{"title":"Informed Voting","authors":"Meng Gao, Jiekun Huang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3777316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3777316","url":null,"abstract":"Information production by shareholders is of fundamental importance for the efficiency of proxy voting. We propose a stock-return based measure to capture informed voting. Our measure, the vote alpha, quantifies the extent to which a shareholder votes in the direction that the market perceives as value increasing. Using data on mutual funds' proxy voting records, we find that the vote alpha is persistent. Our main result shows that the voting pattern of high vote alpha funds predicts abnormal stock returns at horizons up to 18 months following contentious votes. We further find that the presence of high vote alpha funds leads to improved operating performance and stock returns.","PeriodicalId":440326,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Law eJournal","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122819003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Governing the Purpose of Investment Management: How the ‘Stewardship’ Norm is being (Re)Developed in the UK and EU","authors":"I. Chiu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3908561","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3908561","url":null,"abstract":"From the introduction of shareholder engagement as a ‘norm’ for stewardship, the regulatory governance of investment management conduct has been ramping up. As investment funds and asset managers assume control of increasing global assets under management and enjoy significant allocative power, public interest in the exercise of such power increases correspondingly. It is inevitable that societal and public expectations would be augmented and the governance needs for the industry would rise. This article argues that the UK Stewardship Code 2020 is a ‘graduation’ from an earlier experimental period which focused on the narrower and process-based ‘norm’ of shareholder engagement. The Code has broken new ground by articulating purpose-based steers for investment management, providing the starting point for a type of governance that may come to define the regulation of investment management in the future. Indeed, sustainable finance reforms such as in the EU and UK may provide the crucial kickstart to introducing non-optional integration of sustainability risks and goals into mainstream investment management in due course. Purpose-based governance, albeit in its soft law beginnings, is arguably a new trajectory for calibrating the relationship between private investment management and regulation, reflecting the public interest and expectations for the future of the industry.","PeriodicalId":440326,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Law eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121843840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Are Investor Reactions Shaping Sec Filings Writing?","authors":"Nihat Aktas, Eric de Bodt, Can Dogan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3901815","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3901815","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines whether companies consider investor reactions when reporting information to the SEC. We rely on M&A decisions as a testbed for two main reasons: (i) these are associated with announcement dates allowing the isolation of investor reactions and (ii) they require filing well defined SEC forms after the deal announcement. Relying on a large sample of hand collected merger-related SEC filings, we perform textual analysis to measure their readability (i.e., the Fog index). We find evidence about the existence of a feedback effect from investor reactions to the readability of the SEC filings and to the timing of its reporting to the SEC, supporting the presence of strategic behaviors in SEC filings information disclosure. The results indicate that more negative investor reactions are associated with less readable SEC filings and faster reporting.","PeriodicalId":440326,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Law eJournal","volume":"227 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134375739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Strategic Use of 13F Restatements by Hedge Funds","authors":"S. Cao, Zhi Da, Daniel X. Jiang, Baozhong Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3907560","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3907560","url":null,"abstract":"Hedge funds can amend their originally reported 13F holdings using restatements subsequently. We conduct the first systematic analysis of such filings, which are as common as the confidential filings (used by funds to delay holdings disclosure), but affect three times more stocks. We find the restated holdings are associated with significant abnormal returns, suggesting that restatements are often used strategically to hide funds' trading intention (for both buys and sells). We examine fund and stock characteristics that are related to this strategic choice. We also construct a return gap measure to gauge the value added from such restatements and find it to predict future fund performance. Finally, we show that commonly used databases such as Thomson Reuters do not fully adjust for restatements. While the resulting discrepancy is small in aggregate, it can be large for many funds.","PeriodicalId":440326,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Law eJournal","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127638097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"For Whom (and For When) is the Firm Governed? The Effect of Changes in Corporate Fiduciary Duties on Tax Strategies and Earnings Management","authors":"Douglas J. Cumming, Bryce Tingle, QC, F. Zhan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3897031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3897031","url":null,"abstract":"The proper object of the fiduciary duties of corporate directors and officers is frequently described as the central question in all corporate law. We use the adoption of constituency statutes, which shift the loci of corporate managers’ duties from shareholders to a wide range of stakeholders, as a quasi-natural experiment to determine the actual impact of fiduciary duties. We find that while the adoption of constituency statutes has no significant effect on measures of earnings management, it has a robust effect on firms’ effective tax rate, which increases in a range between 0.570% and 1.903%. These results are robust in terms of various measures of the firm’s effective tax rate. We provide explanations for why fiduciary duties apparently do not influence manager behaviors in relation to shareholders, but do affect their behaviors in relation to the taxing authority. We argue that a change to fiduciary duties doesn’t appear to alter the motivation of managers to maximize shareholder welfare outcomes, but rather it allows them to eschew short-term strategies that often impair long-term outcomes.","PeriodicalId":440326,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Law eJournal","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127712285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What Makes the Securities Criminal Law System of the United States Work? ‘All-Embracing’ ‘Blanket’ Securities Crimes and the Linked Enforcement Framework","authors":"T. Tajti","doi":"10.5937/pravzap0-30658","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5937/pravzap0-30658","url":null,"abstract":"The article explores the key factors that make the securities criminal law of the United States (US), as one of the integral building blocks of the capital markets and securities regulatory system, efficient. This includes the role and characteristics of sectoral (blanket) all-embracing securities crimes enshrined into the federal securities statutes, their nexus with general crimes, the close cooperation of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and prosecutorial offices, the applicable evidentiary standards, and the fundamental policies undergirding these laws. The rich repository of US experiences should be instructive not only to the Member States of the European Union (EU) striving to forge deeper capital markets but also to those endeavoring to accede the EU (e.g., Serbia), or to create deep capital markets for which efficient prosecution of securities crimes is inevitable.","PeriodicalId":440326,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Law eJournal","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116189959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Xiaohu Guo, Vishal K. Gupta, W. Jackson, Sandra C. Mortal
{"title":"Is There a Racial Gap in CEO Compensation?","authors":"Xiaohu Guo, Vishal K. Gupta, W. Jackson, Sandra C. Mortal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3883642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3883642","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Racial gap in corporate leadership has prompted continuous and intense discussions, motivating research into the conditions minorities face after they reach top management positions. We contribute to the ongoing debate in this area by examining the association between CEO race and compensation. We do not find evidence for a significant racial wage gap at the CEO level across various econometric specifications, including total-sample OLS, firm-fixed effects to capture CEO transitions within firm, propensity score matched sample, and instrumental variable analysis. The insignificant results hold for total compensation, cash compensation, and non-cash compensation. Further, there is no consistent evidence of differences in CEO compensation for any of the major racial groups (Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians). Based on our results, we conclude that racial minorities who make it to the CEO position in Corporate America are compensated at similar levels to their Caucasian counterparts.","PeriodicalId":440326,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Law eJournal","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127752580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"GR communication in social networks","authors":"P. Ramenskiy, A. Sosnovskaya","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3839593","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3839593","url":null,"abstract":"The study of GR research (I. Mergel, 2017 [1]) made it possible to determine the peculiarities of presence, communication and visual representation of power in social networks. Conclusions were made about the emerging trends of aestheticization, new rigor, expressed in the requirements for the organization of visual space, geolocation and content, imposed by the structure of social networks, orders and boundaries of technical agents (John Law, 2015 [2]). The discursive principles of the social network Instagram, which determine social habits and practices, have been identified (L. Manovich, 2016 [3,4], A. V. Markov, 2020 [5]). The modes of communication of the government and social networks are considered.","PeriodicalId":440326,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Law eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132969526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Paper Series VI – Company Voluntary Arrangements","authors":"Ikemefuna Stephen Nwoye","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3817398","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3817398","url":null,"abstract":"Paper Series VI deals with company voluntary arrangement, which essentially is a procedure that allows a company to settle debts by paying only a proportion of the amount that it owes to creditors and to come to some other arrangement with its creditors over the payment of its debts. It examines the statutory provision on proposing an arrangement, summoning of meetings, consideration, and implementation of the proposal.","PeriodicalId":440326,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Law eJournal","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123651125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Temporary Securities Regulation","authors":"Anita K. Krug","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3808662","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3808662","url":null,"abstract":"In times of crisis, including the 2020-21 global pandemic, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has engaged in a type of securities regulation that few scholars have acknowledged, let alone evaluated. Specifically, during recent market crises, the SEC has adopted rules that are temporary, designed to help the securities markets and its participants—both public companies and public investment funds, such as mutual funds and ETFs—weather the crisis at hand but go no further. Once that goal has been accomplished, these rules usually expire, replaced by the permanent rules that they temporarily supplanted. Although the temporary-rulemaking endeavor is laudable—and arguably necessary for the sake of maintaining well-functioning markets in crisis circumstances—neither the SEC nor its observers have sufficiently acknowledged the meaningful risks that temporary rules might present to investors. At the same time, they have also not appreciated the opportunities that temporary rules may create for furthering the cause of more effective regulation. This Article seeks to illuminate the potential and the pitfalls of temporary rules, thereby contributing to a better understanding of what is at stake when the SEC adopts them and what considerations should inform the agency’s rulemaking during future crises.","PeriodicalId":440326,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance & Law eJournal","volume":"208 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116214141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}