{"title":"Representation and Government","authors":"Catherine E. De Vries, S. Hobolt","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvt9k3d3.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvt9k3d3.12","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter highlights the impact of the rise of challenger parties on both representation and responsible government. It begins by examining whether voters are more mobilized and feel more represented in systems with greater choice and more challenger parties. The chapter also looks at how the rise of a new challenger, the Alternative for Germany, on the far right in German politics has had a mobilizing effect on citizens. It then turns to the effect on government stability. The chapter shows that it is more difficult to form a government as the share of challenger parties rises and, importantly, the governments that are formed are less stable. Finally, it discusses the specific examples of government formation in Belgium and government instability in the Netherlands.","PeriodicalId":434877,"journal":{"name":"Political Entrepreneurs","volume":"115 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130969964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Entrepreneurship","authors":"Catherine E. De Vries, S. Hobolt","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvt9k3d3.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvt9k3d3.9","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter evaluates issue entrepreneurship, an innovation strategy through which political parties mobilize a new or previously ignored issue. Political parties will engage in issue entrepreneurship when the electoral gains of doing so outweigh the costs. Challenger parties are more likely to act as issue entrepreneurs than dominant parties because the potential costs relating to possible bad reactions of the voter base or coalition partners are likely to be lower for the former. At the same time, the potential electoral gains are more uncertain for dominant parties than for challenger parties. Parties that wish to politically innovate by mobilizing new or previously ignored policy issues are likely to choose issues with a high degree of appropriability—that is to say, issues that are not easily subsumed in the dominant left-right dimension. These issues may drive a wedge in the constituencies of dominant parties and lead to internal rifts.","PeriodicalId":434877,"journal":{"name":"Political Entrepreneurs","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114515355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Voter Loyalty","authors":"Catherine E. De Vries, S. Hobolt","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvt9k3d3.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvt9k3d3.7","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter focuses on voter loyalty, looking at the barriers to entry that challenger parties face, most notably the strength of party attachments to dominant parties. First, it explores the development of party membership, which is the most formal expression of an attachment to a party. Second, it considers subjective measures of party attachment, which show cross-national volatility, but also clear signs of loosening ties. Third, the chapter studies actual behavior—namely, voter volatility, which captures individual-level party switching between elections. Here one sees that voters in the countries examined have become much more willing to switch parties. Finally, the chapter highlights the importance of different barriers to entry by comparing British and Danish case studies. Overall, the evidence suggests that voters are becoming more like consumers and more willing to switch if there is something more appealing on offer.","PeriodicalId":434877,"journal":{"name":"Political Entrepreneurs","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127425872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Antiestablishment Rhetoric","authors":"Catherine E. De Vries, S. Hobolt","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvt9k3d3.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvt9k3d3.10","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter studies antiestablishment rhetoric. Antiestablishment rhetoric is not only used by many political entrepreneurs to paint themselves as outsiders, but is also a core feature of populism. Populist parties aim to distinguish themselves from the political mainstream not only by advocating anti-immigration or anti-EU stances, but also by attacking the mainstream political parties. Yet the chapter shows that antiestablishment rhetoric is a strategy used not only by populist parties, but by other political parties as well. It then situates the use of antiestablishment rhetoric in the book's more general argument about party strategy and its theory of political change. Antiestablishment rhetoric by political parties is predominantly aimed at attacking the competence of competitors, and is especially used by challenger parties.","PeriodicalId":434877,"journal":{"name":"Political Entrepreneurs","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127359745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Changing Voter Appeal","authors":"Catherine E. De Vries, S. Hobolt","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvt9k3d3.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvt9k3d3.11","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter assesses whether the innovation strategies of challenger parties are successful in terms of extending their voter base and generating more votes. Challenger parties innovate by mobilizing high appropriability issues that are difficult to handle for dominant parties because they risk splitting their rank and file. Challenger parties also aim to protect their innovation and first-mover advantage by discrediting rivals. This twofold approach based on policy and rhetoric is aimed at increasing electoral appeal and thus breaking the brand loyalty of voters to dominant parties. The chapter then considers two expectations which can be derived from this book's theory of political change. First, challenger parties that innovate want to attract new voters, and by doing so break the market power of dominant parties. Second, when choosing a challenger over a dominant party, voters should be voting on the basis of high appropriability issues and motivated by antiestablishment considerations. The chapter empirically tests these expectations by combining data for over 200 parties between 1950 and 2017 in 18 West European countries with survey data for over 18,000 individuals in 17 West European countries in 2014.","PeriodicalId":434877,"journal":{"name":"Political Entrepreneurs","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126045655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strategies of Dominance","authors":"C. D. Vries, S. Hobolt","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvt9k3d3.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvt9k3d3.8","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines the strategies employed by dominant parties to secure their long-term electoral success and control of office. The first of the dominant-party strategies is that of distinctive convergence, whereby dominant parties take positions closer to the center ground in order to appeal to the tastes of a larger share of the electorate. Second, dominant parties seek to keep challengers at bay by controlling the political agenda and avoiding issues that may be disadvantageous to them. The final strategy concerns the emphasis of dominant parties on their competence. In combination, the strategies of distinctive convergence, issue avoidance, and competence have kept the old center-right and center-left parties in a dominant position in most of Western Europe for decades. Yet, these strategies are not without risk. As dominant parties converge to the center, there is a real risk that voters perceive them as too similar and feel they lack a genuine alternative.","PeriodicalId":434877,"journal":{"name":"Political Entrepreneurs","volume":"139 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116726162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
L. Langner, L. Joyce, D. Wear, J. Prestemon, D. Coulson, Claire B. O'Dea
{"title":"Future Scenarios","authors":"L. Langner, L. Joyce, D. Wear, J. Prestemon, D. Coulson, Claire B. O'Dea","doi":"10.2737/rmrs-gtr-412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2737/rmrs-gtr-412","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter summarizes the main arguments and findings of the book by defining two key principles that guide political change in Europe. These two principles are the principle of contestability and the principle of appropriability. The principle of contestability focuses on the likelihood that a party can gain a larger share of the political market if it offers a product of greater value to voters. The principle of appropriability concerns the extent to which a successful innovator can capture the benefits resulting from its innovation. The chapter then outlines three different scenarios for the future of European politics. It also highlights topics which were not addressed in this book, but are nonetheless important areas for future research. Finally, the chapter discusses important normative considerations about the stability and resilience of democratic institutions.","PeriodicalId":434877,"journal":{"name":"Political Entrepreneurs","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121925848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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