发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Journal of Scottish Philosophy最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Thomas Carlyle, Scotland's Migrant Philosophers, and Canadian Idealism, c. 1870–1914 托马斯·卡莱尔，苏格兰的移民哲学家和加拿大的理想主义，约1870-1914
IF 0.3
Journal of Scottish Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-03-04 DOI: 10.3366/JSP.2021.0289
Alexander Jordan
{"title":"Thomas Carlyle, Scotland's Migrant Philosophers, and Canadian Idealism, c. 1870–1914","authors":"Alexander Jordan","doi":"10.3366/JSP.2021.0289","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/JSP.2021.0289","url":null,"abstract":"That the great Scottish man of letters Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881) exercised a formative influence over late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century ‘British Idealism’ has long been recognized by hi...","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":"19 1","pages":"39-56"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47728364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Impartiality through ‘Moral Optics’: Why Adam Smith revised David Hume's Moral Sentimentalism 从“道德光学”看公正：亚当·斯密为何修正大卫·休谟的道德情操论
IF 0.3
Journal of Scottish Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-03-04 DOI: 10.3366/JSP.2021.0287
Christine Fricke, M. Carrasco
{"title":"Impartiality through ‘Moral Optics’: Why Adam Smith revised David Hume's Moral Sentimentalism","authors":"Christine Fricke, M. Carrasco","doi":"10.3366/JSP.2021.0287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/JSP.2021.0287","url":null,"abstract":"We read Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments as a critical response to David Hume's moral theory. While both share a commitment to moral sentimentalism, they propose different ways of meeting it...","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":"19 1","pages":"1-18"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48215449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Perception as a Multi-Stage Process: A Reidian Account 感知是一个多阶段的过程:一个里德的解释
IF 0.3
Journal of Scottish Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-03-04 DOI: 10.3366/JSP.2021.0290
M. Folescu
{"title":"Perception as a Multi-Stage Process: A Reidian Account","authors":"M. Folescu","doi":"10.3366/JSP.2021.0290","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/JSP.2021.0290","url":null,"abstract":"The starting point of this paper is Thomas Reid's anti-skepticism: our knowledge of the external world is justified. The justificatory process, in his view, starts with and relies upon one of the m...","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":"19 1","pages":"57-74"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41669662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Hume's General Point of View, Smith's Impartial Spectator, and the Moral Value of Interacting with Outsiders 休谟的一般观点、斯密的公正旁观者与与外界交往的道德价值
IF 0.3
Journal of Scottish Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-03-01 DOI: 10.3366/JSP.2021.0288
Jack McHugh
{"title":"Hume's General Point of View, Smith's Impartial Spectator, and the Moral Value of Interacting with Outsiders","authors":"Jack McHugh","doi":"10.3366/JSP.2021.0288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/JSP.2021.0288","url":null,"abstract":"Here is an appealing position: one reason to pursue interaction with people from backgrounds that differ from our own is that doing so can improve our moral judgment. As some scholars have noticed, this position seems pedigreed by support from the famed philosophers of human sociability, David Hume and Adam Smith. But regardless of whether Hume or Smith personally held anything like the appealing position, neither might have had theoretically grounded reason to do so. In fact, both philosophers explain moral judgment in ways that seem to present obstacles to the acceptance of the appealing position. This paper entertains the possibility that either of their moral theories contains resources to overcome these obstacles and implies the appealing position. I argue that Smith's theory does so more straightforwardly than Hume's does. This difference, I also argue, reveals something important about the Hume-Smith philosophical relationship. I close by sketching a way to fit the source of the appealing position in Smith's moral psychology with his focus on the desire for mutual sympathy.","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":"19 1","pages":"19-37"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46797788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Religion, Evolution and Scottish Philosophy 宗教、进化论和苏格兰哲学
IF 0.3
Journal of Scottish Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-03-01 DOI: 10.3366/JSP.2021.0291
G. Graham
{"title":"Religion, Evolution and Scottish Philosophy","authors":"G. Graham","doi":"10.3366/JSP.2021.0291","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/JSP.2021.0291","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores developments in the defence of theism within Scottish philosophy following Hume's Dialogues and the advent of Darwinian evolutionary biology. By examining the writings of two nineteenth-century Scottish philosophers, it aims to show that far from Darwinian biology completing Hume's destruction of natural theology, it prompted a new direction for the defence of philosophical theism. Henry Calderwood and Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison occupied, respectively, the Chairs of Moral Philosophy and Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Edinburgh in the late nineteenth century. Their books reveal that the challenge of articulating new grounds for philosophical theism was not motivated by a conservative desire to see off a new intellectual threat, but by a desire for a proper understanding of evolutionary biology.","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":"19 1","pages":"75-89"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42359103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Otto Pipatti, Morality Made Visible: Edward Westermarck's Moral and Social Theory 《看得见的道德:爱德华·韦斯特马克的道德与社会理论》，奥托·皮帕蒂著
IF 0.3
Journal of Scottish Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-03-01 DOI: 10.3366/JSP.2021.0292
A. Garrett
{"title":"Otto Pipatti, Morality Made Visible: Edward Westermarck's Moral and Social Theory","authors":"A. Garrett","doi":"10.3366/JSP.2021.0292","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/JSP.2021.0292","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":"19 1","pages":"91-94"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42048958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Constantine Sandis, Character and Causation: Hume's Philosophy of Action 康斯坦丁·桑蒂斯:《性格与因果:休谟的行为哲学》
IF 0.3
Journal of Scottish Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-09-08 DOI: 10.3366/jsp.2020.0283
Enrico Galvagni
{"title":"Constantine Sandis, Character and Causation: Hume's Philosophy of Action","authors":"Enrico Galvagni","doi":"10.3366/jsp.2020.0283","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2020.0283","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":"18 1","pages":"333-338"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43236666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Education, Commerce, and Public Spirit: Craig Smith's Study of Adam Ferguson 教育、商业与公共精神——克雷格·史密斯对亚当·弗格森的研究
IF 0.3
Journal of Scottish Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-09-01 DOI: 10.3366/jsp.2020.0280
E. Heath
{"title":"Education, Commerce, and Public Spirit: Craig Smith's Study of Adam Ferguson","authors":"E. Heath","doi":"10.3366/jsp.2020.0280","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2020.0280","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":"18 1","pages":"313-320"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45356787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Introduction 介绍
IF 0.3
Journal of Scottish Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-09-01 DOI: 10.3366/jsp.2020.0279
G. Graham
{"title":"Introduction","authors":"G. Graham","doi":"10.3366/jsp.2020.0279","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2020.0279","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42492885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Role of Instinct in David Hume's Conception of Human Reason 本能在大卫·休谟人类理性观中的作用
IF 0.3
Journal of Scottish Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-09-01 DOI: 10.3366/jsp.2020.0277
James Hill
{"title":"The Role of Instinct in David Hume's Conception of Human Reason","authors":"James Hill","doi":"10.3366/jsp.2020.0277","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2020.0277","url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates the role of instinct in Hume's understanding of human reason. It is shown that while in the Treatise Hume makes the strong reductive assertion that reason is ‘nothing but’ an instinct, in the First Enquiry the corresponding statement has been modified in several ways, rendering the relation between instinct and reason more complex. Most importantly, Hume now explicitly recognises that alongside instinctive experimental reasoning, there is a uniquely human intellectual power of intuitive and demonstrative reason that is not itself an instinct. At first sight it may look as if this intellectual reason, that is capable of grasping ‘relations of ideas’, is not even grounded in instinct but is a thoroughly non-natural element in human nature. On closer analysis, however, it is shown that intellectual reason, in its apprehension of ‘abstract’ and general relations, is dependent on language – the use of ‘terms’ – and that language itself is grounded in instinctive associations of ideas. Thus, Hume's overall view is that even the intellect is an outgrowth of instinct and his conception of human nature is, therefore, shown to be fully naturalistic. Yet this naturalism can still make room for the ‘exceptionalism’ of human mathematical thought, which has no counterpart in the animal kingdom where language is lacking.","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":"18 1","pages":"273-288"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42137869","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信