World Competition最新文献_第10页

Book Review: Misuse of Market Power: Rationale and Reform, by Katharine Kemp. (Cambridge University Press. 2018) 书评:《滥用市场力量:理论基础与改革》，凯瑟琳·坎普著。(剑桥大学出版社，2018)

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World Competition Pub Date : 2018-12-01 DOI: 10.54648/woco2018035

Tjarda van der Vijver

引用次数: 0

Do Pay-for-Delay Agreements Promote Innovation?: The Effects Across Innovation Cycles 延期付费协议能促进创新吗?:跨创新周期的影响

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World Competition Pub Date : 2018-12-01 DOI: 10.54648/woco2018030

Laureen de Barsy

{"title":"Do Pay-for-Delay Agreements Promote Innovation?: The Effects Across Innovation Cycles","authors":"Laureen de Barsy","doi":"10.54648/woco2018030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2018030","url":null,"abstract":"Since the first EU case in 2013, pay-for-delay agreements have been considered a restriction of competition by object under Article 101 TFEU. However, according to parties to these agreements, the harm caused to consumers can be balanced out by efficiencies in terms of increased incentives to innovate. The aim of this thesis is to assess this efficiency argument by studying the effect of pay-fordelay agreements on innovation. It appears from the analysis that this effect partly depends on the innovation cycle it relates to: either first-generation innovation or subsequent innovation. The impact on first-generation innovation is studied sequentially, by reference to the literature, for three dimensions of innovation: returns on innovation, R&D investments and the innovative output. We conclude that first-generation innovation is either promoted or nonaffected. Subsequent innovation is then studied from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view. The theoretical analysis focuses on two distinct issues: the incentives for first-generation innovators to invest in an improved version of their patented invention, and the ability of follow-on innovators to use existing knowledge. Based on this theoretical analysis, we put forward the revocation of a patent as a proxy for pay-for-delay agreements. We further use this assumption to design an empirical model whose objective is to estimate these agreements’ effect on innovation. We conclude that second-generation innovation is either unaffected or hindered.","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85084077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Cultural and Political Forces in the Criminalization of Cartels: A Case Study on the Chilean Experience 文化和政治力量在卡特尔定罪:对智利经验的个案研究

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World Competition Pub Date : 2018-12-01 DOI: 10.54648/woco2018031

Chiara Muraca

引用次数: 2

Book Review: Competition Enforcement and Procedure, by Nazzini, R. (Oxford University Press. 2016). 书评:竞争执法和程序，纳兹尼，R.(牛津大学出版社，2016)。

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World Competition Pub Date : 2018-12-01 DOI: 10.54648/woco2018034

M. Ferro

引用次数: 0

What Can We Learn About the Application of the as Efficient Competitor Test in Fidelity Rebate Cases from the Recent US Case Law? 从美国最近的判例法中，我们可以了解到作为有效竞争者测试在保真退款案件中的应用?

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World Competition Pub Date : 2018-12-01 DOI: 10.54648/woco2018029

Miroslava Marinova

{"title":"What Can We Learn About the Application of the as Efficient Competitor Test in Fidelity Rebate Cases from the Recent US Case Law?","authors":"Miroslava Marinova","doi":"10.54648/woco2018029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2018029","url":null,"abstract":"It is accepted that the treatment of fidelity rebates is one of the most controversial topics in European Union competition law. It remains an outstanding issue despite the clear position of the Court of Justice in both the Intel and Post Danmark II judgments to depart from the strict form-based approach and to endorse an approach based on an evaluation of the possible anticompetitive effects of fidelity rebates. In particular, it remains unclear whether a price-cost test should be deployed. The conditions when a price-cost test should be applied to fidelity rebates as opposed to alternative approaches is a central issue in recent US case law of fidelity rebates and associated scholarly debate. This article examines the academic debate in US and compares the treatment of fidelity rebates on both sides of the Atlantic in an attempt to clarify under which circumstances a price-cost test should be used as a tool to determine anticompetitive effects of fidelity rebates and how this clarification can be translated into concrete lessons for European caselaw. It reveals that the economic theory of raising rival’s cost explains that the assessment of a strategy to exclude an as efficient competitor does not require a price-cost test.","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83112206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Book Review: The Normative Foundations of European Competition Law: Assessing the Goals of Antitrust through the Lense of Legal Philosophy, by Oles Andriychuk. (Edward Elgar. 2017) 书评:《欧洲竞争法的规范基础:通过法律哲学的视角来评估反垄断的目标》，奥尔斯·安德里丘克著。(爱德华·埃尔加，2017)

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World Competition Pub Date : 2018-12-01 DOI: 10.54648/woco2018033

I. Lianos

引用次数: 1

Legal Professional Privilege in EU Antitrust Enforcement: Law, Policy & Procedure 欧盟反垄断执法中的法律职业特权:法律、政策与程序

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World Competition Pub Date : 2018-11-09 DOI: 10.54648/woco2019003

W. Wils

引用次数: 2

Framing Algorithms: Competition Law and (Other) Regulatory Tools 框架算法:竞争法和(其他)监管工具

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World Competition Pub Date : 2018-10-30 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3275198

Peter Georg Picht, Gaspare Tazio Loderer

引用次数: 7

Polar Opposites: Judgments and Counterfactuals in Sainsburys V. Mastercard and Asda V. Mastercard 两极对立:塞恩斯伯里诉万事达卡案与阿斯达诉万事达卡案的判断与反事实

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World Competition Pub Date : 2018-09-01 DOI: 10.54648/woco2018023

James Hotchkiss

{"title":"Polar Opposites: Judgments and Counterfactuals in Sainsburys V. Mastercard and Asda V. Mastercard","authors":"James Hotchkiss","doi":"10.54648/woco2018023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2018023","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the recent cases Sainsbury’s v. Mastercard and Asda v. Mastercard and uses them to demonstrate how the decentralization of Article 101 TFEU enforcement is creating legal uncertainty due to national courts being unequipped to apply complex Ex Post counterfactuals consistently. It considers the distinction between restriction of competition by object and restriction of competition by effect to show that EU and national courts now apply the latter. It then considers the requirements for effects-based analysis, focussing on the mandatory use of Ex Post counterfactuals, highlighting their emergence as a legal mechanism in Article 101 application. This article argues that Ex Post counterfactuals’ basis in vague economic theory creates significant difficulties for national courts attempting to enforce Article 101 consistently and evidences these difficulties by considering the courts’ composition, their overreliance on expert economic witnesses, the standard of proof, complex court interplay and referral for preliminary ruling. Ultimately, it argues that despite procedural tools being provided to national courts to ensure consistent application of Article 101 at national and EU levels, the courts are failing to utilize them, resulting in the creation of significant legal uncertainty as evidenced by the polaropposite judgments reached in the Mastercard cases.","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"132 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75037747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

An Economic Assessment of Antitrust Fines in Spain 西班牙反垄断罚款的经济评估

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World Competition Pub Date : 2018-09-01 DOI: 10.54648/woco2018020

J. García-Verdugo, Carlos Merino Troncoso, L. G. Cruz

{"title":"An Economic Assessment of Antitrust Fines in Spain","authors":"J. García-Verdugo, Carlos Merino Troncoso, L. G. Cruz","doi":"10.54648/woco2018020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2018020","url":null,"abstract":"Fines remain an essential mechanism of competition enforcement and should deter anticompetitive practices. This article quantifies the deterrent power of fines imposed by the Spanish competition authority from 2011 to 2015. First, we compare the evolution of fines over three sub-periods: From January 2011 to the creation of the CNMC on October 2013, since then until the Supreme Court’s judgment on fines on January 2015, and for the rest of 2015. The average fine per firm is similar in the first two periods but significantly lower in the third period, and now fines are more concentrated around the mean than before. Second, we define three scenarios – according to low, average or high values of the relevant parameters – for which we compute deterrence ratios to compare actual and optimal deterrent fines. The results show that most of the fines were under deterrent – a deterrence ratio lower than one – even when using the lower optimal fines of the lower scenario. More specifically, 80% of the actual fines are under deterrent in that scenario (close to 100% in the other two scenarios), and the average value of the fines imposed to these companies was on average 64% below the optimal deterrent fine, with slight changes across subperiods. We conclude that the fining policy of the Spanish competition authority between 2011 and 2015 should be considered significantly under deterrent.","PeriodicalId":43861,"journal":{"name":"World Competition","volume":"61 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84574721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0