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Accretion-Based Progressive Wealth Taxation 基于增长的累进财富税
ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-08-17 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2825662
D. Hasen
{"title":"Accretion-Based Progressive Wealth Taxation","authors":"D. Hasen","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2825662","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2825662","url":null,"abstract":"A large literature has compared the efficiency properties of income and consumption tax bases. Its general conclusion is that a consumption base dominates an income base, except to the extent that practical compliance and administrative problems create opportunities for avoidance and evasion under a consumption tax that are absent under an income tax. An apparent corollary is that the same superiority holds in the comparison of an ideal accretion wealth tax and an ideal consumption tax, because an accretion wealth tax seems not to differ in relevant ways from an ideal income tax.This article argues that these conclusions are significantly qualified. A progressive accretion wealth tax can curb negative externalities that remain in place under a consumption or an income tax, and it can do so more effectively than an excise wealth tax; the article accordingly argues for an accretion tax as a supplement to existing federal taxes (or to a consumption tax, if enacted). The article also argues that any practicable consumption tax creates timing distortions absent under an accretion-type tax, whether on income or on wealth, because of the need for progressivity in rates. Policymakers need to consider all of these issues when weighing the relative merits of income, consumption, and wealth taxes.","PeriodicalId":420615,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132182189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Submission to House Ways & Means Committee in Connection with February 24, 2016, Hearings on Intl. Corp Tax Reform -- Taxation of Accumulated Deferred Foreign Income 众议院筹款委员会就2016年2月24日关于国际收支的听证会提交的意见书。公司税改革——累积递延外国收入的税收
ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-02-25 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2738450
Jeffery M. Kadet
{"title":"Submission to House Ways & Means Committee in Connection with February 24, 2016, Hearings on Intl. Corp Tax Reform -- Taxation of Accumulated Deferred Foreign Income","authors":"Jeffery M. Kadet","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2738450","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2738450","url":null,"abstract":"The Committee’s planned international tax reform draft (Draft) will undoubtedly suggest some transition from the present deferral system to some other system. As an integral part of that transition, it is expected as well that the Draft will impose taxation on all “accumulated deferred foreign income” existing as of the transition date.This submission suggests two administratively workable mechanisms by which a favorable lower-then-35% tax rate can be appropriately applied to accumulated deferred foreign income that was earned through real business activities conducted outside the U.S., consistent with the Congressional intent of the current deferral tax system. On the other hand, any such accumulated deferred foreign income that has resulted from profit shifting activities should be taxed at the full 35%, including an interest charge.","PeriodicalId":420615,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134638362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A Statistical Model of Inequality 不平等的统计模型
ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-01-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2735873
Ricardo T. Fernholz
{"title":"A Statistical Model of Inequality","authors":"Ricardo T. Fernholz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2735873","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2735873","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops a nonparametric statistical model of wealth distribution that imposes little structure on the fluctuations of household wealth. In this setting, we use new techniques to obtain a closed-form household-by-household characterization of the stable distribution of wealth and show that this distribution is shaped entirely by two factors - the reversion rates (a measure of cross-sectional mean reversion) and idiosyncratic volatilities of wealth across different ranked households. By estimating these factors, our model can exactly match the U.S. wealth distribution. This provides information about the current trajectory of inequality as well as estimates of the distributional effects of progressive capital taxes. We find evidence that the U.S. wealth distribution might be on a temporarily unstable trajectory, thus suggesting that further increases in top wealth shares are likely in the near future. For capital taxes, we find that a small tax levied on just 1% of households substantially reshapes the distribution of wealth and reduces inequality.","PeriodicalId":420615,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132365189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Optimal Tax Salience 最优税收显著性
ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-08-21 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2009108
Jacob Goldin
{"title":"Optimal Tax Salience","authors":"Jacob Goldin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2009108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2009108","url":null,"abstract":"Recent empirical work finds that consumers under-account for commodity taxes when the after-tax price is not prominent. I investigate how policymakers may utilize such “low-salience” taxes to promote welfare. The optimal combination of high- and low-salience taxes balances two competing effects: low-salience taxes dampen distortionary substitution but cause consumers to misallocate their budgets. Using a stylized model, I show the availability of taxes with differing salience provides an extra degree of freedom that can be used to implement the first-best welfare outcome. I characterize the optimal policy and derive a formula for incremental adjustments when the first-best is unattainable.","PeriodicalId":420615,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132365198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 61
Changes in the Distribution of After-Tax Wealth: Has Income Tax Policy Increased Wealth Inequality? 税后财富分配的变化:所得税政策是否加剧了财富不平等?
ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-06-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2642452
Adam Looney, Kevin B. Moore
{"title":"Changes in the Distribution of After-Tax Wealth: Has Income Tax Policy Increased Wealth Inequality?","authors":"Adam Looney, Kevin B. Moore","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2642452","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2642452","url":null,"abstract":"A substantial share of the wealth of Americans is held in tax-deferred form such as in retirement accounts or as unrealized capital gains. Most data and statistics on assets and wealth is reported on a pre-tax basis, but pre-tax values include an implicit tax liability and may not provide as accurate a measure of the financial position or material well-being of families. In this paper, we describe the distribution of tax-deferred assets in the SCF from 1989 to 2013, provide new estimates of the income tax liabilities implicit in those assets, and present new statistics on the level and distribution of after-tax net worth. The results of our analysis suggest that, relative to published statistics on pre-tax net worth, the distribution of after-tax wealth is slightly less concentrated at each point in time and the effectiveness of the income tax system in reducing wealth inequality has decreased during the last decade. We find the reduction in the long-term capital gains rate is the primary reason for the muted effectiveness of the income tax system in reducing wealth inequality.","PeriodicalId":420615,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123316923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
On Measuring Inequity in Taxation Among Groups of Income Units 论收入单位群体间税收不平等的衡量
ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-03-01 DOI: 10.1111/roiw.12070
Mara Monti, S. Pellegrino, A. Vernizzi
{"title":"On Measuring Inequity in Taxation Among Groups of Income Units","authors":"Mara Monti, S. Pellegrino, A. Vernizzi","doi":"10.1111/roiw.12070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12070","url":null,"abstract":"type=\"main\"> In this paper a method for analyzing the fairness of an income tax system when portioning the population into heterogeneous socio-economic groups is proposed. The equitable tax system is defined by the three axioms given by Kakwani and Lambert in 1998 and, as they suggest, inequity is evaluated by the negative influences on the redistributive effect of the tax associated with axiom violations. Measuring the extent of axiom violations among households belonging to different groups, we improve the Kakwani and Lambert analysis, which is able to detect only the existence of overall inequities. We propose a method that allows for evaluation of the contribution of each group to the overall inequity. Moreover, the adopted method enables disentangling the directions of violations. The obtained results allow us to judge how axiom violations discriminate among groups in their reciprocal relationships. An application to the 2010 Italian income tax reveals that inequities disproportionately penalize the household typologies. More precisely, unfairness affects households with children more severely than the other household groups.","PeriodicalId":420615,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127312571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17
A Tax-Benefit Microsimulation Model for Italy: A Partial Evaluation of Fiscal Consolidation in the Period 2011-2014 意大利税收-收益微观模拟模型:2011-2014年财政整顿的部分评价
ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2665547
Elena Giarda, M. Baldini, A. Olivieri
{"title":"A Tax-Benefit Microsimulation Model for Italy: A Partial Evaluation of Fiscal Consolidation in the Period 2011-2014","authors":"Elena Giarda, M. Baldini, A. Olivieri","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2665547","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2665547","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops a tax-benefit microsimulation model for the Italian economy to evaluate the impact of fiscal policy measures on household income. The simulations are performed on a dataset obtained from the matching of IT-SILC 2011 with HBS 2010, SHIW 2010 and IT-SILC 2008 to integrate income variables with consumption, financial assets and the tax base of property tax. The model quantifies the impact (the so-called first round effects) on household income of a set of fiscal policies implemented in Italy in the period 2011-2014: the increase in the ordinary VAT rate, the reintroduction of the property tax on the main home, the increase in the earnings tax credit, the 80-euro tax credit for employees, the modification of the personal income tax base and finally the rise of the tax rate on yields of deposits. We assess also the effects of changes of regional income taxes, despite not being part, strictly speaking, of the consolidation package. As a whole, the simulated average change in disposable income is negative.","PeriodicalId":420615,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128800450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 16
Lapse and Reentry in Variable Annuities 可变年金的失效及重新入息
ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-10-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2503995
Thorsten Moenig, Nan Zhu
{"title":"Lapse and Reentry in Variable Annuities","authors":"Thorsten Moenig, Nan Zhu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2503995","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2503995","url":null,"abstract":"Section 1035 of the current U.S. tax code allows policyholders to exchange their variable annuity policy for a similar product while maintaining tax-deferred status. When the variable annuity contains a long-term guarantee, this \"lapse-and-reentry\" strategy allows the policyholder to potentially increase the value of the embedded guarantee. We show that this is frequently optimal and has severe repercussions for pricing and hedging of the guarantee. We analyze various policy features that may help mitigate the incentive to lapse, and compare them regarding the residual risk exposure to both policyholder and insurer.","PeriodicalId":420615,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125622157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 14
Intergenerational Transfers Under an Uncertain Estate Tax 不确定遗产税下的代际转移
ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-08-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2489245
David Joulfaian
{"title":"Intergenerational Transfers Under an Uncertain Estate Tax","authors":"David Joulfaian","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2489245","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2489245","url":null,"abstract":"The paper examines the pattern of lifetime transfers during a period of uncertainty in estate taxation where the tax was set to expire, reintroduced, and its reach curtailed. More specifically, it examines lifetime gifts made during the past decade, with a focus on the size and frequency of transfers over the period 2002-2012. Using data from gift tax returns, reported lifetime taxable gifts over the years 2002-2009 were in the range of $20 to $30 billion per year. But, by 2012, these taxable gifts (which are in excess of the annual exclusion) increased to an unprecedented level of $440 billion. These transfers represent significant acceleration in bequests, and may very well have serious implications for future tax revenues, as well as the observed distribution of income and wealth. Equally important, the findings also provide further support for the bequest motive as these lifetime transfers cannot be accidental in nature.","PeriodicalId":420615,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130773847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Equity in the Distribution of Tax Preferences for Pensions: Capping the Amount Allowable in Tax-Preferenced Retirement Plans 养老金税收优惠分配的公平性:税收优惠退休计划中允许的金额上限
ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-08-05 DOI: 10.5744/ftr.2014.1022
Norman P. Stein, J. Turner
{"title":"Equity in the Distribution of Tax Preferences for Pensions: Capping the Amount Allowable in Tax-Preferenced Retirement Plans","authors":"Norman P. Stein, J. Turner","doi":"10.5744/ftr.2014.1022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5744/ftr.2014.1022","url":null,"abstract":"Tax-preferenced retirement plans are designed to be vehicles for saving for retirement, not massive tax shelters for wealthy individuals. Because tax preferences for retirement savings cause a loss in federal tax revenue, and are one of the largest sources of tax expenditures, it has long been a principle in pension policy and tax law in the United States and in other countries to limit the amount of retirement tax preferences an individual can receive. Specifically, U.S. tax law sets limits on the maximum benefit provided by a tax-preferenced defined benefit plan and the maximum contribution to either a tax-preferenced defined contribution plan or individual retirement account (“IRA”). It was never the intent of Congress, the tax policy, or pension policy communities that tax-preferenced plans should provide a tax preference for wealthy individuals to accumulate massive savings in retirement plans. Indeed, the conventional understanding of providing tax subsidies for the affluent to save for retirement is not to incentivize them to save, since the affluent will save adequately without such incentives, but to induce them to establish plans to capture tax benefits for themselves and then require them to include rank-and-file employees in the plans thus established. The purpose of the section 415 limits is to control the tax subsidies for the wealthy so that the tax incentives for them to establish plans do not impose excessive revenue loss to the government treasury.","PeriodicalId":420615,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"9 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125064595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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