World Competition最新文献_第4页

SOEs, Foreign Investments & Competition: A View from the Gulf States 国有企业、外国投资与竞争:海湾国家的视角

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World Competition Pub Date : 2021-12-01 DOI: 10.54648/woco2021027

N. Memeti, Agata Jurkowska-Gomułka

{"title":"SOEs, Foreign Investments & Competition: A View from the Gulf States","authors":"N. Memeti, Agata Jurkowska-Gomułka","doi":"10.54648/woco2021027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021027","url":null,"abstract":"State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) directly compete with private companies, including foreign investors. The scope of applicability of competition law towards SOEs constitutes one of the key features of national competition protection regimes. Two approaches (models) can be identified in this area: the equality approach (competition law applied in the same manner towards the public and the private sector; the model is based on the neutrality principle); and the differentiation approach (excluding fully the application of competition law on SOEs). The second model is usually justified by important social and economic goals, mainly by a necessity to provide highquality public services. However, the differentiation model may negatively affect both domestic competition and the investment atmosphere.\u0000The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries adopted competition laws that generally put SOEs and the public sector in a broader sense out of scrutiny of competition law regime. The paper aims to check what reasons lie behind a rejection of the neutrality principle in GCC’s competition laws, specifically if competition protection regimes are patterned on antitrust laws from liberal economies. By identifying how the differentiation approach to addressees of competition laws is reflected at a legislative or practical level in most GCC’s countries, the article tends to assess the impact of national competition laws on Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in the Gulf region.\u0000competition law, Gulf States, neutrality principle, State-owned enterprises, foreign investments, national champions","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85790586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

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Creating More Public Value in the EU Competition Law by Reaching a Higher Level of Prevention in the Particular Context of the Digital Markets 在数字市场的特殊背景下，通过达到更高的预防水平，在欧盟竞争法中创造更多的公共价值

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World Competition Pub Date : 2021-12-01 DOI: 10.54648/woco2021024

A. Tóth

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Shaping the New Modality of the Digital Markets: The Impact of the DSA/DMA Proposals on Inter-Platform Competition 塑造数字市场的新形态:DSA/DMA提案对平台间竞争的影响

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World Competition Pub Date : 2021-10-01 DOI: 10.54648/woco2021017

Oles Andriychuk

{"title":"Shaping the New Modality of the Digital Markets: The Impact of the DSA/DMA Proposals on Inter-Platform Competition","authors":"Oles Andriychuk","doi":"10.54648/woco2021017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021017","url":null,"abstract":"An unprecedented recalibration of the rules regulating the functioning of competition in the digital markets has catalysed diverse reactions among the main stakeholders. The proposed approach to regulating gatekeepers will have a paradigmatic impact on European consumers, businesses and public institutions. It will have equally significant implications for the theoretical foundations of competition law, economics and policy. While formally the Digital Markets Act (DMA) is complementing, not substituting, existing provisions of competition de lege lata, such a substantial extension of the rationale and instruments of competition policy is likely to have significant implications also for the application of ex-post rules. The entire apparatus of competition law will be extended by the new modality. Out of the wide spectrum of changes introduced by the DMA/DSA proposal, this article identifies and analyses one of the central – though not so commonly discussed – elements of the transformation. It asks a normative question about what kind of competition in the digital markets the European Union should seek to establish, and a methodological question about procedural and substantive legal mechanisms used for shaping such a new format.\u0000digital competition law, polycentric and dialectical approach to antitrust, competition law and the digital economy, goals of competition law, ex-ante and ex-post competition policy, Digital Markets Act – DMA, inter-platform competition, ecosystem competition, Digital Services Act – DSA.","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75452261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

World Competition’s Editor, José Rivas, Interviews Mr Andreas Schwab, Rapporteur of the Digital Markets Act in the European Parliament 《世界竞争》编辑jos<s:1> Rivas采访欧洲议会数字市场法案报告员Andreas Schwab先生

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World Competition Pub Date : 2021-10-01 DOI: 10.54648/woco2021016

J. Rivas

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Innovation Incentives in the Pharmaceutical Sector: Rethinking Competition and Public Policy? 制药行业的创新激励:重新思考竞争与公共政策?

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World Competition Pub Date : 2021-10-01 DOI: 10.54648/woco2021019

Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, R. Lauer, Laura Robles

{"title":"Innovation Incentives in the Pharmaceutical Sector: Rethinking Competition and Public Policy?","authors":"Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, R. Lauer, Laura Robles","doi":"10.54648/woco2021019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021019","url":null,"abstract":"The incentives of pharmaceutical companies to innovate and how competition affects these incentives has been topical in recent years: for the general public, as evidenced by a patent race at an unprecedented pace during the ongoing Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic; and more specifically for competition authorities, as demonstrated for example by the role innovation played in the assessment of the Bayer/Monsanto (2018), Dow/DuPont (2017), and the Novartis/GSK (2015) mergers. This article contributes to the innovation debate, notably in the pharmaceutical industry, by giving an overview on firm and market-level incentives to carry out research and development (R&D). Understanding these innovation incentives is relevant for a proper competition assessment where the effect of a particular conduct or structural change on these incentives is considered, but also more generally in the context of public policy or regulatory questions. We review the fundamental elements driving innovation incentives and tentatively relate these to the development of new drugs for neurodegenerative diseases (NDD), in particular Parkinson’s disease (PD) and Alzheimer’s disease (AD).\u0000Health Economics, Pharmaceutical Products, Innovation, R&D, Information Asymmetry, Coase Conjecture, Replacement Effect, Patent Race, Neurodegenerative Diseases, Parkinson’s Disease, Alzheimer’s Disease","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73480861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Innovation: An Antitrust Trojan Horse? 创新:反垄断的特洛伊木马?

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World Competition Pub Date : 2021-06-01 DOI: 10.54648/woco2021013

Shaurya Aron

{"title":"Innovation: An Antitrust Trojan Horse?","authors":"Shaurya Aron","doi":"10.54648/woco2021013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021013","url":null,"abstract":"Innovation is regarded as the spearhead of consumer benefit in a competitive market. However, a strategy of predatory innovation presents the innovator with a shower of opportunities to close down the market and drive out competitors, thereby directly affecting consumer sovereignty. An inquiry into the relationship between innovation and market structures is not only important to assess the impact of such forms of the market on innovative activities, but also for a well-founded and evidenced framing of principles of antitrust laws in respect of Intellectual Property Rights (‘IPRs’). Therefore, this article makes a case for the legal recognition, across jurisdictions including India, of predatory innovation in the context of high-tech markets to uphold the objectives of the antitrust regime, i.e., consumer welfare. The article traces the progressive steps taken by developed jurisdiction in this context and highlights how a similar approach could be adopted by India, fitting its current framework.\u0000This article, firstly, discusses the impact the market structure has on the motives and incentives for a manufacturer to innovate; secondly, brings forward the anti-competitive nature of predatory innovation in high tech markets; thirdly, advocates for the need for legal recognition of the conduct of Predatory Innovation while noting the counterarguments; lastly, concludes with identifying the effects of recognizing Predatory Innovation as anticompetitive conduct.\u0000Innovation, Predatory, Market Structures, Monopoly, Intellectual Property Rights, India, High-tech Markets, Interoperability, Platforms, Network Effects","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82078058","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Book Review: Competition Law and Antitrust: A Global Guide, David J. Gerber. Oxford University Press. 2020. 书评:《竞争法与反托拉斯:全球指南》，大卫·j·格伯著。牛津大学出版社，2020。

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World Competition Pub Date : 2021-06-01 DOI: 10.54648/woco2021015

Spencer Weber Waller

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Inability-to-Pay Fine Reductions in European Cartel Cases 欧洲卡特尔案件中无力支付罚款的减少

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World Competition Pub Date : 2021-06-01 DOI: 10.54648/woco2021009

Ioannis P. Kokkoris, Garry A. Gabison, Nandini Pahari

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Think Green Before You Apply: EU Competition Law and Climate-Change Abatement 申请前考虑环保:欧盟竞争法和气候变化减排

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World Competition Pub Date : 2021-06-01 DOI: 10.54648/woco2021010

David Henry, Jacques Buhart

{"title":"Think Green Before You Apply: EU Competition Law and Climate-Change Abatement","authors":"David Henry, Jacques Buhart","doi":"10.54648/woco2021010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021010","url":null,"abstract":"European Union (EU) competition law and the protection of the environment may not be the most obvious bedfellows. Nonetheless, how the EU competition rules can contribute to the EU’s mission to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 is a subject of keen debate – both by the European Commission (EC) and at Member State level. It is submitted, however, that the manner in which Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR) are applied by the EC is unconducive to the achievement of the EU’s ambitious climate goals. As such, it requires adaptation. A principal, though not the only, stumbling block in this regard pertains to the EC’s insistence on the need to demonstrate economic ‘in-market’ efficiencies with a view to offsetting any alleged competition concerns. Environmental benefits, however, tend by definition to be ‘out-of-market’. Drawing upon recent developments at national level, in particular, this article therefore seeks to offer some food for thought on how the rules relating to Article 101(3) TFEU and the EUMR could be amended/ applied differently as a means of accommodating environmental benefits and supporting the 2050 climate neutrality objective.\u0000European Green Deal, Climate neutrality, Environment, Article 101(3) TFEU, EU Merger Regulation, In-market efficiencies, Out-of-market efficiencies, CECED, UK CMA, Netherlands ACM","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72509269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

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Online Advertising and the Competition for Data: What Abuse are We Looking For? 在线广告和数据竞争:我们在寻找什么滥用?

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World Competition Pub Date : 2021-06-01 DOI: 10.54648/woco2021012

Alexandre Köhler

{"title":"Online Advertising and the Competition for Data: What Abuse are We Looking For?","authors":"Alexandre Köhler","doi":"10.54648/woco2021012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2021012","url":null,"abstract":"Competition law has to adapt to the challenges of the digital era, not by changing its objectives but by changing its analytical tools. At a time where the Commission contemplates going back to using exploitative abuses under Article 102 (a) TFEU, an enquiry into the use of these quite unexplored abuses for prohibiting excessive data gathering seems necessary. Considering that online advertising is the financial lungs of the zero-price economy in which platforms operate, we will address the competitive problems of third-party data processing from the standpoint of online advertising. Thus, we will analyse the functioning of advertising markets, how they interact with the consumer-facing markets as regards data extraction and what competitive problems may arise out of this interaction. The framework being set, we will give a detailed analysis of the Facebook decision from the German Competition Authority (GCA) by which it sanctioned Facebook for abuse of dominant position for its extensive data collection policy. Considering the successes and pitfalls of this attempt, we will suggest an analytical framework for approaching third-party data gathering under European competition law and Article 102 (a) TFEU in particular, taking into account exclusionary effects on the advertising side of platforms.\u0000advertising market, Facebook case, abuse of dominance (exploitative), abuse of dominance (exclusionary), third-party data gathering, unfair trading conditions, GDPR, causal link, theory of harm, DMA","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88151251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1