{"title":"Social Security and the Interactions between Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Risk","authors":"Daniel Harenberg, A. Ludwig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2416124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2416124","url":null,"abstract":"We ask whether a PAYG-financed social security system is welfare improving in an economy with idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. We argue that interactions between the two risks are important for this question. One is a direct interaction in the form of a countercyclical variance of idiosyncratic income risk. The other indirectly emerges over a household's life-cycle because retirement savings contain the history of idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. We show that this leads to risk interactions, even when risks are statistically independent. In our quantitative analysis, we find that introducing social security with a contribution rate of two percent leads to welfare gains of 2.2% of lifetime consumption in expectation, despite substantial crowding out of capital. This welfare gain stands in contrast to the welfare losses documented in the previous literature, which studies one risk in isolation. We show that jointly modeling both risks is crucial: 60% of the welfare benefits from insurance result from the interactions of risks.","PeriodicalId":430314,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Pensions & Retirement (Topic)","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123537529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Helping Ontarians Save for Retirement: How the Province Could Adapt the Canada Supplementary Pension Plan","authors":"Keith P. Ambachtsheer","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2408039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2408039","url":null,"abstract":"As Ontario pushes ahead with pension reform to improve retirement security for its citizens, it should consider a “middle-way” solution between current competing visions for reform, according to a report released today by the C.D. Howe institute. In “Helping Ontarians Save for Retirement: How the Province Could Adapt the Canada Supplementary Pension Plan,” author Keith Ambachtsheer recommends an approach that avoids the potential pitfalls of two existing options: an expanded Canada Pension Plan (CPP) on one hand, or reliance on Pooled Registered Pensions Plans (PRPPs), on the other.","PeriodicalId":430314,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Pensions & Retirement (Topic)","volume":"146 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116141503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Simulated Replacement Rates for CPP Reform Options","authors":"Kevin S. Milligan, Tammy Schirle","doi":"10.11575/SPPP.V7I0.42459","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11575/SPPP.V7I0.42459","url":null,"abstract":"A certain segment of the Canadian population is at risk of being ill-prepared for retirement. These people will likely not have enough pension income when they retire to maintain their current lifestyle. It sounds like a problem that calls for urgent government action. Only, these people are not underprivileged or lowincome earners. They are middle- and higher-income earners who lack an employer-provided pension, but presumably have the capacity to save for retirement on their own. Whether we see the fact that many of them do not as a problem for government to solve depends entirely on our view of the role of government. This, ultimately, is what the current discussions about reforming the Canada Pension Plan, boil down to. The trend in the incomes of the elderly is generally positive: compared to the 1970s, retirees are living far more comfortably, with incomes overall showing no obvious signs of distress. And data show that Canadians earning low incomes will be able to largely maintain their current earnings upon retirement, relying on the Canada Pension Plan and other public supports. Those Canadians earning mid-range and higher incomes who also enjoy an employer-provided pension, such as public-service workers, are also well-positioned to be able to largely maintain their working-age lifestyles after retirement. Meanwhile, there is no obvious evidence that the number of workers with employment-related pensions will decline in the future; pension coverage among young workers has been increasing, as has the proportion of workers in the public sector. Expanding the CPP — whether it is using the plan recently proposed by P.E.I., the “wedge” proposal offered by economist Michael Wolfson, or simply doubling the maximum pensionable-earnings room allowed for CPP contributions — would have the largest impact on relatively comfortable workers who are not saving adequately for retirement. In effect, it would force them to save more. But that is not without risks. On a practical level, simply increasing CPP contributions makes the investment decisions of the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board that much more liable for the retirement fate of Canadians. But it also promulgates a philosophy in which the federal government plays an ever-larger role, moving further into parts of our lives that have traditionally been considered areas of personal responsibility. That said, decisions about retirement savings are complicated and irreversible, yet critically important. There will inevitably be at least some people who make poor choices. Whether leaving relatively advantaged workers to suffer the consequences of their own investment decisions, or whether we require government intervention to protect them with an expanded CPP, hinges very much on just how paternalistic we expect our policy-makers to be.","PeriodicalId":430314,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Pensions & Retirement (Topic)","volume":"207 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121194379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mandatory Participation in Occupational Pension Schemes in the Netherlands and Other Countries. An Update","authors":"Damiaan H. J. Chen, R. Beetsma","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2670476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2670476","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses mandatory participation in Dutch occupational pension schemes. While mandatory participation is a historical feature of most second-pillar pension arrangements, some recent developments may affect the case for mandatory participation. The main ones are the revision of the Dutch supplementary pension contract, changes in the prudential supervisory rules and developments in European regulations regarding supplementary pensions. We also compare mandatory participation in the Dutch occupational pension system with that in a number of foreign pension systems.","PeriodicalId":430314,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Pensions & Retirement (Topic)","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122326145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Role of Economic, Fiscal, and Financial Shocks in the Evolution of Public Sector Pension Funding","authors":"Robert. Triest, Bo Zhao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2433796","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2433796","url":null,"abstract":"Many studies have documented the pervasive underfunding of public sector pension plans in the United States in recent years. The deterioration of the funded status of public pension plans coincided with severe fiscal crises that state and local governments experienced in the 2000s. This development has led to a suspicion that state and local governments have decreased employer pension contributions as a backdoor means of running fiscal deficits. In this paper, the authors investigate the extent to which this phenomenon has occurred. They estimate panel data regressions using the Boston College Center for Retirement Research's Public Plans Database, which provides data for 2001 through 2010. The authors find that contrary to popular belief, plan sponsors do not reduce their contributions in response to negative fiscal or economic shocks. In contrast, plan sponsors' contributions to their pension plans increase in response to growth in their unfunded liabilities. The authors document that the public pension underfunding crisis during the 2000s developed largely as a consequence of portfolio returns that fell short of expectations. Public pension plans' assets portfolios have a relatively high share of equities and other risky assets, leaving the plans' funded status vulnerable to asset price fluctuations. Although plan sponsors increased their contributions in response to the growth of unfunded liabilities, they did not do so by enough to fully counteract the effect of the subpar portfolio returns. This finding holds across the spectrum of plans ranked in terms of funded status in 2010.","PeriodicalId":430314,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Pensions & Retirement (Topic)","volume":"245 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127297750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reforming Pensions in Europe: A Comparative Country Analysis","authors":"D. Natali, F. Stamati","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2376720","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2376720","url":null,"abstract":"This working paper assesses the impact of the economic crisis on European pension systems and provides a comparative overview of the measures imposed on European pension systems, together with their effects. Focussing on eight countries (representative of different pension models) the study shows that these countries applied a similar two-step strategy in response to the crisis. After introducing anti-cyclical measures in the first years (2009-10), they all moved later (2010-12 and on) to austerity measures trying to improve the financial viability of pensions (e.g. revised indexation, an increase in the retirement age or a stricter link between contributions and benefits). That said, these countries implemented different sets of measures to tackle their pension challenges. These differences were very much related to the institutional pension system inherited from the past and the magnitude and nature of the financial crisis hitting these countries. Finally, the working paper also looks at the role of social partners in pension reforms in these countries and concludes that there is a broad trend towards a deterioration of the dialogue between governments and social partners.","PeriodicalId":430314,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Pensions & Retirement (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130399339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pension Obligation Bonds and Government Spending","authors":"Thad D. Calabrese, Todd L. Ely","doi":"10.1111/j.1540-5850.2013.12022.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5850.2013.12022.x","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the use of pension obligation bonds (POBs) as a financing strategy to address the effects of unfunded pension liabilities on government operating budgets. POBs are publicly marketed as money‐saving mechanisms that reduce pension system payments while allowing for increased spending on other government priorities. We review general POB usage and examine whether POBs altered school district spending patterns in Oregon and Indiana. Our results indicate that districts issuing POBs have not increased educational spending relative to other districts. Because POBs cost money to issue and manage, decision makers are encouraged to consider annual budgetary effects prior to issuance.","PeriodicalId":430314,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Pensions & Retirement (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130540900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Allocating Risk Capital: The Case of New Zealand Superannuation Fund","authors":"D. Iverson, Renato Staub","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2330359","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2330359","url":null,"abstract":"This article describes how New Zealand Superannuation Fund (NZSF) allocates risk capital through its strategic tilting program. The process is based on the belief that a disciplined approach to risk allocation is a cornerstone of successfully implementing the Fund’s investment strategies and achieving its goals. The three key elements of the risk allocation approach are supportive investment beliefs, strong governance, and the disciplined use of NZSF’s active risk tool (ART). The article concludes with a summary of our experience with the approach to date. Other investors who engage in, or are considering engaging in, dynamic asset allocation may benefit from such an approach.","PeriodicalId":430314,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Pensions & Retirement (Topic)","volume":"317 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123468604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Housing in Retirement Across Countries","authors":"Makoto Nakajima, Irina A. Telyukova","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2148430","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2148430","url":null,"abstract":"The “retirement saving puzzle” is a phenomenon in which many households U.S. households have significant wealth late in life, contrary to the predictions of a simple life-cycle model. In this project, we examine cross-country differences in the saving behavior of retirees in order to weigh in on the discussion of the puzzle. First, we find that countries in our sample vary noticeably in terms of the extent of the puzzle: one group of countries, in South and Central Europe, look like the United States, while in Northern Europe, retirees spend down their wealth much more rapidly. Second, it appears that the rate of dissaving in retirement is correlated with the extent of public coverage of healthcare and long-term care, and these differences in saving happen predominantly through dissaving of financial assets, while housing assets are less affected. In a quantitative experiment using a life-cycle model of saving in retirement, we measure the role of out-of-pocket medical spending risk in accounting for differences in observed saving patterns among retirees in the United States and Sweden, considering housing and financial assets separately. The model predicts that this risk accounts, on average across age, for one-half of the difference in median net worth between United States and Sweden, and for about 70 percent of the difference in median financial assets. The role of risk diminishes with age, and is seen primarily in financial asset saving, while housing assets do not appear to respond to spending risk, suggesting that housing is not a precautionary asset.","PeriodicalId":430314,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Pensions & Retirement (Topic)","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123163114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Reporting Strictness Index for Pension Funds","authors":"Fieke van der Lecq, J. Rivera-Rozo, O. Steenbeek","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2293562","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2293562","url":null,"abstract":"The structure and organization of pension systems vary considerably across countries. Pension fund regulation and supervision are two characteristics of pension systems that exemplify such variation. This paper provides a structured approach to measure cross-country differences in the intensity and strictness of pension fund reporting requirements.","PeriodicalId":430314,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Pensions & Retirement (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130828995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}