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{"title":"BOOK REVIEW: NOVAES, C.D, The Dialogical Roots of Deduction: Historical, Cognitive and Philosophical Perspectives on Reasoning (Cambridge University Press, 2020, 271 pages.)","authors":"B. R. Mendonça","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n2.bm","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n2.bm","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this article, I review the new book by C. D. Novaes, The Dialogical Roots of Deduction: Historical, Cognitive, and Philosophical Perspectives on Reasoning (2020). I reconstruct the main themes and arguments presented in the work and critically assess its results.","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43602931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"BACK TO THE QUESTION OF ONTOLOGY (AND METAPHYSICS)","authors":"J. Arenhart, R. Arroyo","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2021.V44N2.JR","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.V44N2.JR","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":"44 1","pages":"1-51"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49122055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"THE HARSANYI-RAWLS DEBATE: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AS DECISION THEORY UNDER UNCERTAINTY","authors":"R. Peres","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n2.rp","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n2.rp","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Social decisions are often made under great uncertainty - in situations where political principles, and even standard subjective expected utility, do not apply smoothly. In the first section, we argue that the core of this problem lies in decision theory itself - it is about how to act when we do not have an adequate representation of the context of the action and of its possible consequences. Thus, we distinguish two criteria to complement decision theory under ignorance - Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason and Wald’s maximin criterion. After that, we apply this analysis to political philosophy, by contrasting Harsanyi’s and Rawls’s theories of justice, respectively based on Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason and Wald’s maximin rule - and we end up highlighting the virtues of Rawls’s principle on practical grounds (it is intuitively attractive because of its computational simplicity, so providing a salient point for convergence) - and connect this argument to our moral intuitions and social norms requiring prudence in the case of decisions made for the sake of others.","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44075123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"WHAT’S VOLUNTARY IN STANCE VOLUNTARISM?","authors":"Bruno MALAVOLTA E SILVA","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n2.bs","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n2.bs","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Stance voluntarism highlights the role of the will in epistemic agency, claiming that agents can control the epistemic stances they assume in forming beliefs. It claims that radical belief changes are not compelled by the evidence; they are rationally permitted choices about which epistemic stances to adopt. However, terms like “will”, “choice”, and “stance” play a crucial role while being left as vague notions. This paper investigates what kind of control rational agents can have over epistemic stances. I argue that whether epistemic stances are voluntary depends on what kind of stance is being assessed. Sometimes epistemic stances are taken to be evaluative attitudes about how to produce knowledge. This kind of stance is not directly controllable, since it is essentially connected to beliefs, and believing is not voluntary. But sometimes epistemic stances are taken to be styles of reasoning and modes of engagement, expressing ways of approaching the world in order to produce knowledge, which can be voluntary. Overall, this supports a formulation of stance voluntarism as a dual-systems theory of epistemic agency, where epistemic rationality is compounded by a dynamic interplay between involuntary processes of belief formation and voluntary processes of cognitive guidance.","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45500199","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"THE EXPLORATORY DIMENSION OF FMRI EXPERIMENTS","authors":"A. Venturelli","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2021.V44N1.AV","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.V44N1.AV","url":null,"abstract":"Driven by an appreciation of the field’s early stage of development, I apply the concept of exploratory experimentation, originally put forward in the late 90s philosophy of biology, to current research in cognitive neuroscience. I concentrate on functional magnetic resonance imaging and how this wide-spread technique is used, from experimental design to data analysis. I claim that, although subject to certain significant modifications with respect to the concept’s original rendering, the exploratory character of neuroimaging experiments can be appreciated considering their goals, centered on the stabilization of experimental systems for phenomenological description, and the relevance of their methodological facet. Although I do not claim that there is a specific kind of experiment that one can single out as definitely exploratory, exploration can be seen as a general trait imbuing fMRI-based experimentation. A. Nicolás Venturelli 2 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 44, n. 1, pp. 01-36, Jan.-Mar. 2021.","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48487082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"LEIBNIZ ON FORCE, CAUSE AND SUBJECT OF MOTION: FROM DE CORPORUM CONCURSU (1678) TO THE BREVIS DEMONSTRATIO (1686)","authors":"R. Fazio","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2021.V44N1.RF","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.V44N1.RF","url":null,"abstract":": In the present paper we study the relationship between the notions of force, cause and subject of motion in Leibniz’s early dynamics. First, we specify the role that the problem of the subject and cause of motion played in the development of his dynamics. Second, we analyze the distinction between force and quantity of motion and the validity and limits of his proof. Third, we study and evaluate the limits of the arguments for establishing that forces are inherent to bodies. Our main goal is to show that between 1678 and 1686 Leibniz dissociates the problem of the subject from the problem of the cause of motion and, furthermore, that even though the problem of establishing that","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42344607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"AN INTENSIONAL VIEW OF JUDGMENT IN KANT’S KRV","authors":"Evandro C. Godoy","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2021.V44N1.EG","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.V44N1.EG","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents an elucidation of Kant’s notion of judgment, which clearly is a central challenge to the understanding of the Critic of Pure Reason, as well as of the Transcendental Idealism. In contrast to contemporary interpretation, but taking it as starting point, the following theses will be endorsed here: i) the synthesis of judgment expresses a conceptual relation understood as subordination in traditional Aristotelian logical scheme; ii) the logical form of judgment does not comprise intuitions (or singular representations); iii) the relation to intuition is not a judgment concern; iv) the response to the question about the ‘x’ that grounds the conceptual relation in judgments must be sought in transcendental aspects: 1) on construction in pure form of intuition, 2) in experience and 3) in the requirements to experience, respectively to mathematical, empirical, and philosophical 1 IFSUL – Instituto Federal de Educação, Ciência e Tecnologia Sul-rio-grandense / CNPq – Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico, Brazil. <evandrocgodoy@yahoo.com> Evandro C. Godoy 132 Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 44, n. 1, pp. 131-148, Jan.-Mar. 2021. judgments. The overall purpose is to build up an understanding of judgment that supports a latter assessment of Kant’s theoretical philosophy. The aim of this paper is to elucidate Kant’s conception of judgment. A correct interpretation of the central proposal of the critical program, the enquiry concerning the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments, obviously depends on a correct interpretation of judgment, which in turn depends on determining how predication, and the logical subordination of the subject to the predicate, may (or must) be conceived. As these things are not quite clear in the Critique of Pure Reason2, it seems productive to search for more elements in the logical and historical contexts. The contemporary interpretation tends to fluctuate between two approaches to judgment, one supported by a conception derived from analytic philosophy, and the other from Port-Royal Logic. The analytical interpretation supposes, implicitly or explicitly, that it is possible to read the ‘function of unity among our representations’ (KrV, A69/B94) as the subsumption of an object under a function, in FregeRussellian style3. On the other hand, the reading from PortRoyal adopts a historically more acceptable point of view, explaining judgment as predication in the scheme of Aristotelian logic, plus some novelties of modernity. The view from Port-Royal takes judgment as, or at least involves, the subordination of a singular under a universal representation4. Indeed, the dispute of the readings relies on 2 Kritik der reinen Vernunft, henceforth KrV, quoted and referred to in its two editions, A and B, as usual. 3 See, for instance, Schulthess (1981) and Strawson (1999). 4 See Pariente (1985), Brandt (1995) and Longuenesse (2000). Hanna (2018) takes a position closer to this, with r","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44472853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"HERMANN VON HELMHOLTZ, EWALD HERING AND COLOR VISION: A CONTROVERSY OVER STYLES OF REASONING?","authors":"Juliana Gutiérrez","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2021.V44N1.JG","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.V44N1.JG","url":null,"abstract":": During the second half of the 19th century, in the field of physiological optics, there was a strong controversy between Hermann von Helmholtz and Ewald Hering. This controversy has been usually characterized as “empiricism” vs. “nativism”. In the field of physiology of visual perception, several subjects demanded attention, among them, color vision. Helmholtz and Hering suggested different theories for the physiological correlate of color sensation and different color spaces to give an account of the relationships between colors. In this article, I will argue that the controversy between the two authors could be understood as differences between styles of reasoning, and these different styles express different presuppositions. More specifically, I want to suggest that the disagreements could be linked to the discussions on how vital phenomena should be studied.","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45740185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"WALKING THE ROADS TO REFERENCE SOME COMMENTS ON MARIO GÓMEZ TORRENTE","authors":"Eleonora Orlando","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.eo","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.eo","url":null,"abstract":"In chapter 3 of the very welcome and enjoyable Roads to Reference, “Proper Names and Referential Indeterminacy”, Mario Gómez Torrente proposes a set of conventions establishing merely sufficient conditions for the fixation and transmission of the reference of proper names. There are some aspects of the undoubtedly very original and rigorous proposal that have prompted me the brief comments that follow, grouped into three sections.","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44643996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"TASTY ROADS TO FLAVOUR","authors":"Axel Barceló Aspeitia","doi":"10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.ab","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.ab","url":null,"abstract":": The goal of this brief note is to offer a generalisation of Gómez-Torrente argumentative strategy against perspectivism, which he has developed as a defence of color realism in (2016) and (2019) and then apply it to evaluative language. In particular, I want to defend the thesis that at least some aesthetic predicates can have non-evaluative reference. As an example, I will work with the predicate “tasty” (and its antonym “disgusting”) to argue that it some times refers to a non-subjective non-evaluative property, flavour, which is more fundamental that the relational property of being tasty to someone. In other words, some times, when we say of something that it is tasty, we are not saying how it tastes to us or whether we like it, but just how it tastes period. The goal of this brief note is to offer a generalisation of Gómez Torrente argumentative strategy against perspectivism, which he has developed as a defence of color realism in (2016) and (2019) and then apply it to aesthetic","PeriodicalId":42903,"journal":{"name":"Manuscrito","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43262475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}