ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"The Conflicting Masters of Tax","authors":"Edward J. McCaffery","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3908106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3908106","url":null,"abstract":"America does not redistribute wealth from its richest citizens. This Article sketches out the conflict between revenue-raising and redistribution that has shaped American tax policy and practice for at least a century and resulted in the sacrifice of redistributive taxes on the altar of the state’s revenue-raising needs. In theory and in practice, the tax system is not a direct generator of redistribution but rather serves as the efficient means to redistributive acts left offstage. Flattened wage taxes emerge as the main source of revenue. The wealthiest pay no tax. This Article examines the tension between the two masters of tax, revenue-raising and redistribution; illustrates with a case study of Senator Bernie Sanders’ wealth tax proposal; and concludes with hopes for using tax systems to better serve redistributive ends, in both theory and practice. The most important step is the articulation of clear and discrete redistributive goals, in addition to and independent of the specific goal of getting resources to the poor.","PeriodicalId":420615,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129675421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Income and Wealth Inequality in Hong Kong, 1981-2020: The Rise of Pluto-Communism?","authors":"T. Piketty, Li Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3888118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3888118","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The objective of this paper is to better understand the evolution and institutional roots of Hong Kong's growing economic inequality and political cleavages. By combining multiple sources of data (household surveys, fiscal data, wealth rankings, national accounts) and methodological innovations, two main findings are obtained. First, he evidence suggests a very large rise in income and wealth inequality in Hong Kong over the last four decades. Second, based on the latest opinion poll data, business elites, who carry disproportionate weight in Hong Kong's Legislative Council, are found to be more likely to vote for the pro-establishment camp (presumably to ensure that policies are passed that protect their political and economic interests). This paper argues that the unique alliance of government and business elites in a partially democratic political system is the plausible institutional root of Hong Kong's rising inequality and political cleavages.","PeriodicalId":420615,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127922624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Changes in the Distribution of Alter-Tax Wealth: Will Wealth Tax Improve the Wealth Distribution Inequality in the United States?","authors":"Xinye Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3806950","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3806950","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reviews the historical trends of the distribution of income and wealth in the United States. It also discusses the literature on whether imposing wealth tax suggested by Senator Warren and Sanders will improve the inequalities. The paper researches the tax policy regarding the Wealth taxes on ultra-wealthy households, the policy that has been proposed by Democratic presidential candidates to fight against inequality and raise extra revenue in the long term.<br>","PeriodicalId":420615,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121462374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Tax Treatment of Block Rewards: A Primer","authors":"Abraham Sutherland","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3780102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3780102","url":null,"abstract":"• An unsettled issue of immense practical and economic importance: how to tax the new “reward tokens” created in public cryptocurrency networks. \u0000 \u0000• The wrong policy would drive innovation elsewhere. Fortunately, the correct policy is mandated by existing law: these new tokens – like all forms of new property – do not give rise to income until they are sold. \u0000 \u0000• Informal, seven-year-old IRS guidance – not law – geared to Bitcoin and proof of work suggests reward tokens are immediate income at their fair market value on the date “received.” \u0000 \u0000• For the newer proof-of-stake technology, this would create a compliance nightmare and punitive overtaxation. \u0000 \u0000• Ethereum, Tezos, Cosmos, and many other proof-of-stake cryptocurrencies: compliance would be a daunting task – for the IRS as well as taxpayers. New taxable events would occur every few seconds. \u0000 \u0000• “Income” under such a policy would overstate taxpayers’ actual economic gain – significantly, in many cases – resulting in demonstrable, systematic overtaxation. \u0000 \u0000• The overtaxation is equivalent to taxing a 21 for 20 stock split by counting the “new” share – that is, 20/21 the value of an old share – as taxable income. \u0000 \u0000• Like any property, cryptocurrency tokens can indeed be “income” – when received as payment or as compensation. \u0000 \u0000• But new property – property created or discovered by a taxpayer, not received as payment or compensation from someone else – is never income, and never has been. \u0000 \u0000• Cattle, corn, gold, widgets, wild truffles, artworks, novels – think of any new property created or discovered by the taxpayer: It’s no one else’s expense, and it’s not income until sold. \u0000 \u0000• As a factual matter, new reward tokens are indeed created by stakers. \u0000 \u0000• Understanding how tokens are created is complicated; resorting to flawed financial analogies is easy. \u0000 \u0000• Block rewards are nothing like “stock dividends.” They are not “compensation for services” – try to imagine taxable “compensation” that doesn’t come from another person. \u0000 \u0000• Reward tokens cannot be taxed as immediate income under section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code. But not to worry: they’ll be fairly taxed when sold. \u0000 \u0000• Policy problems remain for cryptocurrency taxation – fortunately, new reward tokens are not among them. \u0000 \u0000• It’s not too late to clarify this issue before the effects of a wrong or uncertain policy are felt by millions of taxpayers and the IRS alike. \u0000 \u0000Related scholarship: \u0000 \u0000Cryptocurrency Economics and the Taxation of Block Rewards, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3466796. \u0000 \u0000Dilution and True Economic Gain From Cryptocurrency Block Rewards, https://ssrn.com/abstract=36724616.","PeriodicalId":420615,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132570953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Persuasion, Spillovers, and Government Interventions","authors":"Cheng Li, Yancheng Xiao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3681080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3681080","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a model of Bayesian persuasion with spillovers to investigate the impact of information production on optimal policy design. A sender produces information to persuade a receiver to take an action with external effects, and the government implements corrective subsidies and taxes to maximize social welfare. Subsidies to the sender’s preferred action incentivize her to produce less information, while taxes motivating her to produce more. Such an informational effect impacts the receiver’s decision and social welfare. We show that the optimal corrective subsidies and taxes may be different from the Pigouvian level. Most notably, the optimal policy is no government intervention when the spillover is positive and small.","PeriodicalId":420615,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"87 7","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120968497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The California Extreme Wealth Tax: Revenue, Economic, and Constitutional Analysis","authors":"D. Gamage, Emmanuel Saez, Darien Shanske","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3782747","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3782747","url":null,"abstract":"This draft report consists of revenue, economic, and constitutional analysis of the California Extreme Wealth Tax. A revised and updated version of this report is available here: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3924524","PeriodicalId":420615,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117195772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Taxes on Income According to Article 2(1) and (2) OECD Model Convention 2017","authors":"A. Kotha","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3794565","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3794565","url":null,"abstract":"The paper forms part of the book compiling papers presented at the MaiSymposium at WU in 2020. The paper discusses the meaning and scope of various terms in Article 2(1) and 2(2) of OECD MC, 2017 with a focus on taxes on income. The paper undertakes a historical analysis of various deliberations that led to the framing of Article 2(1) and 2(2) to answer key questions such as why are few taxes specifically deemed as taxes on income and on capital, what is the significance of payroll taxes, should income be understood autonomously. The article also highlights the changing trend relating to Article 2(1) and 2(2) as many countries are increasingly including these paras in their treaties unlike their earlier treaty practice.","PeriodicalId":420615,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114885492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Vagueness of Tax Fairness: A Discursive Analysis of the Commission’s ‘Fair Tax Agenda’","authors":"A. Pirlot","doi":"10.54648/taxi2020036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/taxi2020036","url":null,"abstract":"Unless treaties are read in very liberal terms, the European Union (EU) is not competent for defining the construct of a fair tax system and determining who should pay taxes and in which proportion within the EuropeanUnion.Yet, the European Commission has increasingly been using references to tax fairness in its tax policy discourse. This raises questions on the future of EU tax law, the commission’s role in responding to European citizens’ concerns, and achieving tax fairness.\u0000By exploring six case studies, this contribution argues that the commission’s narrative on tax fairness remains vague and ambiguous which might indicate that it is not taking tax fairness – as a procedural and/or distributive issue – seriously. The commission uses fairness somewhat loosely to cover three main types of objectives including trade objectives that differ from what has traditionally been linked to tax fairness in the political philosophy literature. Building upon the work of legal scholars and economists, this article then concludes that the commission’s ‘fair tax’ agenda will, at best, achieve objectives in terms of procedural fairness.","PeriodicalId":420615,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116799286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Wealth Taxation: An Overview of the Issues","authors":"Alan D. Viard","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3464263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3464263","url":null,"abstract":"Two Democratic presidential candidates, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Massachusetts) and Senator Bernie Sanders (I-Vermont), have proposed annual wealth taxes. Annual wealth taxes have been adopted in a number of European countries (many of which later repealed them), but not in the United States. Although the proposed wealth tax rates appear low, they are equivalent to high-rate income taxes. Due to the pronounced concentration of wealth in the United States, a wealth tax would be highly progressive. The tax would probably reduce national saving and investment to some extent, although capital inflows would ameliorate the investment reduction. Congress would likely add exemptions for selected assets, which would be distortionary and diminish the tax’s revenue yield. The tax would face compliance and administration challenges due to undervaluation and concealment of assets and it might be ruled unconstitutional in the absence of suitable modifications. Although those challenges would probably not be insurmountable, it would be simpler and more prudent to pursue any desired increase in tax progressivity through reforms of the income tax and estate and gift taxes.","PeriodicalId":420615,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114683758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Effects of Prefilled Tax Returns on Taxpayer Compliance","authors":"Marcus M. Doxey, James G. Lawson, Shane R. Stinson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3285519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3285519","url":null,"abstract":"This study uses two online experiments to examine the potential consequences of a recent U.S. Senate proposal to prefill federal income tax returns on behalf of individuals. Consistent with omission theory, we find that prefilled returns lower compliance compared to selfcompleted returns when the prefilled returns do not estimate undocumented income (e.g., cash tips). However, the results show that including estimates of undocumented income increases taxpayer compliance relative to self-completed returns. We also find evidence suggesting that prefilled returns eliminate the often-replicated differences in reporting behavior between taxpayers in refund versus tax due settlement positions, suggesting that prefilled returns change individuals' reference points. These findings suggest the implementation of a prefilled return policy could have economically important effects on taxpayer decisions.","PeriodicalId":420615,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Personal Income & Other Non-Business Taxes & Subsidies (Topic)","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128947428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}