REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LA FRANCE ET DE L ETRANGER最新文献

{"title":"Jacques Bouveresse (1940-2021)","authors":"C. Bonnet","doi":"10.3917/rphi.214.0577","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/rphi.214.0577","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44338,"journal":{"name":"REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LA FRANCE ET DE L ETRANGER","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43708273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"La métaphysique sauvage. Réflexions autour de Lévy-Bruhl et de la connexion entre philosophie et anthropologie","authors":"Guillaume Lurson","doi":"10.3917/RPHI.212.0223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/RPHI.212.0223","url":null,"abstract":"Il s’agit de mettre en evidence la maniere dont Lucien Levy-Bruhl a permis, et permet encore, de penser la fecondite d’une connexion entre philosophie et ethnologie. A la croisee d’une exigence positiviste dans l’apprehension des faits et du spiritualisme francais du xixe siecle, sa reflexion sur la mentalite primitive rend possible la constitution d’une « metaphysique sauvage ». Celle-ci se defie d’une pensee limitee par les cadres de l’experience, lesquels interdisent traditionnellement de depasser les conditions de possibilite de la connaissance objective. La mentalite primitive possede en effet ceci de commun avec la metaphysique spiritualiste qu’elle permet de penser une apprehension directe de l’etre. L’actualite de la recherche entre alors en resonance avec la demarche de Levy-Bruhl, au sens ou philosophie et ethnologie, de par leur connexion, peuvent reciproquement intensifier leurs possibilites.","PeriodicalId":44338,"journal":{"name":"REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LA FRANCE ET DE L ETRANGER","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43484807","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Qu’est-ce que la compréhension ?","authors":"J. Michel","doi":"10.3917/RPHI.212.0163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/RPHI.212.0163","url":null,"abstract":"On se propose d’analyser en profondeur la comprehension comme activite synthetique de saisie de la signification d’un signe et de l’articulation signifiante d’une serie de signes, en la distinguant de notions connexes ou oppositives. Il s’agit, d’une part, de montrer que, si l’interpretation est une comprehension (mediate et reflexive), toute comprehension, lorsqu’elle est spontanee, n’est pas une interpretation. Il s’agit, d’autre part, de depasser l’antagonisme epistemologique entre l’explication et la comprehension en elargissant leur spectre au-dela du modele psychologique et du modele nomologique-deductif.","PeriodicalId":44338,"journal":{"name":"REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LA FRANCE ET DE L ETRANGER","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49581197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Adorno et la critique de la philosophie hégélienne de l’histoire","authors":"Jean-Baptiste Vuillerod","doi":"10.3917/RPHI.212.0203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/RPHI.212.0203","url":null,"abstract":"On cherche a comprendre la critique qu’Adorno a proposee de la philosophie de l’histoire de Hegel. Parcourant la Dialectique de la raison, co-ecrite avec Horkheimer, La Dialectique negative et divers ecrits sociologiques d’Adorno, on montre comment cette critique s’opere au nom d’une pensee concrete de l’utopie, qui prend place dans les relations amicales et amoureuses, dans la politique ou dans l’art. Adorno, en effet, n’a jamais rejete de maniere unilaterale la conception de l’histoire chez Hegel. Bien qu’il l’ait critiquee sur bien des points, il en a fait un outil heuristique pour comprendre la domination et pour developper sa propre idee de l’emancipation.","PeriodicalId":44338,"journal":{"name":"REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LA FRANCE ET DE L ETRANGER","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41360664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Manuscrit de Lucien Lévy-Bruhl sur la psychologie de Spinoza","authors":"Francesco Saverio Nisio","doi":"10.3917/RPHI.212.0241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/RPHI.212.0241","url":null,"abstract":"Decouvert et transcrit par Francesco Saverio Nisio qui en a complete les references bibliographiques, ce texte, propose en 1880 par le jeune Lucien Levy a la Revue des etudes juives qui venait de se creer, et reste inedit depuis, met l’accent sur « l’exactitude et la profondeur des observations » psychologiques de Spinoza, « grand metaphysicien », c’est-a-dire « grand artiste », dans l’Ethique.","PeriodicalId":44338,"journal":{"name":"REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LA FRANCE ET DE L ETRANGER","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44101865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"De la méthode psychologique de Spinoza dans la Théorie des Passions","authors":"L. Lévy-Bruhl","doi":"10.3917/RPHI.212.0243","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/RPHI.212.0243","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44338,"journal":{"name":"REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LA FRANCE ET DE L ETRANGER","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49605646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Philosophie de la simulation et finitude","authors":"Franck Varenne","doi":"10.3917/RPHI.212.0183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/RPHI.212.0183","url":null,"abstract":"On montre d’abord qu’il est necessaire de caracteriser une simulation informatique a un niveau plus fin que celui des modeles formels : celui des symboles et de leurs divers modes de referer. C’est particulierement vrai pour celles qui integrent des modeles et des formalismes heterogenes. On s’interroge ensuite sur les causes ontologiques qui pourraient expliquer leur succes epistemique. Il est montre qu’elles peuvent s’expliquer commodement si l’on adopte une conception de la nature a la fois discontinuiste et finitiste. Cette derniere these se trouve renforcer une position metaphysique naturaliste en invalidant, a sa racine, l’argument formule par le materialisme speculatif a l’encontre d’une approche scientifique du monde physique procedant, comme les simulations, par representations et operations finitistes.","PeriodicalId":44338,"journal":{"name":"REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LA FRANCE ET DE L ETRANGER","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46618226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Les principes du sens commun face à la norme de l’évidence","authors":"Angélique Thébert","doi":"10.3917/RPHI.211.0049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/RPHI.211.0049","url":null,"abstract":"EnglishAnyone who wants to believe correctly should obey the evidentialist rule, according to which one ought to believe that p if and only if one has sufficient reasons to believe that it is true that p. Otherwise, doubt is required. However, there are beliefs which do not respect this rule: the principles of common sense. I show that though we firmly believe them, while we do not have sufficient reasons in favour of their truth, this attitude is not intellectually illegitimate. For instance, we are entitled to maintain our belief that our intellectual powers are reliable, despite the lack of sufficient reasons to believe, even despite reasons to doubt. As a consequence, we are not doomed to choose between the suspension of judgment and the fideistic idea according to which the principles of common sense pertain to faith (construed as distinct from beliefs). In order to escape this dilemma, I defend the Reidian idea that the principles of common sense are genuine beliefs which we trust, or in which we have faith. According to this view, faith is not an answer to doubt, a leap that one is resolved to do for want of anything better. It is a primitive faith, without which one could not assess the evidence. This leads to conclude that 1) one is entitled to maintain it while one is aware of reasons to doubt, because such a faith is not grounded on reasons, and that 2) the compatibility with principles of common sense is a doxastic rule which takes priority over the evidentialist rule. francaisQuiconque veut croire de maniere appropriee devrait obeir a la regle de l’evidence qui veut que l’on croie que p si et seulement si l’on a des raisons suffisantes de croire qu’il est vrai que p. En tout autre cas, le doute s’impose. Pourtant, il existe des croyances qui ne respectent pas cette regle : les principes du sens commun. Meme si nous croyons en eux sans disposer de raisons suffisantes pour attester de leur verite, cette attitude n’est pas intellectuellement illegitime. Ainsi, nous sommes en droit de croire que nos pouvoirs intellectuels sont fiables, a defaut de disposer de raisons suffisantes, et meme en depit de raisons de douter. Nous n’avons pas a choisir entre la suspension du jugement et la these fideiste selon laquelle les principes du sens commun relevent de la foi, concue comme etant distincte des croyances. L’idee de Reid que les principes du sens commun sont des croyances authentiques en lesquelles nous avons confiance ou foi permet d’echapper a ce dilemme : la foi n’est pas une reponse au doute, un saut qu’on decide de faire faute de mieux. C’est une foi primitive, sans laquelle on ne peut pas evaluer l’evidence. Il en resulte que 1) une telle foi peut etre conservee en depit de raisons de douter, car elle n’est pas acquise du fait de raisons et 2) la compatibilite avec les principes du sens commun est une regle doxastique qui a priorite sur la regle de l’evidence.","PeriodicalId":44338,"journal":{"name":"REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LA FRANCE ET DE L ETRANGER","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70533664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Pierre Aubenque (1929-2020)","authors":"Rémi Brague","doi":"10.3917/RPHI.211.0145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/RPHI.211.0145","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44338,"journal":{"name":"REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LA FRANCE ET DE L ETRANGER","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70534539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Common Sense in Reid’s Response to Scepticism","authors":"Patrick Rysiew","doi":"10.3917/RPHI.211.0033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/RPHI.211.0033","url":null,"abstract":"Thomas Reid is one figure whose epistemological views are bound up with common sense. As with his positive theory, however, Reid’s response to scepticism – what it’s meant to establish, and how – is a matter of controversy. Of course, insofar as it respects and defends our ordinary view of ourselves as having knowledge, and from a variety of sources, any response to scepticism is ‘commonsensical’ in the broad sense. Notably, however, recent interpreters of Reid, and contemporary figures who take inspiration from his views, differ in what role if any they see common sense itself as playing in Reid’s response to the sceptic – hence, in whether they think that response is commonsensical in some more substantive sense. Here, I argue that even those who do give common sense a place in Reid’s defense of our pretheoretic epistemological views underrate the importance therein of common sense as Reid conceives of it. Specifically, they overlook the fact that common sense has an irreducible normative aspect for Reid, and that an adherence to the first principles of common sense is, for him, a minimal requirement on rational judgment and action, a requirement which even the sceptic cannot evade.","PeriodicalId":44338,"journal":{"name":"REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LA FRANCE ET DE L ETRANGER","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70533997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}