PSN: Labor (Topic)最新文献_第7页

Public Sector Pay Scales in PNG: Are Academics Underpaid? 巴布亚新几内亚公共部门的薪级表:学者薪酬过低吗?

PSN: Labor (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-07-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2464405

Thomas Wangi, Stephen Howes

引用次数: 3

Minimum Wages and Firm Employment: Evidence from China 最低工资与企业就业:来自中国的证据

PSN: Labor (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-04-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2537795

Yi Huang, Prakash Loungani, Gewei Wang

引用次数: 3

Centralised Labour Market Negotiations 集中劳动力市场谈判

PSN: Labor (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-11-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2359384

Julia Müller, Thorsten Upmann

引用次数: 1

Labor Law Violations in Chile 智利违反劳动法的行为

PSN: Labor (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2303986

R. Kanbur, L. Ronconi, Leigh Wedenoja

引用次数: 35

Access Denied: The Effect of Apprenticeship Restrictions in Skilled Trades 拒绝准入:技术行业学徒制限制的影响

PSN: Labor (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2303826

R. Brydon, Benjamin Dachis

{"title":"Access Denied: The Effect of Apprenticeship Restrictions in Skilled Trades","authors":"R. Brydon, Benjamin Dachis","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2303826","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2303826","url":null,"abstract":"Skilled trades workers – ranging from electricians to carpenters to welders – are a crucial component of the Canadian labour force. However, many employers report that there are shortages of skilled workers in these occupations. Federal and provincial governments have targeted many grant and tax credit programs to encourage workers to become apprentices in the skilled trades. However, myriad provincial regulations that limit how many apprentices firms may hire are stymieing these efforts and limiting apprenticeship opportunities. Provinces regulate whether workers must complete a certified apprenticeship in order to legally work in an occupation, as well as the length of apprenticeship terms. This Commentary finds that strict provincial regulations on the rate at which firms may hire apprentices, which is relative to the number of certified workers they employ, reduce the number of people who work in a trade. Furthermore, the trades in provinces with the strictest regulations on hiring have lower levels of young workers while workers who manage to find work in these trades have higher incomes, suggesting that these regulations are acting as barriers to entry. Governments have set these regulations in order to protect workers and the general public by encouraging workers to gain the proper training in skilled trades. However, entry restrictions are not the best means by which to regulate the quality and safety of work for all trades. Instead of regulating the rate of apprentice entry, governments should focus on regulating the quality of work and safety standards when appropriate. In other words, instead of regulating inputs governments should shift the focus of trades’ regulation to outputs. With recent moves by the federal government to encourage workers to enter the trades, it is now up to the provinces to eliminate antiquated and harmful regulations on apprenticeship.","PeriodicalId":423579,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Labor (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130212801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 13

Implementing Laws Against Child Labor: A Case Study of Pakistan 实施反童工法:以巴基斯坦为例

PSN: Labor (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-08-03 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1904268

Dr. Asif Khan

引用次数: 0

Start-Up Incentives: Entrepreneurship Policy or Active Labour Market Programme? 创业激励:创业政策还是积极劳动力市场计划?

PSN: Labor (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-06-03 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1619990

C. Román, E. Congregado, José María Millán

{"title":"Start-Up Incentives: Entrepreneurship Policy or Active Labour Market Programme?","authors":"C. Román, E. Congregado, José María Millán","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1619990","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1619990","url":null,"abstract":"As several European governments develop new start-up programmes during recessions, the appropriateness of these policies recently has become a hot policy issue. This study suggests that the contribution of these incentives is dubious, if aimed to combat economic and jobs crises as part of the entrepreneurship policy, and can be shaped by various country-specific factors, such as the economic situation and the stringency of labour laws. To provide support for these claims, this paper investigates the underlying determinants of an individual's decision to switch from unemployment to self-employment in Europe and stresses the need to devote special attention to the role of three essential dimensions: (i) the existing heterogeneity within self-employment, by considering self-employed individuals who hire employees (employers) and self-employed individuals without personnel (own-account workers) as separated groups; (ii) the effects of different measures of social capital and network contacts, as forms of micro level institutional factors; and (iii) the explanatory power of cross-country differences in the state of the economy, expenditure on start-up incentives, and the stringency of labour laws, as forms of macro level institutional factors. This study has useful theory and policy implications for entrepreneurship development.","PeriodicalId":423579,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Labor (Topic)","volume":"11 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122354007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 200

Wage Bargaining Tensions in Italian and Greek Banking: The Role of Employer Associability and Labour-State Coalitions 意大利和希腊银行业的工资谈判紧张:雇主关联性和劳工-国家联盟的作用

PSN: Labor (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2334221

Andreas Kornelakis

{"title":"Wage Bargaining Tensions in Italian and Greek Banking: The Role of Employer Associability and Labour-State Coalitions","authors":"Andreas Kornelakis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2334221","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2334221","url":null,"abstract":"How do we explain divergent trajectories of change in wage bargaining institutions? Existing studies maintained that European economic integration and liberalisation, decline in trade union power, changing work organization and new pay systems would push national wage-setting institutions towards decentralisation. This expectation, however, was not borne out. Instead, change in wage bargaining has been more nuanced and differentiated than anticipated. To overcome the limitations of earlier theoretical conjectures, this paper explores the mediating conditions under which centrifugal tendencies in wage bargaining are likely to be reversed. I argue that ‘employer associability’ and ‘labour-state coalitions’ mediate pressures for convergence to the Anglo-Saxon model of decentralised bargaining. A strong employers association is expected to better appreciate the long run benefits of industry-wide bargaining, but also accommodate its firm-members needs for increased flexibility, striking effective compromises. In the absence of a strong employers association, the state may ‘fill the gap’ of employer associability and the institution is likely to survive due to a labour-state coalition. Unions will likely stem an employers’ offensive, if they are able to speak with a single voice and use their political influence effectively. The relevance of the argument is suggested by two critical case studies that trace developments in wage bargaining since the mid 1990s in Italian and Greek banking.","PeriodicalId":423579,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Labor (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114182635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Spending and Debt Response to Minimum Wage Hikes 最低工资上调后的支出和债务反应

PSN: Labor (Topic) Pub Date : 2008-05-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1144222

Daniel Aaronson, Sumit Agarwal, Eric French

引用次数: 201

Minimum Wage Effects and Low-Wage Labor Markets: A Disequilibrium Approach 最低工资效应与低工资劳动力市场:一种非均衡方法

PSN: Labor (Topic) Pub Date : 1994-01-01 DOI: 10.3386/W4617

D. Neumark, W. Wascher

{"title":"Minimum Wage Effects and Low-Wage Labor Markets: A Disequilibrium Approach","authors":"D. Neumark, W. Wascher","doi":"10.3386/W4617","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W4617","url":null,"abstract":"We present a new approach to estimating minimum wage effects on employment. In contrast to most previous research, we account for the possibility that the relationship between minimum wages and employment depends on the magnitude of the minimum wage relative to the equilibrium wage in the absence of the legislated minimum. In particular, estimating the employment effects of binding minimum wages requires separation of sample observations into those that are on the labor demand curve but off the labor supply curve, and those that are at labor market equilibria. The paper implements an endogenous switching regression model with unknown sample separation that yields these estimates. The approach also yields estimates of the impact of labor market characteristics on the probability that minimum wages are binding. We also extend the disequilibrium approach to monopsony, which introduces a third regime, between the equilibrium monopsony wage and the equilibrium competitive wage, in which observations are on the labor supply curve but off the labor demand curve and minimum wages are therefore positively related to employment. Minimum wage effects under monopsony are estimated in a three-regime endogenous switching regression model with unknown regimes, and the monopsony characterization of low-wage labor markets is tested against the competitive characterization.","PeriodicalId":423579,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Labor (Topic)","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133614763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 17