Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal最新文献_第2页

Artificial Intelligence and Anticompetitive Collusion: From the ‘Meeting of Minds’ Towards the ‘Meeting of Algorithms’? 人工智能与反竞争合谋:从“思想的相遇”到“算法的相遇”?

Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2021-01-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3751255

G. Colangelo

{"title":"Artificial Intelligence and Anticompetitive Collusion: From the ‘Meeting of Minds’ Towards the ‘Meeting of Algorithms’?","authors":"G. Colangelo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3751255","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3751255","url":null,"abstract":"Information technologies has affected so many aspects of daily life that algorithmic society is not considered science fiction anymore. When it comes to marketplaces and business strategies, it has been observed that a growing number of firms are using algorithms for dynamic price setting, thereby automatically adjusting their prices to changes in market conditions, including rivals’ prices. As a result, the diffusion of algorithmic pricing raises concerns for competition policy about the potential to enable collusion. Further, some policy makers and scholars are questioning the ability of existing antitrust tools to tackle effectively this new form of collusion. Indeed, current antitrust rules have been designed to deal with human facilitation of coordination requiring some form of mutual understanding among firms (‘meeting of the minds’). However, according to a strand of literature, algorithms could coordinate independently of human intervention and even autonomously learn to collude. Against this background, the paper aims at investigating whether current antitrust rules are suited to facing these new challenges, whether algorithmic interactions (‘meeting of algorithms’) could be treated similarly to a ‘meeting of minds’ or whether new regulatory tools are needed.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125027703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Governance of Data Sharing: a Law & Economics Proposal 数据共享的治理:法律与经济学建议

Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2021-01-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3774912

Jens Prufer, Inge Graef

引用次数: 11

Keeping Consumers in the Dark: Addressing 'Nagging' Concerns and Injury 让消费者蒙在鼓里:解决“恼人”的担忧和伤害

Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2021-01-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3803936

Alison Hung

{"title":"Keeping Consumers in the Dark: Addressing 'Nagging' Concerns and Injury","authors":"Alison Hung","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3803936","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3803936","url":null,"abstract":"In the digital context, companies often use \"dishonest design\"—commonly known as \"dark patterns\"—to trick or push consumers into doing things they wouldn't necessarily have done otherwise. Existing scholarship has focused on developing a taxonomy and definitions for different categories of dark patterns, conducting empirical research to better understand the effectiveness of dark patterns, and broadly surveying the legal and regulatory landscape for legal theories, existing and new, through which to curb these practices. This Note offers a deep dive into one category of dark patterns—\"nagging\"—and the unique legal issues the practice raises. While the FTC has started to use its Section 5 “unfair or deceptive” authority to combat some other types of dark patterns, particularly practices that mislead consumers, nagging practices are especially elusive—but just as insidious as the more commonly discussed categories of dark patterns. This Note identifies the direct and indirect harms nagging poses to consumers, argues for the regulation of the nagging category of dark patterns, and proposes a “do not nag” feature, modeled after the federal “do not call” list, as a solution.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130926083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Prohibitions Against Abuse of Dominant Position in Pakistan - A Country Where Statutory Monopolies Thrive 禁止滥用支配地位在巴基斯坦-一个国家的法定垄断茁壮成长

Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2021-01-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3763109

Faisal Daudpota

{"title":"Prohibitions Against Abuse of Dominant Position in Pakistan - A Country Where Statutory Monopolies Thrive","authors":"Faisal Daudpota","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3763109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3763109","url":null,"abstract":"Pakistan’s Competition Act, 2010 (CA ’10) and Competition prohibits abuse of dominant position, and provides elaborate substantive guidelines to suppress and sanction practices that constitute abuse of dominant position. More specifically, CA '10 prohibits practices that include the following: (a) limiting production, sales and unreasonable increases in price or other unfair trading conditions; (b) price discrimination by charging different prices for the same goods or services from different customers in the absence of objective justifications that may justify different prices; (c) tie-ins, where the sale of goods or service is made conditional on the purchase of other goods or services; (d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of the contracts; (e) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions on other parties, placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (f) predatory pricing driving competitors out of a market, prevent new entry, and monopolize the market; (g) boycotting or excluding any other undertaking from the production, distribution or sale of any goods or the provision of any service; or (h) refusing to deal. This article highlights the must to know thresholds for the reader.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129901402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Market Concentration in Europe: Evidence from Antitrust Markets 欧洲市场集中度:来自反垄断市场的证据

Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2021-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3775524

Pauline Affeldt, Tomaso Duso, K. Gugler, Joanna Piechucka

{"title":"Market Concentration in Europe: Evidence from Antitrust Markets","authors":"Pauline Affeldt, Tomaso Duso, K. Gugler, Joanna Piechucka","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3775524","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3775524","url":null,"abstract":"An increasing body of empirical evidence is documenting trends toward rising concentration, profits, and markups in many industries around the world since the 1980s. Two major criticisms of these studies is that concentration and market shares are poorly measured at the national industry level while firm level revenues are a poor indicator of product sales. We use a novel database that identifies over 20,000 product/geographic antitrust markets affected by over 2,000 mergers scrutinized by the European Commission between 1995 and 2014. We show that concentration, as measured by the market-specific post-merger HHI, is larger than reported in the extant literature (at least) by a factor of ten. We also show that concentration has increased over time on average. Yet, there is a great deal of heterogeneity across geographic markets and within broader industries. In a regression analysis that exploits this within-industry variation, we show that barriers to entry are unambiguously positively related to concentration irrespective of time periods, sectors of activity, and geographical market dimension analyzed. Strict past merger enforcement negatively correlates with concentration. Yet, this effect is stronger in the earlier decade (1995-2004) than subsequently. Intangibility of investments consistently displays positive correlation with concentration only for EU wide and worldwide services markets. In contrast, the correlation is negative in national markets. This underscores the importance of the large heterogeneity present in concentration developments across markets.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124360454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

What Does an Appreciable Negative Effect on Competition Mean? 对竞争产生可观的负面影响意味着什么?

Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2020-12-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3756836

C. Bergqvist

引用次数: 0

The New Competition Tool: An Analysis of the Policy Options and Institutional Set-Up 新的竞争工具:政策选择与制度设置分析

Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2020-11-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3737996

Christophe Carugati

引用次数: 0

Rethinking Antitrust 反思反垄断

Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2020-11-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3760730

L. White

引用次数: 2

Effective Interoperability to Enhance Competition in Social Networking: Breaking Down Data-Driven Barriers to Entry 有效的互操作性增强社交网络的竞争:打破数据驱动的进入壁垒

Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2020-11-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3733851

Cristian Santesteban, S. Longpre

{"title":"Effective Interoperability to Enhance Competition in Social Networking: Breaking Down Data-Driven Barriers to Entry","authors":"Cristian Santesteban, S. Longpre","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3733851","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3733851","url":null,"abstract":"The persistent dominance of the largest digital platforms has led many scholars and policymakers to generate proposals to invigorate competition in these markets. In this piece we address a remedy that has recently received renewed attention: interoperability. A primary goal of interoperability is to erode the barriers to entry that exist due to the presence of network effects. Network effects are indeed an important source of market power for social network platforms, but, as we have argued previously, another significant source of market power is related to the economies of scale and scope inherent in the use of data for machine learned applications. Without access to a broad continuous stream of user data, a social network is merely a static interface, with limited capacity to serve engaging or personalized content. We propose a version of interoperability that lessens this data-based entry barrier while explicitly addressing the privacy issues that invariably arise whenever data is shared across firms. We recommend that the standard for interoperability (i) include the broadest possible set of data currently relied on by Facebook about a post – not only intentionally posted data by the author of the post but also data from all users interacting with a post, regardless of which platforms those users belong to or whether they are friends with the person posting; and (ii) allow each user to independently control their own level of privacy restriction regarding storage, learning, and monetization, which would apply to every social network observing the user’s content. In this way, we believe that interoperability would not only reduce the network effects that constrain competition in social networks, but also facilitate access to the vast and varied data necessary for the development of compelling online content. Only by tackling both of these barriers to entry head on, can we more effectively invigorate competition in social networking.","PeriodicalId":439229,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124743524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Labour in Competition Law in Japan 日本竞争法中的劳动问题

Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal Pub Date : 2020-11-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3730497

Masako Wakui

引用次数: 0