Quantum Solipsism 没有相互现象的实在论:莱辛巴赫的立方体、索伯的证据实在论和量子唯我论
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-10-01 DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1964335
F. Boge
{"title":"Realism Without Interphenomena: Reichenbach's Cube, Sober's Evidential Realism, and Quantum Solipsism","authors":"F. Boge","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.1964335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.1964335","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In ‘Reichenbach's cubical universe and the problem of the external world’, Elliott Sober attempts a refutation of solipsism à la Reichenbach. I here contrast Sober's line of argument with observations a hypothetical scientist makes on what is known as the ‘Mermin contraption’ and show that Sober's extension of Reichenbach's argument fails. However, there is a further line of defense against solipsism, endorsed by some interpreters of the quantum theory whose position is otherwise rather close to solipsism. As I shall argue, this line of defense remains viable, but we still fall short of a story in terms of what Reichenbach calls ‘interphenomena’ in the case of the Mermin contraption.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"33 1","pages":"231 - 246"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47573829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Popper's ‘Rationality Principle’ and ‘Epistemic’ Rationality: an Attempt at Reconciliation 波普尔的“理性原则”与“认识论”理性:调和的尝试
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-10-01 DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1960108
Alfonso Palacio-Vera
{"title":"Popper's ‘Rationality Principle’ and ‘Epistemic’ Rationality: an Attempt at Reconciliation","authors":"Alfonso Palacio-Vera","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.1960108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.1960108","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT ‘Situational Analysis’ (SA) constitutes Popper's methodological proposal for the social sciences. There is an apparent inconsistency in the fact that, on the one hand, Popper maintains that we learn by ‘trial and error-elimination’ and, on the other hand, he declares that his ‘Rationality Principle’ (RP) has nothing to do with the epistemic account of rationality implicit in his ‘evolutionary theory of knowledge and learning’. We claim that the most likely reason Popper makes such claim is that his formulation of SA is better interpreted as an extension of his view of the ‘method’ of history to the theoretical social sciences. In light of it we argue that the implementation of SA in the latter may require the adoption of an expanded ‘Rationality Principle’ (ERP) whereby scientists assume that individual actors exhibit both practical and epistemic rationality. We identify two variants of SA we denote as SA1 and SA2 according to whether they are grounded on ERP or RP respectively and discuss some approaches in the social sciences that are representative of each of them. We conclude that the adoption of ERP helps mitigating the absence of social interaction in Popper's formulation of SA.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"33 1","pages":"195 - 209"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42395603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
A Taxonomy of Major Premises and Implications for Falsification and Verification 主要前提的分类及其对证伪和验证的影响
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-10-01 DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1964845
D. Trafimow
{"title":"A Taxonomy of Major Premises and Implications for Falsification and Verification","authors":"D. Trafimow","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.1964845","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.1964845","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Both naïve and sophisticated falsification arguments depend upon using the logic of modus tollens to employ empirical defeats to conclude that the theory is not true (naïve falsification) or that the conjunction of theory and auxiliary assumptions is not true (sophisticated falsification). However, both types of modus tollens syllogisms depend strongly on the precise form of the major premise. The present goal is to introduce a taxonomy of four types of major premises: positive frame, negative frame, positive-negative frame, and negative-positive frame. For two frames, falsification really is logically superior to verification, but for two other frames, verification is logically superior to falsification. Thus, there is no overall logical basis for preferring falsification to verification or for preferring verification to falsification. Nor are there convincing arguments from Bayesian statistical, frequentist statistical, or empirical standpoints. Thus, the attraction of falsification, whether naïve or sophisticated, comes down, in the end, to something other than an objective philosophical account.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"33 1","pages":"211 - 229"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45696916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Replicability Crisis and Scientific Reforms: Overlooked Issues and Unmet Challenges 可复制性危机与科学改革：被忽视的问题和未解决的挑战
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-07-02 DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1943292
M. Andreoletti
{"title":"Replicability Crisis and Scientific Reforms: Overlooked Issues and Unmet Challenges","authors":"M. Andreoletti","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.1943292","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.1943292","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Nowadays, almost everyone seems to agree that science is facing an epistemological crisis – namely the replicability crisis – and that we need to take action. But as to precisely what to do or how to do it, there are no firm answers. Some scholars argue that the current statistical inferential framework is inadequate and therefore we should focus on improving statistical methods. Some others claim instead that the only way to fix science is to change the scientific reward system, promoting quality rather than quantity of scientific publications. However, every positive proposal, either methodological or social, has a valid counterargument. Here I want to make explicit some reasons for explaining the persistence of disagreement on the solutions to the crisis. Focusing on issues which have been overlooked in the debate might help to better evaluate scientific reforms. With this regard, philosophical knowledge can be mobilised to take action in response to the replicability crisis.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"33 1","pages":"135 - 151"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2021.1943292","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45255365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Molyneux’s Question and the History of Philosophy Molyneux的问题和哲学史
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-07-02 DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1940464
S. Parigi
{"title":"Molyneux’s Question and the History of Philosophy","authors":"S. Parigi","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.1940464","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.1940464","url":null,"abstract":"This book is a collection of essays, dealing with one of the most interesting topics in the history of ideas, particularly in the history of theories of visual perception: the question posed by Wil...","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"33 1","pages":"189 - 193"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2021.1940464","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47441846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
An Extra-Mathematical Program Explanation of Color Experience 色彩体验的非数学程序解释
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-07-02 DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1951637
Nicholas Danne
{"title":"An Extra-Mathematical Program Explanation of Color Experience","authors":"Nicholas Danne","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.1951637","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.1951637","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In the debate over whether mathematical facts, properties, or entities explain physical events (in what philosophers call ‘extra-mathematical’ explanations), Aidan Lyon’s (2012) affirmative answer stands out for its employment of the program explanation (PE) methodology of Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit (1990). Juha Saatsi (2012; 2016) objects, however, that Lyon’s examples from the indispensabilist literature are (i) unsuitable for PE, (ii) nominalizable into non-mathematical terms, and (iii) mysterious about the explanatory relation alleged to obtain between the PEs’ mathematical explanantia and physical explananda. In this paper, I propose a counterexample to Saatsi’s objections. My counterexample is Frank Jackson’s (1998a) program explanation for color experience, which I argue needs recasting as an extra-mathematical PE due to its implicit reliance on reflectance, a property that suffers conceptual regress unless redefined with Fourier harmonics. Pace Saatsi, I argue that this recast example is an authoritative PE, non-nominalizable, and minimally esoteric. Important for the indispensability debate at large, moreover, is that my counterexample reifies Fourier harmonics without the Enhanced Indispensability Argument (an argument to which Lyon applies PE as a premise). Indispensabilists have long overlooked the conditionalization of a limited mathematical realism on property realism, and my counterexample to Saatsi exploits this conditionalization.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"33 1","pages":"153 - 173"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2021.1951637","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43599403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
A Phenomenological Approach to Epistemic Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics 量子力学认识论解释的现象学方法
IF 0.8 2区 哲学
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-07-02 DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2021.1950483
Ali Barzegar
{"title":"A Phenomenological Approach to Epistemic Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics","authors":"Ali Barzegar","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.1950483","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.1950483","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Generally, there are two interpretative approaches to quantum theory: psi-ontic and psi-epistemic. According to the psi-ontic interpretations, quantum theory does/should describe or represent what the world is like. In contrast, according to the psi-epistemic interpretations, rather than representing the way the world is, quantum theory advises us on what to expect from the world and so helps us better navigate our surrounding world. In this paper, we will argue that Edmund Husserl’s philosophy of science especially his notion of lifeworld provides an appropriate framework for better understanding this shift from the psi-ontic to psi-epistemic interpretations of quantum theory. In particular, we analyse Richard Healey’s pragmatic approach to quantum mechanics from a phenomenological point of view.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"33 1","pages":"175 - 187"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02698595.2021.1950483","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47642563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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