{"title":"Burdens of proof and judicial errors in civil litigation","authors":"J. Kim","doi":"10.22841/KERDOI.2021.37.1.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22841/KERDOI.2021.37.1.001","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers the effect of whether burden of proof is assigned to plaintiffs or defendants in tort claims on the defendant’s care-taking incentive under the possibility of judicial error. We argue that it is socially better to place burden of proof on the plaintiff if the proof costs of both parties are low and the evidence is very accurate, thus reducing the wasteful incentive for defendants to commit over-precaution. If the burden of proof is placed on the defendant, it exacerbates the defendant’s over-precaution due to an accident avoidance effect whereby the defendant is incentivized to take more care to avoid an accident, thereby saving evidence costs. We also discuss the sine qua non rule in the case ofnoisy evidence and reconfirm the accident-avoidance effect. This is compared to the result of Gomez (2002).","PeriodicalId":426169,"journal":{"name":"The Korean Economic Review","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129315497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jong‐Hee Hahn, Jinwoo Kim, Sang‐Hyun Kim, Jihong Lee
{"title":"Price Discrimination with Loss Averse and Horizontally Differentiated Consumers","authors":"Jong‐Hee Hahn, Jinwoo Kim, Sang‐Hyun Kim, Jihong Lee","doi":"10.22841/KERDOI.2018.34.2.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22841/KERDOI.2018.34.2.001","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers a monopolist seller facing horizontally differentiated consumers, whose preferences are reference-dependent and loss averse in the frame of Kőszegi and Rabin (2006). Our results on optimal menu suggest that consumer loss aversion does not necessarily limit the benefits of screening under the horizontal demand structure, in contrast to the findings of Hahn, Kim, Kim and Lee (2018) and Herweg and Mierendorff (2013) who consider the case of vertically differentiated preferences.","PeriodicalId":426169,"journal":{"name":"The Korean Economic Review","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125100605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests between Groups","authors":"Roman M. Sheremeta","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1516019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1516019","url":null,"abstract":"This experiment investigates contests between groups. Each group has one strong player, with a higher valuation for the prize, and two weak players, with lower valuations. In contests where individual efforts are perfect substitutes, all players expend significantly higher efforts than predicted by theory. In best-shot contests, where group performance depends on the best performer, most of the effort is expended by strong players while weak players free-ride. In weakest-link contests, where group performance depends on the worst performer, there is almost no free-riding and all players expend similar positive efforts conforming to the group Pareto dominant equilibrium.","PeriodicalId":426169,"journal":{"name":"The Korean Economic Review","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124737020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Competition in Corporate and Personal Income Tax: Evidence from 67 Developed and Developing Countries","authors":"Young Lee","doi":"10.22841/KERDOI.2020.36.1.004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22841/KERDOI.2020.36.1.004","url":null,"abstract":"The paper empirically investigates tax competition in corporate income taxes (CIT) and personal income taxes (PIT) in 67 countries between 1981 and...","PeriodicalId":426169,"journal":{"name":"The Korean Economic Review","volume":"87 11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116305533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Payments Systems, Liquidity, Collateral, and Central Banking","authors":"Hyung Sun Choi","doi":"10.22841/KERDOI.2021.37.1.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22841/KERDOI.2021.37.1.003","url":null,"abstract":"A monetary model is constructed to explore the risk-sharing role of gross settlement as a determinant of money demand for consumption in a credit economy. Due to a deferred payment system, the costs of gross and net settlement are sensitive to the nominal interest rate. Gross settlement may dampen a consumption loss against interest-rate risk arising from inflation by acquiring additional cash from a financial market. Hence, it is optimal for the government to influence inflation and to drive net settlement out of a payment system. For payment policy, the optimal collateral requirement ratio is one whereas for monetary policy the optimal money growth rate is infinity. Payment policy can be a useful alternative to monetary policy.","PeriodicalId":426169,"journal":{"name":"The Korean Economic Review","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130032856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Monetary Policy Reaction Function in Korea with Multi-level Factors","authors":"B. Cho","doi":"10.22841/KERDOI.2020.36.2.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22841/KERDOI.2020.36.2.003","url":null,"abstract":"The monetary policy reaction function in Korea is estimated. In particular, a variant of the Taylor rule is analyzed using information from a panel of macroeconomic variables in the United States (US) and Korea. The main findings are as follows. First, two global factors common to both countries are significant in the monetary policy reaction function, while no country-specific factors are significant. Second, the information contained in these factors is similar to variables, such as the credit spread in the US, the KRW/USD exchange rate, non-farm employment, and business survey indices for new contracts and sales in Korea. As such, these variables are also significant when added to the monetary policy reaction function. Third, the policy response to the inflation rate becomes significantly positive only when these additional variables are added, which is consistent with the legal purpose of monetary policy under the inflation targeting regime in Korea.","PeriodicalId":426169,"journal":{"name":"The Korean Economic Review","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124651304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Politics, Religion, and Tax Incentives for Charitable Giving in South Korea","authors":"김영록","doi":"10.22841/KERDOI.2021.37.1.006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22841/KERDOI.2021.37.1.006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":426169,"journal":{"name":"The Korean Economic Review","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126250294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Triple Regime Stochastic Volatility Model with Threshold and Leverage Effects","authors":"Heejoon Han, Eunhee Lee","doi":"10.22841/KERDOI.2020.36.2.007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22841/KERDOI.2020.36.2.007","url":null,"abstract":"This study considers a new stochastic volatility model, in which the sign and magnitude of stock returns play roles in explaining a substantially detailed relationship between stock returns and volatility. The proposed model allows for threshold and leverage effects, and accommodates three regimes (i.e., large negative return; mid-range, including moderate negative and positive returns; and large positive return) to better capture the time-varying aspect of the leverage effect. Applications of the proposed model on the return series of the S&P 500 Index and Microsoft Corporation suggest that the relationship between stock returns and volatility depends on the magnitude of the returns and their signs. The comparison of the deviance information criterion for various stochastic volatility models reveals a good fit of the proposed model for the data.","PeriodicalId":426169,"journal":{"name":"The Korean Economic Review","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123254209","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Evolutionarily Stable Correlation","authors":"Chongmin Kim, Kam-Chau Wong","doi":"10.22841/KERDOI.2017.33.1.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22841/KERDOI.2017.33.1.003","url":null,"abstract":"Most results of evolutionary games are restricted only to the Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we introduce an analogue of the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) for correlated equilibria. We introduce a new concept―the evolutionarily stable correlation (ESC)―and prove that it generalizes the ESS. We also study analogues of perfection and properness for correlated equilibria and discuss their relationships with the ESC.","PeriodicalId":426169,"journal":{"name":"The Korean Economic Review","volume":"21 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131220359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Endogenous timing with a socially responsible firm","authors":"Arturo García, Mariel Leal, Sang‐Ho Lee","doi":"10.22841/KERDOI.2019.35.2.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22841/KERDOI.2019.35.2.003","url":null,"abstract":"This study considers a duopoly model in which a socially responsible (SR) firm competes with a private firm by incorporating environmental externality and clean technology. We analyze the endogenous market structure where both firms strategically, sequentially, or simultaneously decide quantities, which also affect abatement activities. We reveal that depending on the relative concerns on environment and consumer surplus, the SR firm can be less or more aggressive in production and abatement, and it may earn high profits. Thus, not only the significance of externality but also the instrumental conflict of social concerns are crucial factors in determining the equilibrium of endogenous timing game. Finally, we indicate that unless the concern for externality is high, the simultaneous and sequential move game with SR firm leadership are socially desirable.","PeriodicalId":426169,"journal":{"name":"The Korean Economic Review","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133926714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}