JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY最新文献

{"title":"Hegel and Derrida on Spirit’s Temporality","authors":"Cyprian Gawlik","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2021.1920336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2021.1920336","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper confronts G.W.F Hegel and Jacques Derrida in terms of their insights regarding the temporality of spirit. The context for the confrontation is Derrida’s deconstruction of the Husserlian phenomenology. It is argued that Derrida conflated Husserl’s and Hegel’s theories of meaning and teleology under the banner of the metaphysics of presence. The main purpose of this undertaking is to challenge Derrida’s interpretation of Hegel as well as his vision of the history of ontology. This is accomplished by first bringing Derrida and Hegel closer together by showing the affinity of their accounts of the spectral genesis of sense, and then demonstrating discrepancies in their conclusions regarding teleology. As a result, both the differential character of dialectics and the metaphysical nature of deconstruction are shown, which in turn allows the author to confront Hegel with Derrida in terms of virtuality.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00071773.2021.1920336","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42115200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Bergson and the Kantian Concept of Intensive Magnitude","authors":"Florian Vermeiren","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2021.1910854","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2021.1910854","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Bergson’s critique of intensive magnitude in Time and Free Will mainly targets Kant’s “Anticipations of Perception”, in which the Kantian distinction between matter and form is lowered. Bergson praises precisely this distinction for safeguarding sensation as something extra-intellectual. As the concept of intensity is the main tool of neo-Kantian intellectualism, in which the whole of reality is determined by the intellect, younger Bergson forcefully rejects intensive magnitude. However, his relation towards Kant changes. In Creative Evolution, Bergson proposes a genetic correction to Kantianism in which the distinction between matter and form is weakened. By comparing Bergson’s theory with the genetic Kantianism of Salomon Maïmon, who heavily relies on the concept of intensity, I argue that the concept fits his later project of renewing the Kantian theory. I thus demonstrate how the critique of intensive magnitude merely belongs to a provisional stage of Bergson’s relation to Kant.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00071773.2021.1910854","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47863498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Genesis of Action in Husserl’s Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins","authors":"N. Spano","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2021.1909426","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2021.1909426","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In the present article, I discuss Husserl’s analysis of the genesis of action in the Husserliana edition Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. My aim is to clarify how a “voluntary action” has its genetic phenomenological origin in a “non-voluntary doing”, and, in turn, clarify how this latter activity has its genetic phenomenological origin in a passive “tendency” of the will. In order to achieve this aim, I first present the characterization of voluntary action as a “volitional process”. Then, I delimit the full scope of voluntary actions by analysing Husserl’s descriptions of the different degrees of “voluntariness”. After that, I explicate how voluntary actions phenomenologically originate from non-voluntary doings by examining the “consciousness of the I can”. Finally, I disclose the genetic phenomenological origin of non-voluntary doings by addressing the experience of tendency in the sphere of “passivity of the will”.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00071773.2021.1909426","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42160259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"“The Permanent Truth of Hedonist Moralities”: Plato and Levinas on Pleasures","authors":"T. Staehler, A. Kozin","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2021.1891399","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2021.1891399","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Levinas maintains that there is a lasting significance to hedonism if we consider the important role of pleasures for our embodied existence. In this essay, we go back to Plato to explore the nature of pleasure, different kinds of pleasures, and their contribution to the good life. The good life is a considerate mixture of pleasures which requires knowing, understanding and remembering. Pleasures take us to the most basic level of existence which the Presocratics can help us understand through their idea of elements. With the help of Levinas, we can expand the concept of elements to include elemental states. As a result, we see how our embodied existence opens us up to various levels of otherness.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00071773.2021.1891399","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43259194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Phenomenology and Ancient Greek Philosophy: An Introduction","authors":"G. Petropoulos","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2021.1899053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2021.1899053","url":null,"abstract":"Phenomenology, broadly construed, is the study of the meaningful structure of human experience. It is a philosophical tradition that begins with Edmund Husserl, develops with thinkers like Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and is still practiced today, contributing to diverse disciplines like health studies, education and political science. But while the contribution of phenomenology to the study of the self, the body and the world has been widely recognized, there is also another way in which phenomenology remains relevant today. Both phenomenologists and scholars of ancient Greek philosophy are becoming increasingly interested in examining the ways in which the phenomenological tradition intersects, sheds new light on, and re-appropriates Greek philosophy. It is well known that Heidegger’s thought showed a vigorous interest in ancient Greek philosophy, resulting in unorthodox and even violent interpretations of Greek texts. Notwithstanding the idiosyncratic nature of Heidegger’s interpretations, his phenomenological readings of Greek texts during the 1920s exerted influence on a wide range of philosophers and scholars. Gadamer, for example, writes that he visited Freiburg in 1923 “not so much for Husserl’s phenomenology as to learn about Heidegger’s interpretations of Aristotle”. Strauss, Klein, Arendt and Gadamer are only a few of the philosophers who attended Heidegger’s lectures and who continued to focus on Greek philosophy, albeit in ways that differ significantly from Heidegger’s approach. Heidegger, however, is not the only phenomenologist who sought to incorporate Greek philosophy into his thinking. Husserl, for example, made extensive use of Greek terms (e.g. epoché, noesis, noema, etc.) in order to introduce the innovative elements of his phenomenology. Apart from the appropriation of Greek terms for the explication of his own phenomenological intuitions, Husserl’s work exhibits an interest in the genesis of meaning and its historical development, which brings about an explicit emphasis on ancient Greek thinking. Husserl’s and Heidegger’s understanding of their own philosophical projects as having a peculiar relation to a Greek origin, can be taken as an indication that a good understanding of the phenomenological tradition requires a thorough examination of its relation to Greek philosophy. The invigorating interpretations of ancient Greek philosophy offered by thinkers, strictly or loosely related to the phenomenological tradition, such as Arendt, Fink, Patočka and Levinas, to name a few, reinforces this view. Given the vast number of phenomenologists who have shown an interest in Greek philosophy, one way of doing research on the topic of Phenomenology and Ancient Greek Philosophy is to examine the various – and at times","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00071773.2021.1899053","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46559002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Expanding the Active Mind","authors":"J. Slaby","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2021.1905487","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2021.1905487","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT What I call the active mind approach revolves around the claim that what is “on” a person’s mind is in an important sense brought on and held on to through the agent’s self-conscious rational activity. In the first part, I state the gist of this perspective in a deliberately strong way in order to create a touchstone for critical discussion. In the second part, I engage with two categories of our mental lives that seem to speak against construing the mind as active. First, I discuss affectivity, in particular emotion, and show that emotional episodes are active engagements. Second, I discuss habitual action, and in particular those manifestations of habit which are initially opaque to the agent. In my responses to both objections, the notion of a practical self-understanding will play a central role. The result will be a qualified defence and expansion of the active mind position.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00071773.2021.1905487","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48282003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Magic, Emotion and Practical Metabolism: Affective Praxis in Sartre and Collingwood","authors":"T. Greaves","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2021.1906160","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2021.1906160","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article develops a new way of understanding the integration of emotions in practical life and the practical appraisal of emotions, drawing on insights from both J-P. Sartre and R. G. Collingwood. I develop a concept of “practical metabolism” and show that emotions need to be understood not only as transformations from determinate to indeterminate practical intuitions, but also as transformations in the reverse direction. Firstly, I provide a new conception of the dynamic phenomenal structure of the emotions that can resolve significant tensions in the Sartre’s theory. Secondly, I develop that theory to shed light on the diverse socially mediated roles of emotions in practical life by drawing on Collingwood’s philosophy of magic. Thirdly, I deploy the notion of practical metabolism to address the appraisal of emotions, setting out a framework for understanding the various ways in which emotional expression is subject to structural breakdown.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00071773.2021.1906160","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47288133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Love’s Resistance: Heidegger and the Problem of First Philosophy","authors":"R. Desantis","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2021.1893609","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2021.1893609","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper offers a reading of passages in Heidegger’s Nietzsche lectures in which Heidegger describes love as a feeling which grants an essential vision. I contend that by invoking this language of vision while simultaneously contrasting love with infatuation, Heidegger is implicitly attempting to situate love within his category of fundamental attunements. While Heidegger does not explicitly follow this thought through, I argue that doing so leads to a problem—namely, how can love be a fundamental attunement if such attunements are necessarily objectless? I suggest we can see a response to this problem in Heidegger’s treatment of Plato’s Phaedrus within the same lecture course. I conclude by claiming that while Heidegger attempts to follow Plato in arguing that love is most properly directed towards Being, love nonetheless poses a challenge to Heidegger’s category of fundamental attunements which also strikes at the heart of his claim that ontology is first philosophy.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00071773.2021.1893609","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47660441","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Heidegger’s Relative Essentialism","authors":"Timothy J. Nulty","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2021.1885963","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2021.1885963","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT There is relatively little comprehensive treatment of Heidegger’s theory of essences despite his ubiquitous use of essences. It is commonplace in contemporary analytic philosophy to view essences as the ground for true de re modal claims. I argue that Heidegger offers an account of essences that can best be understood as a type of relative essentialism. Relative essentialism is the view that more than one being can occupy the same space at the same time and those beings have distinct sets of de re modal truths about them. Heidegger’s account of essences allows for true de re modal claims about a wide variety of things including scientific and cultural entities. At the same time, Heidegger rejects absolute essentialism: the view that there is one privilege collection of beings whose natures determine the truth values of de re modal claims about them. Relative essentialism is distinguished from contextual essentialism.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00071773.2021.1885963","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45366319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Ambiguity of Nearness in Heidegger’s Ort and Merleau-Ponty’s Espace Vécu","authors":"Suraj Chaudhary","doi":"10.1080/00071773.2020.1743954","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2020.1743954","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Phenomenological approaches to space have consistently made a distinction between a plurality of inhabited spaces and the single homogenous extendedness of Euclidean space. Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty postulate unique spatial wholes pertaining to human life that pose a counterpoint to objective space and provide the necessary context for understanding all our spatial relations. However, the spatial wholes that are posited to clarify these relations are themselves far from univocal. Specifically, differences exist regarding what precisely unites various entities into a meaningful spatial whole and how any such whole relates to others. Showing how Heidegger’s idea of Ort and Merleau-Ponty’s notion of espace vécu rely on multiple senses of nearness, this paper argues that the privileged sense of nearness in each case fails to delimit the spatial context, thereby putting into question the very possibility of a unified and distinct spatial whole.","PeriodicalId":44348,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/00071773.2020.1743954","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43998075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}