{"title":"THE HUMAN BEING AS AN END IN ITSELF","authors":"E. V. Bakeeva","doi":"10.19272/202000702005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.19272/202000702005","url":null,"abstract":"The article explores the problem of the foundation of human unity in the present situation in which the idea of the human being having an essence or inherent nature is essentially denied. In this situation, new heuristic possibilities of the Kantian position of human beings as “ends in themselves” are revealed. A non-metaphysical interpretation of this thesis makes it possible to reveal the basis of “the human” in its noumenal dimension.","PeriodicalId":41562,"journal":{"name":"Acta Philosophica","volume":"36 1","pages":"333-352"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84889476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Metascientific views: Challenge and opportunity for philosophy of biology in practice","authors":"E. Serrelli","doi":"10.19272/201700701005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.19272/201700701005","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I take evolutionary biology as an example to reflect on the role of philosophy and on the transformations that philosophy is constantly stimulated to do in its own approach when dealing with science. I consider that some intellectual movements within evolutionary biology (more specifically, the various calls for ‘synthesis’) express metascientific views, i.e., claims about ‘what it is to do research’ in evolutionary biology at different times. In the construction of metascientific views I see a fundamental role to be played by philosophy, and, at the same time, a need to complement the philosophical methods with many more methods coming from other sciences. What leads philosophy out of itself is its own attention to scientific practice. My humble methodological suggestions are, at this stage, only meant to help us imagine metascientific views that are built with a more scientific, interdisciplinary approach, in order to attenuate partiality, subjectivity and impressionism in describing the scientific community. And yet, we should not be naive and imbued with the myth of ‘data-driven’ research, especially in this field: other complex issues about metascientific views call for a serious, constant philosophical reflection on scientific practice.","PeriodicalId":41562,"journal":{"name":"Acta Philosophica","volume":"24 1","pages":"65-82"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88146626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Post-humanismo y crisis del humanismo","authors":"J. G. Cuadrado","doi":"10.19272/201700702003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.19272/201700702003","url":null,"abstract":"The advent of post-Humanism coincides with the crisis of Humanism (the human being is a privileged entity in the material world). How did this crisis come about? This paper presents the Christian origins of Humanism until its transformation into the Enlightened Humanism. The crisis of Humanism brought by Heidegger and consummated by Sloterdijk and post-Humanist supposes, actually, the ideal of Enlightened Humanism, strongly criticized, for example, by Gray. At this crossroads the alternatives are the death of Humanism (nihilism) or the overcoming of the Enlightened model in search of a new humanism.","PeriodicalId":41562,"journal":{"name":"Acta Philosophica","volume":"1 1","pages":"267-284"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79487839","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"La responsabilité pour ce qui est inévitable","authors":"C. Michon","doi":"10.4000/BOOKS.CDF.4959","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4000/BOOKS.CDF.4959","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that one can be responsible for a certain state of affairs, one has brought about, or one has let happen, only if one could have avoided it, by omitting or by performing a certain action. I limit my argument to the consequences of actions and omissions (vs actions and omissions themselves), and to the conditional ability of avoiding the consequences by an alternative behaviour (vs the absolute ability to behave otherwise). Even within those limits, the argument challenges the Causal Conception of Moral Responsibility and the strategy mounted by Frankfurt against the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. It is a step in favor of the idea that the ability to do otherwise (free will) is a necessary condition for moral responsibility.","PeriodicalId":41562,"journal":{"name":"Acta Philosophica","volume":"68 1","pages":"27-44"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84092710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bibliografia tematica : il nuovo realismo","authors":"V. Ascheri","doi":"10.1400/245539","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1400/245539","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41562,"journal":{"name":"Acta Philosophica","volume":"69 1","pages":"365-382"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90365406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Thomistic Truthmaker Principle","authors":"Timothy Pawl","doi":"10.1400/238911","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1400/238911","url":null,"abstract":"In this article I provide a Thomistic truthmaker principle. Although Aquinas himself never provides a truthmaker principle, he does say things that show he thought many truths require truthmakers, or, in other terms, that truths have an ontological grounding. That truths are somehow grounded or explained by reality is an important aspect of Thomistic thought. The principle I provide could be affirmed by someone with Thomistic tendencies: it is consistent with Aquinas’ thought and makes sense of some peculiar aspects of his writings. In what follows, I will argue that a Thomistic truthmaker principle should require all truths about being to have a truthmaker at any time that they are about (and I will explain what these two restrictions mean).","PeriodicalId":41562,"journal":{"name":"Acta Philosophica","volume":"148 1","pages":"45-64"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77907753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Soggettività, corpo e differenza sessuale nel dibattito filosofico di area femminista","authors":"M. Russo","doi":"10.1400/245533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1400/245533","url":null,"abstract":"Reflecting on subjectivity is one of the fundamental questions of modern thinking. In the second half of the twentieth century this reflection is mainly focused on two keys: the knowledge of sex and the knowledge of gender. What symbolic and ethical importance does the sexual body have? How to consider the sexual difference? Which role does the perception of gender play in the establishment of the identity? Finally, which type of relation does exist between sexuality and political power? These are questions which are faced for the first time by philosophy in a large and systematic way, thanks also to the reflection of thinkers, men and women, who are more or less close to the area of diversified feminism. Among the many voices of this debate there are of particular interest the ones who, on the basis of a phenomenology of the sexual body, intend to refuse the neutral conception of identity and emphasize the insuppressible character of the difference between man and woman. Nevertheless, affirming that sexual difference is something ontologically original and absolute does evoke further questions which require a more solid metaphysical and anthropological perspective.","PeriodicalId":41562,"journal":{"name":"Acta Philosophica","volume":"119 1","pages":"257-274"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87387848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Concept of Human Flourishing in Charles Taylor","authors":"M. Schlag","doi":"10.1400/229723","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1400/229723","url":null,"abstract":"This essay was written for people who are not yet familiar with A Secular Age and other publications by Charles Taylor, as well as for those who are already acquainted with his work. Here I attempt to summarize, introduce and reflect upon Taylor’s massive oeuvre, with particular attention to the specific and central topic of human flourishing. I have chosen this special theme because it is essential to comprehending Taylor’s definition of what a secular age is, and because it is also a vital component of the renewal of moral theology after the Second Vatican Council. Furthermore it is an important concept for Christian humanism and Christian secularity. This essay follows Charles Taylor on his intellectual journey, as he strives to guide both secular and Christian minds to a mutual comprehension of the other’s true intentions, as well as to uncover shared values and the common concern for the human predicament. The article concludes with a reflection on the ways in which Taylor’s arguments could be improved by theology. I consider this to be the unity and distinction of nature and grace, as well as virtue ethics examined from a first person perspective.","PeriodicalId":41562,"journal":{"name":"Acta Philosophica","volume":"12 1","pages":"111-134"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79194416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Virtue without pleasure?: Aristotle and the joy of a noble life","authors":"M. C. O. D. Landázuri","doi":"10.1400/215384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1400/215384","url":null,"abstract":"How it is possible for Aristotle to say that the virtuous man finds the greatest pleasures? In this article I try to show a reasonable link between virtue and pleasure, grounded on the notion of perfect activity (ἐνέργeια τeλeία), which in the case of human beings is an activity according to virtue. The virtuous person can contemplate his own noble life and find joy in his good actions, and pleasure appears in this contemplation, which is a perfect activity (ἐνέργeια τeλeία).","PeriodicalId":41562,"journal":{"name":"Acta Philosophica","volume":"1 1","pages":"89-100"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73415835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}