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Logic and Logical Philosophy最新文献

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Fidel Semantics for Propositional and First-Order Version of the Logic of CG’3 CG’3逻辑命题和一阶版本的Fidel语义
IF 0.5
Logic and Logical Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-05-24 DOI: 10.12775/llp.2022.019
Aldo Figallo Orellano, Miguel Pérez-Gaspar, E. Bárcenas
{"title":"Fidel Semantics for Propositional and First-Order Version of the Logic of CG’3","authors":"Aldo Figallo Orellano, Miguel Pérez-Gaspar, E. Bárcenas","doi":"10.12775/llp.2022.019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/llp.2022.019","url":null,"abstract":"Paraconsistent extensions of 3-valued Gödel logic are studied as tools for knowledge representation and nonmonotonic reasoning. Particularly, Osorio and his collaborators showed that some of these logics can be used to express interesting nonmonotonic semantics. CG’3 is one of these 3-valued logics. In this paper, we introduce Fidel semantics for a certain calculus of CG’3 by means of Fidel structures, named CG’3-structures. These structures are constructed from enriched Boolean algebras with a special family of sets. Moreover, we also show that the most basic CG’3-structures coincide with da Costa–Alves’ bi-valuation semantics; this connection is displayed through a Representation Theorem for CG’3-structures. By contrast, we show that for other paraconsistent logics that allow us to present semantics through Fidel structures, this connection is not held. Finally, Fidel semantics for the first-order version of the logic of CG’3 are presented by means of adapting algebraic tools.","PeriodicalId":43501,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47486370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Equality and Near-Equality in a Nonstandard World 非标准世界中的平等与接近平等
IF 0.5
Logic and Logical Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-05-21 DOI: 10.12775/llp.2022.018
Bruno Miguel Antunes Dinis
{"title":"Equality and Near-Equality in a Nonstandard World","authors":"Bruno Miguel Antunes Dinis","doi":"10.12775/llp.2022.018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/llp.2022.018","url":null,"abstract":"In the context of nonstandard analysis, the somewhat vague equality relation of near-equality allows us to relate objects that are indistinguishable but not necessarily equal. This relation appears to enable us to better understand certain paradoxes, such as the paradox of Theseus’s ship, by identifying identity at a time with identity over a short period of time. With this view in mind, I propose and discuss two mathematical models for this paradox.","PeriodicalId":43501,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43471402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
A Leibnizian Logic of Possible Laws 可能律的莱布尼兹逻辑
IF 0.5
Logic and Logical Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-05-06 DOI: 10.12775/llp.2022.017
K. Świętorzecka, Marcin Łyczak
{"title":"A Leibnizian Logic of Possible Laws","authors":"K. Świętorzecka, Marcin Łyczak","doi":"10.12775/llp.2022.017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/llp.2022.017","url":null,"abstract":"The so-called Principle of Plenitude was ascribed to Leibniz by A. O. Lovejoy in The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (1936). Its temporal version states that what holds always, holds necessarily (or that no genuine possibility can remain unfulfilled). This temporal formulation is the subject of the current paper. Lovejoy’s idea was criticised by Hintikka. The latter supported his criticisms by referring to specific Leibnizian notions of absolute and hypothetical necessities interpreted in a possible-worlds semantics. In the paper, Hintikka’s interpretative suggestions are developed and enriched with a temporal component that is present in the characteristics of the real world given by Leibniz. We use in our approach the Leibnizian idea that change is primary to time and the idea that there are possible laws that characterize worlds other than the real one. We formulate a modal propositional logic with three primitive operators for change, temporal constancy, and possible lawlikeness. We give its axiomatics and show that our logic is complete with respect to the given semantics of possible worlds. Finally, we show that the counterparts of the considered versions of the Principle of Plenitude are falsified in this semantics and the same applies to the counterpart of Leibnizian necessarianism.","PeriodicalId":43501,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41583136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Relational Semantics for the Paraconsistent and Paracomplete 4-valued Logic PŁ4 准一致和准完全4值逻辑的关系语义PŁ4
IF 0.5
Logic and Logical Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-04-23 DOI: 10.12775/llp.2022.016
G. Robles, Sandra M. López, J. Blanco
{"title":"Relational Semantics for the Paraconsistent and Paracomplete 4-valued Logic PŁ4","authors":"G. Robles, Sandra M. López, J. Blanco","doi":"10.12775/llp.2022.016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/llp.2022.016","url":null,"abstract":"The paraconsistent and paracomplete 4-valued logic PŁ4 is originally interpreted with a two-valued Belnap-Dunn semantics. In the present paper, PŁ4 is endowed with both a ternary Routley-Meyer semantics and a binary Routley semantics together with their respective restriction to the 2 set-up cases.","PeriodicalId":43501,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44249301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Beyond Mixed Logics 超越混合逻辑
IF 0.5
Logic and Logical Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-04-11 DOI: 10.12775/llp.2022.014
Joaquín Toranzo Calderón, F. Pailos
{"title":"Beyond Mixed Logics","authors":"Joaquín Toranzo Calderón, F. Pailos","doi":"10.12775/llp.2022.014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/llp.2022.014","url":null,"abstract":"In order to define some interesting consequence relations, certain generalizations have been proposed in a many-valued semantic setting that have been useful for defining what have been called pure, mixed and ordertheoretic consequence relations. But these generalizations are insufficient to capture some other interesting relations, like other intersective mixed relations (a relation that cannot be defined as a mixed relation, but only as the intersection of two mixed relations) or relations with a conjunctive (or, better, “universal”) interpretation for multiple conclusions. We propose a broader framework to define these cases, and many others, and to set a common background that allows for a direct compared analysis. At the end of the work, we illustrate some of these comparisons","PeriodicalId":43501,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48520659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Varieties of Relevant S5 S5相关品种
IF 0.5
Logic and Logical Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-03-08 DOI: 10.12775/llp.2022.011
Shawn Standefer
{"title":"Varieties of Relevant S5","authors":"Shawn Standefer","doi":"10.12775/llp.2022.011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/llp.2022.011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000In classically based modal logic, there are three common conceptions of necessity, the universal conception, the equivalence relation conception, and the axiomatic conception. They provide distinct presentations of the modal logic S5, all of which coincide in the basic modal language. We explore these different conceptions in the context of the relevant logic R, demonstrating where they come apart. This reveals that there are many options for being an S5-ish extension of R. It further reveals a divide between the universal conception of necessity on the one hand, and the axiomatic conception on the other: The latter is consistent with motivations for relevant logics while the former is not. For the committed relevant logician, necessity cannot be the truth in all possible worlds.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":43501,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42707523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
From Inconsistency to Incompatibility 从不一致到不相容
IF 0.5
Logic and Logical Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-02-21 DOI: 10.12775/llp.2022.027
M. Coniglio, Guilherme V. Toledo
{"title":"From Inconsistency to Incompatibility","authors":"M. Coniglio, Guilherme V. Toledo","doi":"10.12775/llp.2022.027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/llp.2022.027","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this article is to generalize logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs) to systems dealing with the concept of incompatibility, expressed by means of a binary connective. The basic idea is that having two incompatible formulas to hold trivializes a deduction, and as a special case, a formula becomes consistent (in the sense of LFIs) when it is incompatible with its own negation. We show how this notion extends that of consistency in a non-trivial way, presenting conservative translations for many simple LFIs into some of the most basic logics of incompatibility, thereby evidencing in a precise way how the notion of incompatibility generalizes that of consistency. We provide semantics for the new logics, as well as decision procedures, based on restricted non-deterministic matrices. The use of non-deterministic semantics with restrictions is justified by the fact that, as proved here, these systems are not algebraizable according to Blok-Pigozzi nor are they characterizable by finite Nmatrices. Finally, we briefly compare our logics to other systems focused on treating incompatibility, specially those pioneered by Brandom and further developed by Peregrin.","PeriodicalId":43501,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48963644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Logic for a Critical Attitude? 批判态度的逻辑？
IF 0.5
Logic and Logical Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-02-19 DOI: 10.12775/llp.2022.010
F. Boem, S. Bonzio
{"title":"A Logic for a Critical Attitude?","authors":"F. Boem, S. Bonzio","doi":"10.12775/llp.2022.010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/llp.2022.010","url":null,"abstract":"Individuating the logic of scientific discovery appears a hopeless enterprise. Less hopeless is trying to figure out a logical way to model the epistemic attitude distinguishing the practice of scientists. In this paper, we claim that classical logic cannot play such a descriptive role. We propose, instead, one of the three-valued logics in the Kleene family that is often classified as the less attractive one, namely Hallden’s logic. By providing it with an appropriate epistemic interpretation, we can informally model the scientific attitude.","PeriodicalId":43501,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45114148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
On Barrio, Lo Guercio, and Szmuc on Logics of Evidence and Truth 论Barrio, Lo Guercio和Szmuc关于证据和真理的逻辑
IF 0.5
Logic and Logical Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-02-12 DOI: 10.12775/llp.2022.009
A. Rodrigues, W. Carnielli
{"title":"On Barrio, Lo Guercio, and Szmuc on Logics of Evidence and Truth","authors":"A. Rodrigues, W. Carnielli","doi":"10.12775/llp.2022.009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/llp.2022.009","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this text is to reply to criticisms of the logics of evidence and truth and the epistemic approach to paraconsistency advanced by Barrio [2018], and Lo Guercio and Szmuc [2018]. We also clarify the notion of evidence that underlies the intended interpretation of these logics and is a central point of Barrio’s and Lo Guercio & Szmuc’s criticisms.","PeriodicalId":43501,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46511883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Logical Pluralism and Interpretations of Logical Systems 逻辑多元论与逻辑系统的解释
IF 0.5
Logic and Logical Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-02-07 DOI: 10.12775/llp.2022.007
Diego Tajer, Camillo Fiore
{"title":"Logical Pluralism and Interpretations of Logical Systems","authors":"Diego Tajer, Camillo Fiore","doi":"10.12775/llp.2022.007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/llp.2022.007","url":null,"abstract":"Logical pluralism is a general idea that there is more than one correct logic. Carnielli and Rodrigues [2019a] defend an epistemic interpretation of the paraconsistent logic N4, according to which an argument is valid in this logic just in case it necessarily preserves evidence. The authors appeal to this epistemic interpretation to briefly motivate a kind of logical pluralism: “different accounts of logical consequence may preserve different properties of propositions”. The aim of this paper is to study the prospect of a logical pluralism based on different interpretations of logical systems. First, we give our analysis of what it means to interpret a logic – and make some hopefully useful distinctions along the way. Second, we present what we call an interpretational logical pluralism: there is more than one correct logic and a logic is correct only if it has some adequate interpretation. We consider four variants of this idea, bring up some possible objections, and try to find plausible solutions on behalf of the pluralist. We will argue that interpretations of logical systems provide a promising – albeit not unproblematic – route to logical pluralism.","PeriodicalId":43501,"journal":{"name":"Logic and Logical Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42601894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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