Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto-Journal of Legal Philosophy最新文献_第3页

Determinism, compatibilism, and basic desert: a reply to Gregg Caruso 决定论、相容论和基本沙漠:对格雷格·卡鲁索的回复

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Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto-Journal of Legal Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-10-12 DOI: 10.4337/jlp.2021.02.06

A. Walen

引用次数: 1

Taking responsibility for criminal responsibility: comments on Rejecting Retributivism: Free Will, Punishment, and Criminal Justice 承担刑事责任:评《拒绝报复主义:自由意志、惩罚与刑事司法》

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Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto-Journal of Legal Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-10-12 DOI: 10.4337/jlp.2021.02.04

C. Kennedy

引用次数: 1

Why not ‘weak’ retributivism? 为什么它不会变得软弱?

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Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto-Journal of Legal Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-10-12 DOI: 10.4337/jlp.2021.02.05

K. Sifferd

引用次数: 1

Retributivism, free will skepticism and the public health-quarantine model: replies to Corrado, Kennedy, Sifferd, Walen, Pereboom and Shaw 报应主义、自由意志怀疑论和公共卫生检疫模式:回复Corrado、Kennedy、Sifferd、Walen、Pereboom和Shaw

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Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto-Journal of Legal Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-10-12 DOI: 10.4337/jlp.2021.02.09

Gregg D. Caruso

{"title":"Retributivism, free will skepticism and the public health-quarantine model: replies to Corrado, Kennedy, Sifferd, Walen, Pereboom and Shaw","authors":"Gregg D. Caruso","doi":"10.4337/jlp.2021.02.09","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/jlp.2021.02.09","url":null,"abstract":"I would like to begin by thanking Michael Corrado, Chloë Kennedy, Katrina Sifferd, Alec Walen, Derk Pereboom and Elizabeth Shaw for their astute and challenging comments on my book, Rejecting Retributivism: Free Will, Punishment, and Criminal Justice. It is seldom that one gets the opportunity to put their views to the test by responding to six of the leading figures in their field. While I have had only the briefest time to consider their comments, and more prolonged reflection would no doubt yield more insights, I have already benefited greatly by wrestling with their perceptive criticisms. In this article, I outline the objections, suggestions and critical points presented by each commentor and respond to each as best I can. While I dedicate more space to some challenges than others, this is not a reflection of the quality of the commentaries but is instead due to a limitation on time and space. There is also occasional overlap between the commentaries, and it makes more sense to address common criticisms only once. I begin by responding to Michael Corrado and then proceed in the order indicated in the subtitle.","PeriodicalId":41811,"journal":{"name":"Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto-Journal of Legal Philosophy","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89756161","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Unravelling incoherence: utilizing property theory to challenge the classification of animals as chattels 解开不连贯:利用产权理论挑战动物作为动产的分类

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Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto-Journal of Legal Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-10-12 DOI: 10.4337/jlp.2021.02.01

Anna Wotherspoon

{"title":"Unravelling incoherence: utilizing property theory to challenge the classification of animals as chattels","authors":"Anna Wotherspoon","doi":"10.4337/jlp.2021.02.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/jlp.2021.02.01","url":null,"abstract":"In law, domesticated animals are chattels, the object of property rights. This classification does not reflect the characteristics and capacities of nonhuman animals that make them unlike other objects of property. The categorization also fails to reflect widely held beliefs that animals deserve some moral consideration. In recognition of these difficulties, a literature has developed to advance the case for animal rights and alternative frameworks for animal protection. Yet the literature has neglected one logically antecedent issue: the normative suitability of property status itself. The property paradigm provides a straightforward legal mechanism for the exercise of control over others, as seen in its historical influence over the treatment of children and married women; yet in the animal context, its suitability has remained unscrutinized. This article does not rely on moral objections to the classification of animals as property. It focuses instead on reasons of legal theory that challenge this hegemony. Consideration of animal welfare legislation provides a preliminary indication that animals’ property status is unsuitable. Regardless of whether property is conceived as the right to exclude or a ‘bundle’ of rights, protection of the interests of objects is inconsistent with other frameworks that regulate proprietary relations. Moreover, a comprehensive examination of traditional justifications for the private property institution reveals that animal property does not serve the purposes for which the institution was established. These analyses expose the normative incoherence of the classification of animals as chattels.","PeriodicalId":41811,"journal":{"name":"Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto-Journal of Legal Philosophy","volume":"91 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87485432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Précis of Rejecting Retributivism: Free Will, Punishment, and Criminal Justice 拒绝报复主义的实践:自由意志、惩罚和刑事司法

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Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto-Journal of Legal Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-10-12 DOI: 10.4337/jlp.2021.02.02

Gregg D. Caruso

{"title":"Précis of Rejecting Retributivism: Free Will, Punishment, and Criminal Justice","authors":"Gregg D. Caruso","doi":"10.4337/jlp.2021.02.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/jlp.2021.02.02","url":null,"abstract":"The dual aims of Rejecting Retributivism: Free Will, Punishment, and Criminal Justice are to argue against retributivism and to develop and defend a viable non-retributive alternative for addressing criminal behaviour that is both ethically defensible and practically workable. In the first half of the book, I develop six distinct arguments for rejecting retributivism, not the least of which is that it’s unclear that agents possess the kind of free will and moral responsibility needed to justify it. I also consider a number of alternatives to retributivism, including consequentialist deterrence theories, educational theories and communicative theories, and argue that they have ethical problems of their own. In the second half of the book, I then develop and defend my novel non-retributive approach, which I call the public health-quarantine model. The model draws on the public health framework and prioritizes prevention and social justice. I argue that it not only offers a stark contrast to retributivism, it also provides a more humane, holistic and effective approach to dealing with criminal behaviour, one that is superior to both retributivism and other leading non-retributive alternatives. Along the way, I also explore the relationship between free will and criminal law; identify and document the social determinants of criminal behaviour and argue that they are analogous to the social determinants of health; offer a number of specific policy proposals and prescriptions for implementing a public health approach to crime prevention; and defend a capabilities approach to social justice, arguing that it can serve as the moral foundation of my public health framework as well as being consistent with my free will skepticism – which maintains that who we are and what we do is ultimately the result of factors beyond our control (whether those be determinism, indeterminism, or luck), and because of this we are never morally responsible in the basic desert sense.","PeriodicalId":41811,"journal":{"name":"Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto-Journal of Legal Philosophy","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76044048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Non-free general deterrence 非自由一般威慑

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Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto-Journal of Legal Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-10-12 DOI: 10.4337/jlp.2021.02.07

Derk Pereboom

引用次数: 0

Rethinking neutrality: a conceptual analysis 重新思考中立性:一个概念分析

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Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto-Journal of Legal Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-03-01 DOI: 10.4337/JLP.2021.01.01

M. Watson

{"title":"Rethinking neutrality: a conceptual analysis","authors":"M. Watson","doi":"10.4337/JLP.2021.01.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/JLP.2021.01.01","url":null,"abstract":"This article attempts to determine whether there exists a coherent, plausible, and ultimately compelling explication of what it is to act neutrally. I argue that there is – an account I label neutrality of volition, and according to which an actor acts non-neutrally where she either acts for the purpose of differentially helping or hindering a particular party in a given contest, or acts or in the belief that there is a substantial likelihood that her action will have this effect. Along the way, I suggest that political philosophers concerned with whether justice requires that the state’s laws and policies be publicly justifiable, as well as legal commentators who note that oftentimes laws of general application have disparate impacts, would do well to cease framing their arguments in the language of neutrality. I conclude by arguing that debate over the proper interpretation of neutrality is not merely a matter of semantics. Having identified an account of neutrality that aligns with our ordinary understanding of the concept, and which is also internally consistent, we have access to a conceptual tool that we can use to make better sense of a wide array of actions in the political sphere and beyond, while also avoiding an unhelpful conflation of neutrality with distinct concepts such as fairness, public justifiability, anti-perfectionism, equal impact, and non-discrimination.","PeriodicalId":41811,"journal":{"name":"Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto-Journal of Legal Philosophy","volume":"60 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81417598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Common ground and grounds of law 共同基础和法律基础

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Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto-Journal of Legal Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-11-01 DOI: 10.4337/jlp.2020.01.01

Marat Shardimgaliev

{"title":"Common ground and grounds of law","authors":"Marat Shardimgaliev","doi":"10.4337/jlp.2020.01.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/jlp.2020.01.01","url":null,"abstract":"A central premise of Ronald Dworkin’s famous Argument from Theoretical Disagreement is that judges regularly disagree about the grounds of law. The occurrence of these so-called ‘theoretical disagreements’, it is argued, cannot be explained by the influential legal positivist theory of HLA Hart according to which the grounds of law are constituted by judicial consensus. However, in his attempt to show that theoretical disagreements actually exist Dworkin primarily relies on the occurrence of judicial disagreements about legal interpretation, as he takes them to be disagreements about the grounds of law. In this article, I will argue that these interpretive disagreements do not pose a problem for Hartian positivism. My argument will rely on standard work from the field of pragmatics which provides sophisticated explanations of how the interpretation of linguistic texts, such as legal documents, works. On the model that I will propose, interpretive disagreements concern the meaning that the legal authorities who enacted the document intended to get across and these disagreements arise from diverging assumptions about the context in which these documents were enacted. I will argue that disagreements about intentions and contextual presumptions do not concern the grounds of law and therefore do not threaten Hartian positivism.","PeriodicalId":41811,"journal":{"name":"Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto-Journal of Legal Philosophy","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88058986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Notes toward a supreme (legal) fiction 对最高(法律)小说的注释

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Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto-Journal of Legal Philosophy Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI: 10.4337/jlp.2022.01.07

E. K. White

引用次数: 0