{"title":"进化稳定相关","authors":"Chongmin Kim, Kam-Chau Wong","doi":"10.22841/KERDOI.2017.33.1.003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Most results of evolutionary games are restricted only to the Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we introduce an analogue of the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) for correlated equilibria. We introduce a new concept―the evolutionarily stable correlation (ESC)―and prove that it generalizes the ESS. We also study analogues of perfection and properness for correlated equilibria and discuss their relationships with the ESC.","PeriodicalId":426169,"journal":{"name":"The Korean Economic Review","volume":"21 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Evolutionarily Stable Correlation\",\"authors\":\"Chongmin Kim, Kam-Chau Wong\",\"doi\":\"10.22841/KERDOI.2017.33.1.003\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Most results of evolutionary games are restricted only to the Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we introduce an analogue of the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) for correlated equilibria. We introduce a new concept―the evolutionarily stable correlation (ESC)―and prove that it generalizes the ESS. We also study analogues of perfection and properness for correlated equilibria and discuss their relationships with the ESC.\",\"PeriodicalId\":426169,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Korean Economic Review\",\"volume\":\"21 1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Korean Economic Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.22841/KERDOI.2017.33.1.003\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Korean Economic Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.22841/KERDOI.2017.33.1.003","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Most results of evolutionary games are restricted only to the Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we introduce an analogue of the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) for correlated equilibria. We introduce a new concept―the evolutionarily stable correlation (ESC)―and prove that it generalizes the ESS. We also study analogues of perfection and properness for correlated equilibria and discuss their relationships with the ESC.
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