{"title":"Truth-telling, promises and the shape of a character","authors":"Daniel Peixoto Murata","doi":"10.4337/jlp.2023.02.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/jlp.2023.02.02","url":null,"abstract":"In this article I want to focus on a specific function that promises fulfil in our lives: their role as a way of shaping our character. To make my case, I will present an account of truth-telling based on Bernard Williams’ work on genealogy and on the virtues of truth. This account will highlight how our selves (or characters) are not static entities in time, that they are not immediately transparent to us. Nonetheless, we seem to have what I call a drive to be someone, to have a character. We need ways to ‘steady the mind’, that is, ways of shaping our selves to whom we are or want to be. The argument I will put forward is that promises are one of the resources we have for doing so. By making promises, we commit ourselves to acting in a certain way and by doing that we also shape our selves. The argument will help us to answer some philosophical challenges raised against promises, notably about their rationality and about their relationship with vows and resolutions. Additionally, it will impact our thinking about contract law. What emerges from this article is an account of an important role played by promises that has been often neglected by the literature.","PeriodicalId":41811,"journal":{"name":"Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto-Journal of Legal Philosophy","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134945035","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Is the rule of recognition really a duty-imposing rule?","authors":"Laurenz Ramsauer","doi":"10.4337/jlp.2023.02.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/jlp.2023.02.01","url":null,"abstract":"According to a persistent assumption in legal philosophy, the social rule at the foundation of a legal system (the Rule of Recognition) serves both an epistemic and a duty-imposing function. Thus, some authors have claimed that it would be a formidable problem for legal philosophy to explain how such social rules can impose duties, and some have taken it upon themselves to show how social practices might just do that. However, I argue that this orthodox assumption about the dual function of rule of recognition is ill-founded. Contrary to the orthodox view, we have no good reasons to ascribe more than an epistemic function to the rule of recognition. Accordingly, the norms deriving immediately from the rule of recognition are no different than those entailed by other epistemic, grammatical or syntactic norms. Consequently, accounts of the normativity of law need not explain how social practices like conventions or plans might impose duties on the officials of a legal system.","PeriodicalId":41811,"journal":{"name":"Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto-Journal of Legal Philosophy","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134945034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hans Kelsen, Legal Scientist","authors":"Iain Stewart","doi":"10.4337/jlp.2023.02.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/jlp.2023.02.03","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41811,"journal":{"name":"Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto-Journal of Legal Philosophy","volume":"71 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134945036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sovereignty and constituent power: reimagining the process of constituent power through the politico-legal matrix of sovereignty","authors":"Ayesha Wijayalath","doi":"10.4337/jlp.2023.01.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/jlp.2023.01.05","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41811,"journal":{"name":"Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto-Journal of Legal Philosophy","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75489131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The limits of constituent power? Vice and illiberalism","authors":"Yarran Hominh","doi":"10.4337/jlp.2023.01.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/jlp.2023.01.04","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41811,"journal":{"name":"Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto-Journal of Legal Philosophy","volume":"252 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74997255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Indigenous Australia and the pre-legal society in HLA Hart’s The Concept of Law","authors":"Diana Anderssen","doi":"10.4337/jlp.2023.01.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/jlp.2023.01.01","url":null,"abstract":"The continuing existence and operation of the traditional law of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples has – relatively recently – been explicitly acknowledged in Australian law. In emerging case law on the subject, the High Court of Australia has confirmed the common law recognition of the survival of Indigenous Australian law. However, in determining what it is that is recognized by the common law – in interpreting Indigenous Australian ‘traditional laws and customs’ – the High Court has disregarded the knowledge reposed in those with authority or expertise in Indigenous Australian law, relying instead upon concepts and assumptions from the jurisprudence of English legal philosopher, HLA Hart. The influence of Hart’s theory in the Australian High Court’s interpretation of Indigenous Australian ‘traditional laws and customs’ is problematic, because it contains an obvious pre-legal–legal dualism reminiscent of the ‘state of nature’ – ‘civil society’ mechanism that was instrumental in the application of terra nullius to Australia. At the heart of The Concept of Law lies the notion of progression from a ‘primitive community’ with only primary rules, to an advanced legal system with a combination of both primary and secondary rules. In this article, I investigate how Indigenous Australians are positioned in relation to Hart’s pre-legal–legal dualism. I examine the ‘primitive’, pre-legal society in The Concept of Law, and its counterpart, the advanced legal system, to analyze the position of Indigenous Australian societies and law in Hart’s scheme. Finally, I analyze the construction of the dualism and consider its impact on the High Court’s interpretation of Indigenous Australian ‘traditional laws and customs’.","PeriodicalId":41811,"journal":{"name":"Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto-Journal of Legal Philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89260006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A reply to critics","authors":"Joel I Colón-Ríos","doi":"10.4337/jlp.2023.01.06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/jlp.2023.01.06","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41811,"journal":{"name":"Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto-Journal of Legal Philosophy","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87544859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction: seven theses on the constituent power","authors":"Joel I Colón-Ríos","doi":"10.4337/jlp.2023.01.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/jlp.2023.01.02","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41811,"journal":{"name":"Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto-Journal of Legal Philosophy","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87542663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Democratizing constituent power","authors":"R. Levy","doi":"10.4337/jlp.2023.01.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/jlp.2023.01.03","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41811,"journal":{"name":"Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto-Journal of Legal Philosophy","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90684814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Response to Desmond Manderson and Emily Kidd White","authors":"M. Mar","doi":"10.4337/jlp.2022.01.08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/jlp.2022.01.08","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41811,"journal":{"name":"Rivista di Filosofia del Diritto-Journal of Legal Philosophy","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90225535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}