{"title":"Finding Better Words: Markets, Property Rights, and Resources","authors":"Andrew P. Morriss, Roger E. Meiners, B. Yandle","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3673465","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3673465","url":null,"abstract":"To use or conserve environmental and natural resources effectively is complex. Many economists believe that institutional solutions built around markets and property rights can help improve results. This approach addresses what Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto termed the “missing lessons of U.S. history” – institutions whose designers may not have understood the outcomes that would occur, but the results were generally beneficial. However, technical economic analysis generally fails to persuade many at the policy level. Adding a focus on the practicality of solving issues by voluntary action will enrich the policy discussions. To do so requires economists to provide concrete examples of how to resolve environmental issues. \u0000 \u0000In this Article, we contrast the narratives given to support markets and property rights and state-centered solutions. The analysis suggests how to frame issues to increase opportunities for market and property rights solutions to be more broadly considered. In short, economists must stop talking past the dedicated environmentalists who have learned to communicate effectively with the public but often lack practical tools that economists can provide, Better narratives allow economists to join the public conversation successfully.","PeriodicalId":440985,"journal":{"name":"Law & Rhetoric eJournal","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128649867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Positivist, Baseball-Centric Critique of Originalism","authors":"W. Blake","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3619166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3619166","url":null,"abstract":"Some scholars have argued that respect for the Constitution compels judges to adopt originalism. This paper evaluates the claim of “compelled originalism” by comparing the language of the baseball rulebook to that of the U.S. and other constitutions. First, I describe how different rules of our national pastime align with originalism, while others invite umpires to use a living Constitution approach. I then leverage H.LA. Hart’s philosophy of legal positivism to evaluate baseball and constitutional rules. Hart claims public officials must accept the most fundamental rules of their legal system, which would include any guidance about how to interpret the Constitution. \u0000 \u0000Because compelled originalism is rooted in respect for the Constitution’s legitimacy and supremacy, one would assume the text would instruct judges to be originalists. Of course, the Constitution says no such thing. By contrast, the baseball rulebook sometimes provides specific instructions to umpires about how to adjudicate certain rule violations. I conclude by demonstrating how originalists have managed to turn the debate over constitutional legitimacy on its head. If the goal of originalism is to prevent judges from reading provisions into the Constitution, originalists must take seriously that no requirement to use original public meaning exists in the constitutional text.","PeriodicalId":440985,"journal":{"name":"Law & Rhetoric eJournal","volume":"52 Pt 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128956252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Special Case Thesis and the Dual Nature of Law","authors":"R. Alexy","doi":"10.1111/raju.12215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12215","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I take up two arguments in favor of the discursive model of legal argumentation: the claim to correctness argument and the dual nature thesis. The argument of correctness implies the dual nature thesis, and the dual nature thesis implies a nonpositivistic concept of law. The nonpositivistic concept of law comprises five ideas. One of them is the special case thesis. The special case thesis says that positivistic elements, that is, statutes, precedents, and prevailing doctrines, are necessary for law in order to achieve legal certainty. Without this, law would not be as perfect as it could possibly be. But it says, at the same time, that this alone would not be enough to fulfill the claim to correctness. The claim to correctness refers not only to the real dimension of law, defined by statutes, precedents, and prevailing doctrines, but also to its ideal dimension, defined, first and foremost, by justice. The special case thesis is my oldest thesis. It has remained an essential element of my system over the years. Its connection with four other theses—the Radbruch formula, the human rights thesis, the idea of deliberative democracy, and principles theory—does not change this at all. On the contrary, this connection has lent greater strength to the special case thesis.","PeriodicalId":440985,"journal":{"name":"Law & Rhetoric eJournal","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129350585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Eine globale Ideengeschichte in der Sprache des Rechts (A Global History of Ideas in the Language of Law)","authors":"G. Schuppert","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3317569","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3317569","url":null,"abstract":"German Abstract: Ziel des Artikels ist es, die Bedeutung der Sprache des Rechts als 'language of politics' im Rahmen einer globalen Ideengeschichte herauszuarbeiten. Nach einer Darstellung der Funktion der Sprache des Rechts als ideengeschichtlich relevanter Sprache werden einmal die Rolle von Rechtskonzepten/Rechtsregimen im Kontext einer globalen Ideengeschichte erortert, wie etwa die Sprache des Naturrechts, des Volkerrechts, der Menschenrechte oder der Rule of Law. Zum anderen geht es um die Rolle von rechtlichen Schlusselbegriffen in einer globalen Ideengeschichte, wie etwa die Leitbegriffe der Souveranitat, der Verfassung, der Staatsgewalt, aber auch von Basisinstitutionen wie Vertrag und Eigentum. Insgesamt erweist sich so die Sprache des Rechts als Sprache politischer Herrschaft. \u0000 \u0000English Abstract: The article aims at synthesizing the meaning of the language of law as a 'language of politics' within the context of a global history of ideas. After outlining the function of the language of law as one relevant for the history of ideas, this study discusses the role of legal concepts/legal regimes, such as natural law, international law, human rights or rule of law, within the context of a global history of ideas. Moreover, the role key legal concepts play within a global history of ideas, for instance, sovereignty, constitution, state authority, not to mention concepts basic institutions such as treaty and property, is also analyzed. On the whole, the language of law proves itself as a language of political authority.","PeriodicalId":440985,"journal":{"name":"Law & Rhetoric eJournal","volume":"91 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124194293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Law as a Linguistic Instrument Without Truth Content? On the Epistemology of Koskenniemi's Understanding of Law","authors":"S. Dellavalle","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2773743","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2773743","url":null,"abstract":"The most significant merit of Martti Koskenniemi’s legal epistemology consists in decisively radicalizing the “linguistic turn” in jurisprudence. This radicalization entails the claim that law should be understood not only as a specific language, but as a language without truth content, regardless of whether this truth is assumed to have universal or even only contextual validity. The innovative potential of Koskenniemi’s approach becomes even more evident if we consider it in the light of a short overview of the main strands of legal philosophy. However, the most far-going assertion of Koskenniemi’s legal philosophy – namely that legal propositions do not contain any inherent truth content, nor do they refer to an external source of reliable validity – is also its most contestable tenet. Indeed, the most recent philosophy of language maintains that neither language in general, nor the language of the law in particular, can be regarded as devoid of truth content. As a consequence, the legal professional cannot be just allowed to use the law as an instrument at the service of his/her preferences, but should justify his/her position by resorting to the linguistic content in which law, without assuming a metaphysical or ontological substance, is lastly rooted.","PeriodicalId":440985,"journal":{"name":"Law & Rhetoric eJournal","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122968169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Using (and Mis-Using?) Slavery","authors":"Karen E. Bravo","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2801286","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2801286","url":null,"abstract":"Today, we hear ‘slavery’ diagnosed everywhere: ‘modern slavery,’ ‘modern day slavery’, ‘modern forms of slavery’, and ‘contemporary forms of slavery’ are some of the terms. Uses of the term no longer arise from celebratory invocations of the 19th century legal prohibition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade in Africans and of chattel slavery by the United Kingdom, the United States, and other European powers. Instead, the dominant contemporary use of ‘slavery’ is said to reflect the emergence of ‘new’ forms of exploitation which are similar to, yet different from, the slavery of the past. This paper will explore how the uses and misuses of ‘slavery’. The issues addressed include: (1) What are the origins of and reasons for the contemporary resurgence in the use of the term? (2) What goals are sought or achieved by ‘slavery’s’ use in the public sphere? (3) Identification of some of the contexts and mechanisms of use of the term. (4) Exploration of who benefits, and who loses, from the contemporary use. (5) How the use of ‘slavery’ can work. In exploring those issues, the paper addresses ‘slavery’ as a legal definition which may be in the process of evolution into a term which captures any form of shock-inducing contemporary exploitation; and ‘slavery’ as a tool of anti-trafficking and anti-exploitation activists.","PeriodicalId":440985,"journal":{"name":"Law & Rhetoric eJournal","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127335190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The French Bar and the Emerging Legal Profession in Russia","authors":"Elizaveta Blagodeteleva","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2676649","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2676649","url":null,"abstract":"The complex and seemingly inconsistent use of the social vocabulary has been on the research agenda of those who study the Russian Empire for quite some time. Historians have long believed that the indiscriminate use of such terms as “estate” (“soslovie”) and “corporation” reflected Russian backwardness and eventually impeded further social and economic development, especially when it came to professional groups. The paper examines this assumption by focusing on the terminology deployed for the designation of Russian lawyers, in comparison to their French counterparts. Therefore, it dwells at length on the references to the French Bar in the bureaucratic discussion and in current press at the time of drafting the basic principles of the future Bar organization in Russia between 1857 and 1864. The comparison of the two sets of references provided plenty of evidence that the French notion of the estate (l'ordre des avocats) had a dramatic impact on the interpretation of Russian soslovie of legal practitioners. The French model seemed to spur social imagination and eventually helped Russian political and intellectual elites envisage a new type of social organization encompassing free, well-educated and politically engaged men.","PeriodicalId":440985,"journal":{"name":"Law & Rhetoric eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123855817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"'Three Men in a Room' and Albany - Where Did the Phrase Come From?","authors":"Bennett Liebman","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2649989","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2649989","url":null,"abstract":"The paper examines how the phrase \"three men in a room\" came to be associated with the operation of New York State government.","PeriodicalId":440985,"journal":{"name":"Law & Rhetoric eJournal","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121187789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Difference between Contract of Indemnity and Contract of Guarantee: Ten Case Analysis","authors":"S. Shekhar","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2587228","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2587228","url":null,"abstract":"The paper discusses the difference between Contract of Indemnity and Contract of Guarantee. The determination of the nature of contract is a matter of construction and depends upon facts of each case. The paper analyzes ten prominent cases on this issue.","PeriodicalId":440985,"journal":{"name":"Law & Rhetoric eJournal","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121821645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fifty Shades of Manipulation","authors":"C. Sunstein","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2565892","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2565892","url":null,"abstract":"A statement or action can be said to be manipulative if it does not sufficiently engage or appeal to people’s capacity for reflective and deliberative choice. One problem with manipulation, thus understood, is that it fails to respect people’s autonomy and is an affront to their dignity. Another problem is that if they are products of manipulation, people’s choices might fail to promote their own welfare, and might instead promote the welfare of the manipulator. To that extent, the central objection to manipulation is rooted in a version of Mill’s Harm Principle: People know what is in their best interests and should have a (manipulation-free) opportunity to make that decision. On welfarist grounds, the norm against manipulation can be seen as a kind of heuristic, one that generally works well, but that can also lead to serious errors, at least when the manipulator is both informed and genuinely interested in the welfare of the chooser. For the legal system, a pervasive puzzle is why manipulation is rarely policed. The simplest answer is that manipulation has so many shades, and in a social order that values free markets and is committed to freedom of expression, it is exceptionally difficult to regulate manipulation as such. But as the manipulator’s motives become more self-interested or venal, and as efforts to bypass people’s deliberative capacities becomes more successful, the ethical objections to manipulation become very forceful, and the argument for a legal response is fortified. The analysis of manipulation bears on emerging first amendment issues raised by compelled speech, especially in the context of graphic health warnings. Importantly, it can also help orient the regulation of financial products, where manipulation of consumer choices is an evident but rarely explicit concern.","PeriodicalId":440985,"journal":{"name":"Law & Rhetoric eJournal","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121139983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}