Legal Theory最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
THE RULE OF LAW AND THE LIMITS OF ANARCHY 法治与无政府状态的极限
IF 0.6
Legal Theory Pub Date : 2021-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/S1352325221000045
Carmen E. Pavel
{"title":"THE RULE OF LAW AND THE LIMITS OF ANARCHY","authors":"Carmen E. Pavel","doi":"10.1017/S1352325221000045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325221000045","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Anarchy is often contrasted with law, order, or security. But anarchist societies, by which I mean societies that lack a monopoly of coercive force, need not be lawless. They can develop sophisticated legal systems that regulate the behavior of their members and protect their rights. International law, market anarchism, and other models of anarchism such as the one proposed by Chandran Kukathas already exhibit or could plausibly exhibit complex legal rules and institutions. I will show that insofar as these models rely on consent, they all share similar structural flaws, namely, that they cannot meet basic rule-of-law values such as equality before the law and access to legal remedies for wrongs that embody and respect individual moral equality, even minimally conceived. The implication of this argument is not to vindicate state-based legal systems. Rather it is to show that legal systems, state-based or not, must have a strong nonconsensual, coercive element: the process of making, applying, and enforcing law must, to some extent, be severed from consent if law is to perform its function of providing for minimal justice.","PeriodicalId":44287,"journal":{"name":"Legal Theory","volume":"27 1","pages":"70 - 95"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S1352325221000045","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47761430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
CASTING THE LIGHT OF THE THEORY OF OPPOSITION ONTO HOHFELD'S FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTS 论反对论对霍菲尔德基本法律概念的启示
IF 0.6
Legal Theory Pub Date : 2021-03-01 DOI: 10.1017/S1352325221000070
João Alberto de Oliveira Lima, Cristine Griffo, J. P. Almeida, G. Guizzardi, M. Aranha
{"title":"CASTING THE LIGHT OF THE THEORY OF OPPOSITION ONTO HOHFELD'S FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTS","authors":"João Alberto de Oliveira Lima, Cristine Griffo, J. P. Almeida, G. Guizzardi, M. Aranha","doi":"10.1017/S1352325221000070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325221000070","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract At the core of Hohfeld's contribution to legal theory is a conceptual framework for the analysis of the legal positions occupied by agents in intersubjective legal relations. Hohfeld presented a system of eight “fundamental” concepts relying on notions of opposition and correlation. Throughout the years, a number of authors have followed Hohfeld in applying the notion of opposition to analyze legal concepts. Many of these authors have accounted for Hohfeld's theory in direct analogy with the standard deontic hexagon. This paper reviews some of these accounts and extends them employing recent developments from opposition theory. In particular, we are able to extend application of opposition theory to an open conception of the law. We also account for the implications of abandoning the assumption of conflict-freedom and admitting seemingly conflicting legal positions. This enables a fuller analysis of Hohfeld's conceptual analytical framework. We also offer a novel analysis of Hohfeld's power positions.","PeriodicalId":44287,"journal":{"name":"Legal Theory","volume":"27 1","pages":"2 - 35"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S1352325221000070","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45839131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
LEG volume 26 issue 4 Cover and Front matter LEG第26卷第4期封面和封面
IF 0.6
Legal Theory Pub Date : 2020-12-01 DOI: 10.1017/s1352325220000245
{"title":"LEG volume 26 issue 4 Cover and Front matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s1352325220000245","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1352325220000245","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44287,"journal":{"name":"Legal Theory","volume":" ","pages":"f1 - f2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/s1352325220000245","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44068930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
MISTAKEN AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION 错误的权力和义务
IF 0.6
Legal Theory Pub Date : 2020-12-01 DOI: 10.1017/S135232522100001X
Luciano Venezia
{"title":"MISTAKEN AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION","authors":"Luciano Venezia","doi":"10.1017/S135232522100001X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S135232522100001X","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Massimo Renzo argues that, as long as it is acting in good faith, an authority can issue orders that require subjects to act in ways that are morally wrong and still be acting within the scope of its jurisdiction, so that the orders are binding. This, however, is incorrect. If the authority is permitted to issue an order, it is acting within the scope of its jurisdiction and so the order creates an obligation. But if the authority is not permitted to issue the order, it is not acting within the scope of its jurisdiction and so the order does not create any obligation whatsoever. I develop my position and provide a model of mistaken authority through engagement with Renzo's view.","PeriodicalId":44287,"journal":{"name":"Legal Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":"338 - 351"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S135232522100001X","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44661509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
LEG volume 26 issue 4 Cover and Back matter LEG第26卷第4期封面和封底
IF 0.6
Legal Theory Pub Date : 2020-12-01 DOI: 10.1017/s1352325220000257
{"title":"LEG volume 26 issue 4 Cover and Back matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s1352325220000257","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1352325220000257","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44287,"journal":{"name":"Legal Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":"b1 - b8"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/s1352325220000257","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44700600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
KEEPING JUSTICE (LARGELY) OUT OF CHARITY: PLURALISM AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR BETWEEN CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS AND THE STATE 将正义(很大程度上)排除在慈善之外:多元化与慈善组织与国家的分工
IF 0.6
Legal Theory Pub Date : 2020-12-01 DOI: 10.1017/S1352325220000233
D. Halliday, M. Harding
{"title":"KEEPING JUSTICE (LARGELY) OUT OF CHARITY: PLURALISM AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR BETWEEN CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS AND THE STATE","authors":"D. Halliday, M. Harding","doi":"10.1017/S1352325220000233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325220000233","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Justice can be pursued by the state, or through voluntary charity. This paper seeks to contribute to the debate about the appropriate division of labor between government and charitable agencies by developing a positive account of the charity sector's moral foundations. The account given here is grounded in a legal conception of charity, as a set of subsidies and privileges designed to cultivate a wide variety of activities aimed at enhancing civic virtue and autonomy. Among other things, this implies that a charity sector oriented largely around the pursuit of justice will come at a moral cost to a liberal society, at least when the state is in a position to take the greater share of the responsibility. So, a positive account of charity provides at least a pro tanto reason for preferring a division of labor in which the state takes a greater share of the responsibility for pursuing justice. As well as developing and defending this conception in its own right, we apply it in offering some criticisms and enhancements of existing views about the division of labor.","PeriodicalId":44287,"journal":{"name":"Legal Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":"281 - 304"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S1352325220000233","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42688164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
LEG volume 26 issue 3 Cover and Front matter LEG第26卷第3期封面和封面问题
IF 0.6
Legal Theory Pub Date : 2020-09-01 DOI: 10.1017/s135232522000018x
{"title":"LEG volume 26 issue 3 Cover and Front matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s135232522000018x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s135232522000018x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44287,"journal":{"name":"Legal Theory","volume":" ","pages":"f1 - f2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/s135232522000018x","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46631996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
LEG volume 26 issue 3 Cover and Back matter LEG第26卷第3期封面和封底
IF 0.6
Legal Theory Pub Date : 2020-09-01 DOI: 10.1017/s1352325220000191
{"title":"LEG volume 26 issue 3 Cover and Back matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s1352325220000191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1352325220000191","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44287,"journal":{"name":"Legal Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":"b1 - b4"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/s1352325220000191","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46742651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
TOLERANCE OF INCOHERENCE IN LAW, GRADED SPEECH ACTS AND ILLOCUTIONARY PLURALISM 法律不连贯的容忍度、言语行为分级与言外多元
IF 0.6
Legal Theory Pub Date : 2020-09-01 DOI: 10.1017/S135232522000021X
Oren Perez
{"title":"TOLERANCE OF INCOHERENCE IN LAW, GRADED SPEECH ACTS AND ILLOCUTIONARY PLURALISM","authors":"Oren Perez","doi":"10.1017/S135232522000021X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S135232522000021X","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract One of the most difficult challenges of mature legal systems is the need to balance the conflicting demands of stability and flexibility. The demand for flexibility is at odds with the principle of impartiality, which is considered a cornerstone of the rule of law. In the present article, I explore the way in which the law copes with this dilemma by developing the idea of tolerance of incoherence. I argue that tolerance of incoherence emerges from the interplay between the inferential and lexical-semantic rules that determine the meaning of legal speech acts. I base this argument on an inferential model of speech acts, which I develop through a discussion of graded speech acts, and on the idea that the use of speech acts is governed by multiple and potentially conflicting conventions. I show how this tolerance allows the law to resolve the tension between dynamism and traditionality, and discuss its sociological and moral implications.","PeriodicalId":44287,"journal":{"name":"Legal Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":"214 - 249"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S135232522000021X","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47011431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
THE NEW LEGAL ANTI-POSITIVISM 新法律反实证主义
IF 0.6
Legal Theory Pub Date : 2020-09-01 DOI: 10.1017/S1352325220000208
Hasan Dindjer
{"title":"THE NEW LEGAL ANTI-POSITIVISM","authors":"Hasan Dindjer","doi":"10.1017/S1352325220000208","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325220000208","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to a recent wave of work by legal anti-positivists, legal norms are a subset of moral norms. This striking “one-system” view of law has rapidly become the dominant form of anti-positivism, but its implications have so far been little tested. This article argues that the one-system view leads systematically to untenable conclusions about what legal rights and obligations we have. For many clear legal norms, the view lacks the resources to explain the existence of corresponding moral norms. And its criteria for distinguishing legal norms within morality imply an under- or over-inclusive set of legal norms. I stress the special difficulties that apply beyond obligations, in the case of privileges and powers, and I show that the view's problems do not only—or mainly—concern egregiously unjust law, or indeed morally defective law at all. I close with reflections on legal normativity and the prospects for different forms of anti-positivism.","PeriodicalId":44287,"journal":{"name":"Legal Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":"181 - 213"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S1352325220000208","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46291627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信