Are Small Firms Less Vulnerable to Overpriced Stock Offers?

Anand M. Vijh, Ke Yang
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Abstract

We document an inverted-U relation between targetiveness (probability of being targeted) and firm size. However, this pattern describes stock offers and is more pronounced during hot markets with greater overvaluations. For cash offers we find a negative and monotonic relation. These contrasting patterns suggest that small firms (in the bottom NYSE size quartile) are less attractive to overpriced stock acquirers, and also that their managers are less receptive to overpriced stock offers which expropriate the wealth of their long-term shareholders. Several additional results support this hypothesis. First, the stock acquirers of small targets are less overvalued than the stock acquirers of large targets, but an opposite result holds for cash acquirers. Second, the acquirer announcement returns following stock offers are less negative for small targets than for large targets. Moreover, this certification effect increases for acquirers facing greater information asymmetry. Third, the stock acquirers of small targets earn higher long-term returns than the stock acquirers of large targets.
小公司不容易受到股价过高的影响吗?
我们记录了目标性(被目标的概率)和公司规模之间的倒u关系。然而,这种模式描述的是股票报价,在估值过高的热门市场中更为明显。对于现金报价,我们发现了负单调关系。这些对比鲜明的模式表明,小公司(在纽约证券交易所规模最低的四分之一)对价格过高的股票收购者的吸引力较小,而且他们的经理也不太愿意接受价格过高的股票报价,因为这剥夺了他们长期股东的财富。另外还有几个结果支持这一假设。首先,小目标的股票收购者比大目标的股票收购者更少被高估,而现金收购者则相反。其次,收购方在股票报价后公布的回报对小目标的负面影响要小于对大目标。此外,对于信息不对称程度更高的收购方,这种认证效应会增强。第三,收购小目标的股票收购者比收购大目标的股票收购者获得更高的长期回报。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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