CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Acquisitions最新文献_第2页

Review Article: Financial Performance Measures in Merger and Acquisition Studies 综述文章:并购研究中的财务绩效衡量

CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Acquisitions Pub Date : 2017-07-21 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3436345

Seyed-Reza Hashemian-Rahaghi, Cheng FanFah, F. Abed‐Ashtiani, Taufiq Hassan

引用次数: 0

Bid Anticipation, Information Revelation, and Merger Gains 出价预期、信息披露与合并收益

CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Acquisitions Pub Date : 2017-02-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2526312

Wenyu Wang

引用次数: 55

The Wealth of Private Firm Owners Following Reverse Mergers 反向并购后私营企业所有者的财富

CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Acquisitions Pub Date : 2015-12-04 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2557779

Daniel Greene

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引用次数: 10

A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation 一个伟大的游戏:国家竞争和诉讼的动态

CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Acquisitions Pub Date : 2015-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1984758

Matthew D. Cain, Steven Davidoff Solomon

引用次数: 27

The Product Market Impact of Minority Stake Acquisitions 少数股权收购对产品市场的影响

CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Acquisitions Pub Date : 2013-09-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2180996

Amrita Nain, Yan Wang

引用次数: 53

The Corporate Governance Endgame – An Economic Analysis of Minority Squeeze-Out Regulation in Germany 公司治理的最后阶段——德国少数人排挤监管的经济分析

CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Acquisitions Pub Date : 2013-07-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2080745

E. Croci, O. Ehrhardt, E. Nowak

{"title":"The Corporate Governance Endgame – An Economic Analysis of Minority Squeeze-Out Regulation in Germany","authors":"E. Croci, O. Ehrhardt, E. Nowak","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2080745","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2080745","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines minority squeeze-outs and their regulation in Germany, a country where majority shareholders have extensively used this tool since its introduction in 2002. Using unique data on court rulings and compensations, we analyze a sample of 324 squeeze-outs of publicly listed companies from 2002 to 2011. Large firms with foreign large shareholders are the most likely to be delisted. Positive stock price performance increases the likelihood of a squeeze-out, but operating performance has the opposite effect. Stock prices react positively to squeeze-out announcements, in particular when the squeeze-out does not follow a previous takeover offer. Nearly all squeeze-outs are legally challenged by minority shareholders, either with an action of avoidance or with an appraisal procedure (or both). We find that additional cash compensation is larger in appraisal procedures, but actions of avoidance are completed in less time and offer higher annualized returns. Overall, our evidence suggests that challenging the cash compensation offered in a squeeze-out delivers high returns for minority investors, net of opportunity costs.","PeriodicalId":426016,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Acquisitions","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123853181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 5

R&D and the Incentives from Merger and Acquisition Activity 研发与并购活动的激励

CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Acquisitions Pub Date : 2012-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2181152

G. Phillips, A. Zhdanov

引用次数: 330

Are Small Firms Less Vulnerable to Overpriced Stock Offers? 小公司不容易受到股价过高的影响吗?

CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Acquisitions Pub Date : 2012-07-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1957836

Anand M. Vijh, Ke Yang

引用次数: 0

Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal and the Dual Role of Takeovers 绩效薪酬、CEO解聘与收购的双重角色

CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Acquisitions Pub Date : 2012-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1711352

Mike Burkart, Konrad Raff

引用次数: 13

Volkswagen and Porsche: One Family, Two Car Companies, & a Battle for Corporate Control- Instructor's Manual 大众与保时捷:一个家族，两家汽车公司，与企业控制权之战

CGN: Other Corporate Governance: Acquisitions Pub Date : 2012-01-31 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1996440

Heike Nolte, Alva Wright Butcher

引用次数: 0