Legal TheoryPub Date : 2019-09-01DOI: 10.1017/S1352325219000120
D. Enoch, Levi Spectre
{"title":"SENSITIVITY, SAFETY, AND THE LAW: A REPLY TO PARDO","authors":"D. Enoch, Levi Spectre","doi":"10.1017/S1352325219000120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325219000120","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In a recent paper, Michael Pardo argues that the epistemic property that is legally relevant is the one called Safety, rather than Sensitivity. In the process, he argues against our Sensitivity-related account of statistical evidence. Here we revisit these issues, partly in order to respond to Pardo, and partly in order to make general claims about legal epistemology. We clarify our account, we show how it adequately deals with counterexamples and other worries, we raise suspicions about Safety's value here, and we revisit our general skepticism about the role that epistemological considerations should play in determining legal policy.","PeriodicalId":44287,"journal":{"name":"Legal Theory","volume":"25 1","pages":"178 - 199"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S1352325219000120","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42904295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Legal TheoryPub Date : 2019-07-18DOI: 10.1017/S1352325220000221
S. Steel
{"title":"COMPENSATION AND CONTINUITY","authors":"S. Steel","doi":"10.1017/S1352325220000221","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325220000221","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article examines accounts of the moral basis of compensatory duties that explain such duties as the continuation, in some way, of the pre-wrong normative situation. I identify, contrast, and assess three versions of this view—duty continuity, right continuity, and reasons continuity. I argue that each version is defensible, once properly articulated. The article responds to a range of objections to these views that have not received much critical attention by their proponents.","PeriodicalId":44287,"journal":{"name":"Legal Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":"250 - 279"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S1352325220000221","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49050113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Legal TheoryPub Date : 2019-06-13DOI: 10.1017/S1352325219000089
J. Jonker
{"title":"CONTRACTUALIST JUSTIFICATION AND THE DIRECTION OF A DUTY","authors":"J. Jonker","doi":"10.1017/S1352325219000089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325219000089","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT To whom is a duty owed? Contractualism answers with an interest theory of direction. As such, it faces three challenges. The Conceptual Challenge requires acknowledgment that a duty is conceptually distinct from an interest. The Extensional Challenge requires an account of cases in which one who is owed a duty does not take an interest in the duty, or does not take as much of an interest as someone who is not owed the duty. The Positivist Challenge requires explanation of the great flexibility of law and other social practices in positing duties that do not reflect the landscape of moral interests. Contractualism can be shown to meet these challenges once we acknowledge the centrality of the idea of a generic interest. Focusing on generic interests also illuminates the distinctive form of respect involved in directedness.","PeriodicalId":44287,"journal":{"name":"Legal Theory","volume":"25 1","pages":"200 - 224"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S1352325219000089","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44619104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Legal TheoryPub Date : 2019-06-01DOI: 10.1017/S1352325219000077
Gabriel S. Mendlow
{"title":"THE ELUSIVE OBJECT OF PUNISHMENT","authors":"Gabriel S. Mendlow","doi":"10.1017/S1352325219000077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325219000077","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract All observers of our legal system recognize that criminal statutes can be complex and obscure. But statutory obscurity often takes a particular form that most observers have overlooked: uncertainty about the identity of the wrong a statute aims to punish. It is not uncommon for parties to disagree about the identity of the underlying wrong even as they agree on the statute's elements. Hidden in plain sight, these unexamined disagreements underlie or exacerbate an assortment of familiar disputes—about venue, vagueness, and mens rea; about DUI and statutory rape; about hate crimes, child pornography, and counterterrorism laws; about proportionality in punishment; and about the proper ambit of the criminal law. Each of these disputes may hinge on deeper disagreements about the identity of the wrong a statute aims to punish, and these deeper disagreements can be surprisingly hard to resolve, fueled as they are by the complex inner structure of our penal laws and the discretionary mechanisms of their administration.","PeriodicalId":44287,"journal":{"name":"Legal Theory","volume":"25 1","pages":"105 - 131"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S1352325219000077","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46737561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Legal TheoryPub Date : 2019-05-29DOI: 10.1017/S135232521900003X
Maytal Gilboa
{"title":"MULTIPLE REASONABLE BEHAVIORS CASES: THE PROBLEM OF CAUSAL UNDERDETERMINATION IN TORT LAW","authors":"Maytal Gilboa","doi":"10.1017/S135232521900003X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S135232521900003X","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article introduces a significant yet largely overlooked problem in the law of torts: causal underdetermination. This problem occurs when the causal inquiry of a but-for test produces not one but two results, which are contradictory. According to the first, the negligent defendant is the likely cause of the plaintiff's injury, whereas according to the second, she is not. The article explains why causal underdetermination has escaped the radar of tort scholars and is perceived by courts as lack of causation. It demonstrates that the current practice in cases of causal underdetermination might lead to erroneous decisions, absolving negligent defendants of tort liability even when the evidence suggests that they are in fact the likely cause of the plaintiff's injury. This, in turn, the article asserts, may not only lead to underdeterrence among potential defendants, but also encourage manipulative litigation strategy to escape liability in retrospect. The article then proposes solutions that contend with causal underdetermination and resolve the difficulties that the current practice entails.","PeriodicalId":44287,"journal":{"name":"Legal Theory","volume":"25 1","pages":"77 - 104"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S135232521900003X","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45803601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Legal TheoryPub Date : 2019-04-23DOI: 10.1017/S1352325219000028
A. Silk
{"title":"THEORIES OF VAGUENESS AND THEORIES OF LAW","authors":"A. Silk","doi":"10.1017/S1352325219000028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1352325219000028","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT It is common to think that what theory of linguistic vagueness is correct has implications for debates in philosophy of law. I disagree. I argue that the implications of particular theories of vagueness on substantive issues of legal theory and practice are less far-reaching than often thought. I focus on four putative implications discussed in the literature concerning (i) the value of vagueness in the law, (ii) the possibility and value of legal indeterminacy, (iii) the possibility of the rule of law, and (iv) strong discretion. I conclude with some methodological remarks. Delineating questions about conventional meaning, legal content determination, and norms of legal interpretation and judicial practice can motivate clearer answers and a more refined understanding of the space of overall theories of vagueness, interpretation, and law.","PeriodicalId":44287,"journal":{"name":"Legal Theory","volume":"25 1","pages":"132 - 152"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2019-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S1352325219000028","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44895081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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